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Congressional Record: September 28, 2006 (Senate) - Pages S10395 - S10407
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access - DOCID:ccr28se06-165 Part 5

MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006


The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. Kennedy: Mr. President, just quickly, the proceedings we are going to have--if I can inquire--I use the 3 minutes, and then we are moving toward a series of votes; is that right?

Mr. Warner: That is correct, I say to the Senator.

Mr. Kennedy: Then, I would ask when I have 30 seconds left--Mr. President, I have 3\1/2\ minutes; am I correct?

The Presiding Officer: Three minutes.

Mr. Kennedy: Three minutes.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I may have misunderstood my colleague. That is the 3 minutes remaining on your amendment held in abeyance.

Mr. Kennedy: That is correct.

Mr. President, I yield myself the 3 minutes.

Amendment No. 5088

Mr. President, just for the benefit of the membership, in my hand is the Army manual. In the Army manual are the prohibitions for instructions to all the interrogators of the United States, that they cannot use these kinds of harsh tactics which have been recognized by Members as torture.

This amendment says if any country is going to use those similar tactics against those who would be representing the United States in the war on terror--for example, the Central Intelligence Agency; for example, the SEALs; for example, contractors working for the intelligence agency--then they will have committed a war crime.

I reviewed earlier in the debate where we have prosecuted Japanese and other war crimes, giving them 10 or 15 years, and even execution when they went ahead with this. That is why this is so important.

Now, my good friend, the chairman of the committee, says we cannot do it because it violates the Constitution because it is instructing-- instructing--the President of the United States through the State Department to notify the 194 countries.

Well, we thought it was not unconstitutional on the Port Security Act, when we said:

When the Secretary . . . , after conducting an assessment . . . , decides that an airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, the Secretary . . . shall notify the appropriate authorities of the government of the foreign country. . . .

Here is port security.

Here is on the pollution issues:

The Secretary of State shall notify without delay foreign states concerned. . . .

Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.

Hon. Pat Roberts,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I write today regarding the Rockefeller amendment to the military commissions legislation now pending on the Senate floor. The CIA strongly opposes adoption of the Rockefeller amendment.

Since the inception of its detention program, the CIA has a strong and consistent record of keeping its oversight committees fully and currently informed of critical aspects of the program. Further, the bipartisan leadership of Congress has been briefed regularly by the CIA on this program since its inception, and I personally briefed the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate only weeks ago. The CIA remains committed to a frank and open dialogue with the Congress on detailed aspects of the detainee program, while ensuring the secrecy of this particularly sensitive activity. Senate adoption of the Rockefeller amendment would go far beyond traditional CIA reports to Congress by mandating detailed information about assets, methods, locations and individuals involved in sensitive operations. In addition, detailing in public law the amount of sensitive information that CIA must provide to Congress will chill some of our counterterrorism partners whose cooperation is fully conditioned on the absolute secrecy of their support.

Since becoming Director of the CIA, I have made every effort to keep your committee apprised of the status of the detainee program. In July, I updated you and SSCI Vice Chairman Rockefeller on the program, sharing sensitive aspects, including information about specific detainees, examples of actionable intelligence gained from the program and about ways in which the program could continue to be successful in the future. Following this briefing and despite its highly sensitive nature, at your request--and that of Sen. Rockefeller--I fully supported briefing the entire SSCI membership.

On September 6, 2006, I briefed the full SSCI membership on key aspects of the detainee program, providing a level of detail previously not made available to SSCI members. I made clear to the committee that upon passage of new detainee legislation, I would brief the SSCI on how CIA would execute the future program and I agreed to promptly notify the committee when any modifications to the program were proposed or when the status of any individual detainee changed.

Upon Senate passage of the military commissions legislation, I stand ready to again brief your committee and the bipartisan Senate leadership on the future of the detainee program.

Sincerely,
Michael V. Hayden,
General, USAF Director.

That is the second one.

And I have the third illustration in terms of foreign carriers.

In 15 minutes we got these cases. And here we are going to say we are going to refuse to protect Americans who are on the cutting edge of the war on terror because we will not let our State Department go on an e- mail and notify the 192 countries because that is unconstitutional? If the chairman of the Armed Services Committee feels that way, we could strike that provision and just say it is the policy of the United States. Then we would not be instructing anyone. Either way, this is about protecting Americans. It is about protecting Americans.

I believe those Americans who are out there in the hills and in the mountains of Afghanistan today and tonight, those people who are in the hills and mountains and deserts of Iraq, those people who are out in Southeast Asia or all over the world in order to try to deal with the problems of terrorism ought to know, if they are in danger of getting captured, if any of their host countries are going to perform this kind of procedure and torture on them, they will be war criminals.

That is what this amendment is about. I hope it will be accepted. It should be.

