 |
 |
 |
 |
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, the managers, working with our leadership, of course, have a designated number of amendments. My understanding at this time is that the Senator from Pennsylvania will be recognized for the purpose of proposing an amendment.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
amendment no. 5087
(Purpose: To strike the provision regarding habeas review)
Mr. Specter: Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 5064.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator is advised we have No. 5087 at the desk?
Mr. Specter: The amendment which I seek to call up, Mr. President, is one which proposes to strike section 7 of the Military Commission Act entirely.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a moment, I ask the Chair to recite the unanimous consent agreement with regard to the amendment of Senator Specter, the time limitation being?
The Presiding Officer: The amendment has 2 hours equally divided on it.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], for himself and Mr. Leahy, Mr. Dodd, and Mr. Feingold, proposes an amendment numbered 5087:
On page 93 strike line 9 and all that follows through page 94, line 13.
Mr. Leahy: Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a couple of clarifications?
Mr. Specter: I do yield.
Mr. Leahy: Mr. President, in stating the time, isn't there also the remainder of the time? I did not use my full 45 minutes this afternoon. Doesn't the Senator from Vermont have some remaining time on this amendment?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Vermont has remaining time on the bill.
Mr. Leahy: How much time is that?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Vermont has 23 minutes on the bill.
Mr. Leahy: Mr. President, am I correct that the amendment is offered on behalf of the distinguished senior Senator from Pennsylvania and myself, the distinguished senior Senator from Connecticut, and the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Feingold?
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Leahy: I ask and also the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: If the Senator from Pennsylvania will yield just for a question?
Mr. Specter: I do.
Mr. Reid: I have had conversations--I have not spoken with the Senator from Pennsylvania, but I have spoken with his staff on a number of occasions. I had the understanding that the Senator would be able to give Senator Leahy a few minutes off of his time to speak on this amendment?
Mr. Specter: I will consider that, depending on how the argument goes. I appreciate very much the contribution of the distinguished ranking member. I do not know how many people on this side are going to seek time, but I do believe we can accommodate the request of Senator Leahy. But I want to see how the argument goes before making a commitment.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. Specter: Mr. President, substantively, my amendment would retain the constitutional right of habeas corpus for people detained at Guantanamo. The bill before the Senate strips the Federal district court of jurisdiction to hear these cases. The right of habeas corpus was established in the Magna Carta in 1215 when, in England, there was action taken against King John to establish a procedure to prevent illegal detention.
What the bill seeks to do is to set back basic rights by some 900 years. This amendment would strike that provision and make certain that the constitutional right and the statutory right--but fundamentally the constitutional right of habeas corpus--is maintained. The core provision is contained in article I, section 9, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which states:
The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
We do not have either rebellion or invasion, so it is a little hard for me to see, as a basic principle of constitutional law, how the Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus in the face of that flat language. When you have an issue of constitutionality, how can constitutionality be determined and interpreted except in the Court?
We had a very extended discussion of this in the confirmation of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the Chief Justice said that the Congress of the United States lacked the authority to remove the jurisdiction of the Federal courts on issues involving the first amendment.
The same thing would apply generally. It is a constitutional question. But here you have it buttressed in addition by an express provision by the Framers, focusing on the writ of habeas corpus in and of itself, and saying you can't suspend it, so that anyone who can make an argument about stripping jurisdiction--I don't think it lies on a constitutional issue generally because if it does, who is going to interpret the Constitution if the Court does not have jurisdiction? But the writ of habeas corpus is so important and so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in our tradition, going back to 1215 against King John, that the Framers made it expressed and explicit.
It appears to me that this is really dispositive and you don't really need several hours to develop it. But I shall proceed on the matter as to how we got where we are and what the Supreme Court has had to say in four major cases in the course of the last 18 months.
The Congress of the United States has the express responsibility under article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to establish rules governing people captured on land and sea. But the Congress of the United States did not act after 9/11, and we had people detained at Guantanamo. Legislation was introduced by many Senators. Senator Durbin and I introduced a bill. Senator Leahy introduced a bill. Many Senators introduced legislation, but the Congress did not act on it. Congress did not act on it because it was too hot to handle. What resulted is what results many times--Congress punted. It didn't act, left it to the Supreme Court of the United States. That took a long time, to have these cases come through the judicial process.
Finally, in June of 2005 the Supreme Court ruled in three major cases: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, and Rumsfeld v. Padilla. The Supreme Court of the United States rejected the argument of the Government that the President had inherent power under article 2 and could act on that constitutional authority, and the Supreme Court said that habeas corpus was effective.
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court said that it applied even to aliens. It didn't have to be a citizen; that the Constitution draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in custody and said the writ of habeas corpus applied.
In the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor had this to say: All agree that absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States.
That was held to apply to Guantanamo, since the United States controlled Guantanamo.
Justice O'Connor went on to say that under the U.S. Constitution, article I, section 9, clause 2:
The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
Justice O'Connor then goes on to delineate statute 2241, which sets the outline of the procedures, and then says habeas petitioners would have the same opportunity to present and rebut facts that court cases like this retain some ability to vary the ways in which they do so as mandated by due process.
What has happened in Guantanamo with respect to the proceedings under the Combat Status Review Tribunal, referred to as CSRT, demonstrates the importance of having some impartial judicial review to find what, in fact, has happened. These tribunals operate with very little information. Somebody is picked up on the battlefield. There is no record preserved as to what that individual did. If there was a weapon involved, it has been placed with many other weapons, and it can't be identified. The proceedings simply do not comport with basic fairness because the individuals do not have the right to know what evidence there is against them.
Repeatedly, the Combat Status Review Tribunal said the information is classified and the individual can't have it.
There was specific reference to the proceedings in the CSRT in the case action en re: Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 Fed. Sup. Section 443, 2005. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia criticized the way CSRTs required detainees to answer allegations based on information that cannot be disclosed to the detainees. The Court described what might be referred to as a comical scene, where the detainee said he couldn't answer the allegations whether the detainee associated with a known al-Qaida operative because the tribunal could not provide the alleged operative's name.
The detainee said: Give me his name.
The tribunal said: I do not know.
The detainee said: How can I answer this?
The detainee's frustration reportedly led to laughter among all of the tribunal's participants. And the District Court then said:
The laughter reflected in the transcript is understandable, and this exchange might have been humorous had the consequences of the detainee's enemy combatant status not been so terribly serious and had the detainee's criticism of the process not been so piercingly accurate.
How can you sanction that kind of a proceeding? If it is not a sham, it certainly is insufficient. As I reflect on it, it is more than insufficient. It is, in fact, a sham.
When it was apparent that both the committee bill and the administration's position was going to strike habeas corpus, the Judiciary Committee held on short notice a hearing on Monday. We had a distinguished array of witnesses appear. LCDR Charles Swift was present. The attorney who represented Hamdan before the Supreme Court gave very compelling evidence as to why habeas corpus was indispensable in order to have basic justice. Bruce Fein, ranking member of the Reagan administration in the Justice Department, was emphatic on his conclusion about the need to retain habeas corpus. The very distinguished retired U.S. Navy rear admiral, John Hutson, who is now the dean of the Franklin Pierce Law Center, testified about his experience and the importance of retaining habeas corpus. We called, as a matter of balance, other witnesses: David Rivkin and Bradford A. Berenson.
I commend to my colleagues the testimony of Thomas B. Sullivan, LCDR Charles D. Swift, Bruce Fein, David B. Rivkin, Jr., Bradford A. Berenson, and John D. Hutson.
Mr. President, the testimony that was given by Thomas B. Sullivan was especially poignant. Mr. Sullivan is a man in his late seventies. He was U.S. Attorney for 4 years in the late 1970s. He has a distinguished law practice with Jenner & Block. He has been to Guantanamo on many occasions and has represented many people who are detained in Guantanamo.