Mr. President, I yield what time I have to my ranking member.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, at this time we are waiting for clearance by the leadership of the UC. But I will ask at this time we get the yeas and nays on all the votes, the amendments and final passage.

Mr. Rockefeller: Mr. President, without objecting, does any unanimous consent request allow me to close on my amendment for 2 minutes?

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, the UC, as presently drafted, gives 2 minutes to each side for the purpose of addressing amendments.

Mr. Rockefeller: I thank the Senator.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I once again restate the request for the yeas and nays on the amendments and final passage. I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to ask for the yeas and nays on the amendments and final passage.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendments and final passage.

The Presiding Officer: Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any remaining time be yielded back, other than as noted below, and that the Senate proceed to votes in relation to the amendments in the following order:

The Rockefeller amendment No. 5095, the Byrd amendment No. 5104, and the Kennedy amendment No. 5088.

I further ask unanimous consent that there be 4 minutes for debate, equally divided, prior to each of the above votes.

I further ask unanimous consent that prior to passage of the bill, Senator Leahy be recognized for his remaining 12 minutes and, as set forth in the initial unanimous consent request, which was provided for under the original consent order, Senator Levin be in control of 4 minutes, Senator Warner in control of 16 minutes, to be followed by closing remarks by the two leaders and, following that time, the Senate proceed to passage of the bill; further, that there then be 5 minutes equally divided prior to the vote on invoking cloture on the border fence legislation; provided further that with respect to the border fence bill, it be in order to file second degrees at the desk no later than 5 p.m. today under the provisions of rule XXII.

The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?

Mr. Leahy: Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I did not understand the part about the fence.

Mr. Warner: Can the Senator repeat that?

Mr. Leahy: I did not understand the part about the timing of the fence bill.

Mr. Warner: I will repeat it.

Mr. Leahy: Just that part.

Mr. Warner: It reads as follows: Following that time, the Senate proceed to passage of the bill; further, there then be 5 minutes equally divided prior to the vote on invoking cloture on the border fence legislation; provided further that with respect to the border fence bill, it be in order to file second degrees at the desk no later than 5 p.m. today under the provisions of rule XXII.

Mr. Leahy: Mr. President, even though I believe we have made a terrible and tragic mistake in the Senate, including major changes in our constitutional rights willy-nilly to get out to campaign, I realize they have locked this in and there is not much one can do about it. I think it is a farce in the Senate.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I renew the unanimous consent request.

The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 5095

There will now be 4 minutes of debate, equally divided, on the Rockefeller amendment.

The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. Rockefeller: Mr. President, my amendment would require, as I explained this morning, the CIA to provide the Congressional Intelligence Committees, which are required by law to be informed of what is going on in the intelligence world, fully the most basic and fundamental information it needs to oversee the CIA detention and interrogation program.

Frankly, for the past 4 years we have not had that information. The administration has withheld this information from us. I am not saying that in partisan fashion. It is a fact.

It has been very frustrating as a member of the Intelligence Committee, much less as a Member of the Senate. We have made repeated requests and the Intelligence Committee has been prevented from carefully reviewing the program. The program has operated, as a result, without any meaningful congressional oversight whatsoever, and that is our responsibility under the law.

All of my colleagues should be troubled by this fact. We cannot assure ourselves, we cannot assure the American people, and we cannot assure our agents overseas that the CIA program is both legally sound and effective, without the basic information required under my amendment.

My amendment is simply about oversight and accountability, nothing more, nothing less. Nothing in the amendment would require the public disclosure of any classified document or aspect of the CIA program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Feinstein be added as a cosponsor of my amendment.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I spoke in strong opposition to this amendment. Again, I think it tries to displace the oversight that is performed by the Intelligence Committee. I would like to add the following bit of information.

On September 28 of this year, GEN Michael V. Hayden, who is the current Director of the CIA, wrote a letter to Chairman Pat Roberts of the Intelligence Committee in the Senate. In it he said:

On September 6, 2006, I briefed the full SSCI membership on key aspects of the detainee program, providing a level of detail previously not made available to SSCI members. I made clear to the committee that upon passage of the new detainee legislation, I would brief the SSCI on how CIA would execute the future program, and I agreed to promptly notify the committee when any modifications to the program were proposed, or when the status of any individual detainee changed.

I think that is dispositive of a very clear indication by the executive branch to allow the Senate to perform its oversight through the properly designated committee, the Senate Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Rockefeller: Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, are we prepared to move to a vote?

The Presiding Officer: Yes. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. McConnell: The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator from Maine (Ms. Snowe).