His testimony was, as I say, especially poignant when he said that long after all of those in the hearing room are dead, there would be an apology made if habeas corpus is denied, just as the apology was made after the detention of the Japanese in World War II being a denial of basic and fundamental fairness, where we in the United States pride ourselves on the rule of law.
He made reference to a number of individual cases where the proceedings before the Combat Status Review Tribunal were just totally insufficient, reflecting hearings where individuals were called in, they did not speak the language, they did not have an attorney, they did not have access to the information which was presented against them, and they were detained.
Mr. President, documentation presented to the committee speaks eloquently and emphatically about the procedures which lack the most fundamental of due process. These individuals did not know what their charges were; they were so vague and illusory, just like the detainee who was alleged to have an al-Qaida associate. They wouldn't even produce the man's name. How do you know what the charge is? Then they don't have attorneys. Then they don't know what the evidence is. It is classified, and they are not told what the evidence is.
This goes back, again, to Justice O'Connor's opinion where she says:
Habeas petitioners would have some opportunity to present and rebut facts.
Well, how can you rebut facts when you do not know what the facts are? How can you rebut facts when the material is classified and you are not told what the alleged facts are? That is why it is so important that the courts be open.
I have had considerable experience with habeas corpus when I was a prosecuting attorney. When a habeas corpus petition is presented, it requires the government--the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania when I was DA--to take a close look at the case and to focus on it.
One of the matters that was inserted into the Record from Mr. Sullivan, after he filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and was proceeding to gather evidence to present it, he says:
Several months ago without notice to me and without explanation, compensation, or apology, the United States Government returned Mr. Abdul-Hadi al Siba to Saudi Arabia.
So when the Government had to defend, apparently they found out what the case was about. When they had to find out what the case was about, they sent the detainee back to Saudi Arabia.
But here we have a very explicit statement by Justice O'Connor about the right to rebut the facts. It simply is not present in the proceedings which happened before the Combat Status Review Tribunal.
Kenneth Starr, formerly Solicitor General, formerly judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, could not be present at our hearing on Monday but submitted this letter dated September 24. I will not read it in its entirety but only the first sentence where he says:
I write to express my concerns about the limitation on writ of habeas corpus contained in the comprehensive military commissions bill.
Then, in the third paragraph, he cites article I, section 9, clause 2, which I have referred to, about the privilege being suspended only in the case of invasion or rebellion, and again notes the obvious--that we do not face either an invasion or rebellion.
Mr. President, how much time of my hour remains?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has consumed 21 minutes.
Mr. Specter: Mr. President, that states the essence of the proposition.
I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, if I could just use such time as I want, I will not take much because I am anxious for my colleagues to address this issue.
The distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania made the statement that they have constitutional rights. I wish to respectfully sort of differ with the Senator. The Supreme Court, in the Rasul case, ruled that rights of aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 28 U.S.C, 2241--the Court did not reach the question of the constitutional right of habeas corpus that applies to a U.S. citizen; of course, they being aliens. In the Rasul case, the Court interpreted the habeas corpus statute, section 2241, to apply to an alien held at Guantanamo Bay. That holding is based in large part due to the unique long-term lease that the Court took judicial notice of and other evidence brought before the Court, the long-term lease tantamount to U.S. territory.
For more than 50 years, the Court held that aliens in military detention outside the United States had no right to petition the Federal courts for review of their military detention. So I question whether you can elevate that to a constitutional status.
Mr. Specter: If I may respond, Mr. President, I didn't cite Rasul v. Bush for a constitutional proposition. I cited Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and I cited the opinion of Justice O'Connor. But let me repeat it because it is the core consideration. She said:
All agree that absent suspicion the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States. Of course, that does include Guantanamo.
Then Justice O'Connor goes on to say:
United States Constitution, article I, section 9, clause 2, privilege of writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety requires it.
Then she says that all agree that suspension of the writ has not occurred here. Then she deals with the statute, 2241, and makes the comment that it sets the procedures, but Justice O'Connor puts detention in the Hamdi case squarely on constitutional grounds.
Mr. Warner: There are a variety of divided opinions on that point.
At this time, I will regain the floor and discuss this issue. I am anxious to hear from my two colleagues, one from South Carolina and one from Texas, who seek recognition.
Mr. Specter: If I might be recognized.
Mr. Warner: I yield the floor on my time.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Specter: Mr. President, what the distinguished chairman says is accurate about Rasul, but you have Hamdi, which puts it on constitutional grounds. It is that simple.
I yield the floor.
Mr. Warner: I yield such time as the distinguished Senator from South Carolina desires.
Mr. Graham: Mr. President, this debate is a strength, not a weakness, in our country.
In my opinion, the fundamental question for the Senate to answer when it comes to determining enemy combatant status is, Who should make that determination? Should that be a military decision or should it be a judicial decision?
I am firmly in the camp that when it comes to determining who an enemy of the United States is, one who has taken up arms and who presents a threat to our Nation, that is not something judges are trained to do, nor should they be doing. That is something our military should do.
For as long as I have been a military lawyer, Geneva Conventions article 4, where it talks about a competent tribunal to decide whether a person is a civilian--lawful, unlawful, combatant--that competent tribunal has been seen in terms of military people making those decisions.
I have a tremendous respect for our courts. We will follow whatever they tell Congress to do because we are a rule-of-law nation, but this Congress has a role to play.
Unlike my chairman, Senator Specter, I believe the question before the Congress is not whether an enemy combatant noncitizen alien has a constitutional right to habeas corpus because I don't believe that is what the court has said. The issue for the Congress is whether habeas corpus rights should be given to an enemy combatant noncitizen under section 2241 and whether the military should make the determination of who an enemy combatant is versus judiciary.
What happens now is that when someone is brought to Guantanamo Bay, very shortly after they arrive, the military will create a combat status review tribunal that is supposed to be compliant with article 4 of the Geneva Conventions, a competent tribunal.
When we look at the history of competent tribunals, normally they are one person. We will have three people. Of the three people will be a military intelligence officer--and it could be other officers within our military who have expertise in determining what the battlefield situation is and who is involved with the enemy forces and who is not. That tribunal has an evidentiary standard to meet. The tribunal must make a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the person before them indeed fits within the definition "enemy combatant." There is a rebuttal of presumption in favor of the Government's evidence.
Our Federal courts will have the opportunity shortly to determine whether the combat status review tribunal is constitutional due process. The reason I say that is because under the Detainee Treatment Act we passed last year, every detainee at Guantanamo Bay will have their day in Federal court.
After the military renders their decision that they are an enemy combatant, as a matter of right each person can go to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Federal DC Circuit Court of Appeals will look at that case with two issues before them: Does this CSRT process, the annual review board, does it constitutionally pass muster as being adequate due process not only under the Geneva Conventions but under our Constitution to the extent it applies? Second, was the decision rendered by that board finding the person enemy combatant by the preponderance of the evidence--the standards and procedures involved, do they pass muster? And in the individual case, did they get it right? That is the structure for them to decide the issue set up in a constitutionally sound manner.
The reason I oppose my chairman, for whom I have great respect, is because the habeas process is a doctrine that is normally associated with criminal law, and we are in a war. The Japanese and German prisoners we interred in World War II never had access to our Federal courts to bring lawsuits against the people who confined them--our own troops--for a reason: it was a right not given in international law to an enemy prisoner, and it was not a right we gave to any prisoner we have held in the history of our country consciously as Congress.
The problem in this case is the Government argued that Guantanamo Bay was outside the jurisdiction of the United States. Why is it important? It is clear that our habeas statutes do not apply overseas. The Government lost that argument. Chairman Specter is absolutely right. The court said that for legal purposes, Guantanamo Bay falls within the confines of the United States. Section 2241, the habeas statute, unless Congress says otherwise, will apply to this environment.
Now it is time for Congress to decide, in its wisdom, whether the Federal courts should be determining who an enemy combatant is through a habeas action. Do we want that to reside in the military, where it has been for our whole history, and allow Federal courts to review the military decision, not substitute their judgment for the military?
It is not about who loves America and who is un-American. Mr. Sullivan came to my office yesterday. He is a lawyer representing detainees at Guantanamo Bay. He is a great American. He gave me four or five stories about how his client appeared before the Combat Status Review Tribunal, and he had nothing but bad things to say about the way his client was treated and the procedures in place.
Once a week, I get a call from somebody from South Carolina who says their family member was screwed in court. And then what I try to do is to make sure we listen to them respectfully but understand that there are a lot of complaints about any system.
Mr. Sullivan's complaints got me thinking, and I think there is a way to provide some remedies that do not exist now without substituting judges for military officers when it comes to wartime decisions. I will privately talk to him about that.
I urge this Senate to think in broad terms. Do we really want to allow the Federal judiciary to have trials over every decision about who an enemy combatant is or is not, taking that away from the military? Do we really want the people who have been housed by our military to bring every known lawsuit to man against the people fighting the war and protecting us?
I compliment Senator Specter because in this new version they take the conditions of confinement lawsuits off the table. There are 400- something cases that have been filed arising from Guantanamo Bay detention. There is a $300 million lawsuit against Secretary Rumsfeld. There are allegations that people do not get enough exercise. It goes on and on and on. Never in the history of warfare has the host country allowed an enemy prisoner to bring a court case against those people who are fighting the enemy on behalf of the host country. That needs to stop.
I am urging this Senate to dismiss under 2241 the right of habeas actions by enemy prisoners so that judges will not take the role of the military. Adopt anew what we did last year, allowing the military to use a process that I believe is Geneva Conventions compliant, and then some, and have as a backstop judicial review, where the DC Circuit Court of Appeals can review the military's decision. That way, we will have due process unknown to any other war. That will keep the roles of the responsible parties intact. The role of the military in a time of war, I earnestly believe, is to control the battlefield and to designate who is in bounds and out of bounds when it comes to the battlefield. The role of the courts in a time of war is to pass muster and judgment over the processes we create--not substituting their judgment for the military but passing judgment over the infrastructure the military uses to make these decisions.
The problem with this war--there is no capital to conquer, no navy to sink, no army to defeat. The people we are fighting owe an allegiance to an idea, not to a piece of property. They have no home to defend. They have an idea they would like to sell, and they are selling that idea, whether you want to buy it or not. They are selling it in a very brutal way. They are trying to get good and decent people accepting their view of the world because they are terrified of the way the enemy behaves. This is a war unlike other wars in this regard. People do not wear uniforms, but the ideas the terrorists represent are not unknown to mankind. Hitler wore a uniform. He had the same view of mankind as these people do: there are some people not worth living because they are different.
We have to adjust, but we do not need to change who we are. I am not asking this Senate to change who America is because we are fighting barbarians. Quite honestly, we will never win this war if we move in their direction. Our goal is to get the world to move in our direction by practicing what we preach.
I believe the way to balance the interests of our need to protect ourselves and to adhere to the rule of law is to apply the law of armed conflict, not criminal law.
The act of 9/11, in my opinion, was an act of war, not a crime. And the problem with this country is the people we are fighting were at war with us a long time before we knew we were at war with them. Now we are at war.
This administration, on occasion, in my opinion, has tried to cut the corners of the law of armed conflict. I embrace the law of conflict. I want to fully apply the actions of the United States. I embrace the Geneva Conventions. I want to apply it fully to the war we are fighting even though our enemy will not. But I am insistent, with my vote and with my time in this Senate, that we fight the war and not criminalize the war.
No enemy prisoner should have access to Federal courts--a noncitizen, enemy combatant terrorist--to bring a lawsuit against those fighting on our behalf. No judge should have the ability to make a decision that has been historically reserved to the military. That does not make us safer.
There is due process in place for the enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq that I believe is Geneva Conventions compliant. There is judicial review consistent with the military being the lead agency. I urge this Senate to adopt that and to reject this amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. Specter: Will the Senator from South Carolina respond to a question?
Mr. Graham: I will try.
Mr. Specter: I direct an inquiry to my colleague from South Carolina. Would the Senator respond to the question?
Mr. Graham: Yes. I will try my best.
Mr. Specter: I didn't want you to yield for a question because I didn't want to interrupt your presentation.
I begin by complimenting the Senator from South Carolina for his excellent work. He and Senator Warner and Senator McCain have done exemplary work in maintaining the Geneva Conventions and appropriate rules and to classify evidence.
When you talk about constitutional issues and you talk about section 2241, I agree with the Senator, but how do you deal with the flat terms of the Constitution, "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion public safety may require it"? How do you deal with that if you do not have rebellion?
Mr. Graham: Mr. Chairman, I guess one could make that argument. I have been assuming something from the beginning--that the Court's decision in Rasul and Hamdi is a statement by the Court that because Guantanamo Bay falls within the jurisdiction of the United States, it is section 2241 that we are dealing with. It is a statutory right of habeas that has been granted to enemy combatants. And if there is a constitutional right of habeas corpus given to enemy combatants, that is a totally different endeavor, and it would change in many ways what I have said.
I do not know what the Court will decide, but if the Court does say in the next round of legal appeals there is a constitutional right to habeas corpus by those detained at Guantanamo Bay, then the Senator is absolutely right. We would have to make a different legal determination. We would have to make a different legal analysis. And if the Court does that, I will sit down with the Senator and we will figure out how to work through that.
I am just being as honest with the Senator as I know how to be. I think this is a statutory problem, not a constitutional problem.
Mr. Specter: Well, Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee says he does not want to come back and legislate again. If this bill is passed, we will be right back here at a later date.
When the Senator from South Carolina says it is not on constitutional grounds, the plain English of the decision says it is. But let me ask the Senator one further question; that is, you fought hard to have classified evidence available in the trials, albeit a war crimes trial. And you have Justice O'Connor saying they have to have the opportunity to rebut facts. When these proceedings are handled so much on classified information the detainees cannot see, would it not be consistent with your approach on classified information generally to at least have them know something about the charge so they can rebut the facts?
Mr. Graham: If I may, I would invite the chairman--I cannot remember what paragraph the language is in, but Justice O'Connor gave some guidance to the military--I think it is Army Regulation 190-dash- something--that she indicated would be a proper mechanism or at least a guide of how to set up due process rights for this administrative determination. So after that decision, I know the military looked at the Army regulation that she cited and built the CSRT process off that concept. I am of the opinion that the Combat Status Review Tribunal does afford the rights Justice O'Connor indicated and is more than the Army regulation would allow that she cited, and it is fully compliant with article 5 of the Geneva Conventions--competent tribunal--but if you look in that decision, she mentions an Army regulation as a guide as to how to do this. I think the military, the Department of Defense, has gone beyond that.
Mr. Specter: Well, Mr. President, there is flexibility, I agree, but the determination as to whether that flexibility is adequate is up to the Court. That is what the Supreme Court has said.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. Warner: I thank the Chair.
I would say to my colleague, there is an interesting thing we best watch here as we are trying to determine the rights of these people because it seems to me if there is such a fundamental right of constitutionality attached to this thing, then someone might argue: Well, if it is actionable in Guantanamo--this lease thing is to me a fairly weak basis on which to do it--what about 18,000 in our custody in Iraq now? So we just better exercise a little caution as we begin to use that because if we begin to extend habeas corpus to 18,000 in Iraq, we have a problem.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. Specter: Mr. President, I stipulate that Senator Warner is right about Iraq on this point.
Continue to Congressional Records Page S10267