The Presiding Officer: Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 46, nays 53, as follows:

Roll No. 256 Leg.
YEAS--46
AkakaBaucusBayhBidenBingaman
BoxerByrdCantwellCarperChafee
ClintonConradDaytonDoddDorgan
DurbinFeingoldFeinsteinHarkinInouye
JeffordsJohnsonKennedyKerryKohl
LandrieuLautenbergLeahyLevinLieberman
LincolnMenendezMikulskiMurrayNelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)ObamaPryorReedReid
RockefellerSalazarSarbanesSchumerStabenow
Wyden    
Nays--53
AlexanderAllardAllenBennettBond
BrownbackBunningBurnsBurrChambliss
CoburnCochranColemanCollinsCornyn
CraigCrapoDeMintDeWineDole
DomeniciEnsignEnziFristGraham
GrassleyGreggHagelHatchHutchison
InhofeIsaksonKylLottLugar
MartinezMcCainMcConnellMurkowskiRoberts
SantorumSessionsShelbySmithSpecter
StevensSununuTalentThomasThune
VitterVoinovichWarner  
NOT VOTING--1
Snowe    

The amendment (No. 5095) was rejected.

Mr. McConnell: Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 5104

The Presiding Officer: There will now be 4 minutes equally divided on the Byrd amendment.

Who yields time?

The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. Byrd: Friends, Senators, lend me your ears. Friends, Senators, lend me your ears. I voted to report a fair and balanced bill from the Armed Services Committee, but the legislation before the Senate today bears little resemblance to that legislation. It has been changed so many times, we don't know the real implications of this ever-changing bill. The Byrd-Obama-Clinton-Levin amendment sunsets the authority of the President to convene new military commissions after 5 years. There is nothing wrong with that.

This amendment ensures that Congress will not simply stand aside and ignore its oversight responsibilities after this bill is enacted. This amendment will not stop any trials of suspected terrorists that commence before the sunset date. It simply forces Congress to revisit-- revisit--the weighty constitutional implications of this bill in 5 years' time and then be in a position, on the basis of new knowledge and experience, to make a decision again.

It is a very reasonable amendment. I urge my colleagues to support it.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I say to our most distinguished senior colleague that this amendment was well debated on the floor, but I would bring to the attention of all Senators that we do not have any estimates of how long the war on terrorism against the jihadists is going to take place. We may be having those who commit crimes today not apprehended until after this sunset provision. Then they go free. They are not subject, unless the Senate at that time somehow restores the importance of the next President to continue--to continue, Mr. President--bringing to justice and trial under our rules these individuals who are committing war crimes. So I urge all Senators to oppose this amendment.

Mr. Byrd: Mr. President, do I have any time remaining?

The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 36 seconds.

Mr. Byrd: This amendment will not set any terrorists free. Let Senators who are here 5 years from now take a new look on the basis of experience and make a decision in the light of the then circumstances. That is all I am asking. This is nothing new.

The Presiding Officer: Is there further debate on the amendment? If not, the question is on agreeing to the Byrd amendment No. 5104.

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. McConnell: The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator from Maine (Ms. Snowe).

The Presiding Officer: Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 47, nays 52, as follows:

Roll No. 257 Leg.
YEAS--47
AkakaBaucusBayhBidenBingaman
BoxerByrdCantwellCarperChafee
ClintonConradDaytonDoddDorgan
DurbinFeingoldFeinsteinHarkinInouye
JeffordsJohnsonKennedyKerryKohl
LandrieuLautenbergLeahyLevinLieberman
LincolnMenendezMikulskiMurrayNelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)ObamaPryorReedReid
RockefellerSalazarSarbanesSchumerSpecter
StabenowWyden   
Nays--52
AlexanderAllardAllenBennettBond
BrownbackBunningBurnsBurrChambliss
CoburnCochranColemanCollinsCornyn
CraigCrapoDeMintDeWineDole
DomeniciEnsignEnziFristGraham
GrassleyGreggHagelHatchHutchison
InhofeIsaksonKylLottLugar
MartinezMcCainMcConnellMurkowskiRoberts
SantorumSessionsShelbySmithStevens
SununuTalentThomasThuneVitter
VoinovichWarner   
NOT VOTING--1
Snowe    

The amendment (No. 5104) was rejected.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. McConnell: I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 5088

The Presiding Officer: There are 4 minutes equally divided on the Kennedy amendment.

Mr. Kennedy: Mr. President, here is the Army Manual of 2006 printed after the Senate of the United States went on record in accepting the McCain amendment prohibiting torture. In the printed Army Manual is a list of the prohibited activities where any person who is a member of the Defense Department is prohibited to engage in these kinds of activities because they have made a finding that they are basically and effectively torture.

Today we have thousands of Americans in the Central Intelligence Agency, Special Forces, the SEALS, and American contractors working for the CIA around the world fighting terrorism. All this amendment does is give notice to each and every country that any country that is going to practice these kinds of techniques on any American will be guilty effectively of a war crime.

That is effectively what we have done with the Army Manual, and we ought to protect our intelligence agency personnel, our SEALS, and all of those who are all over the world protecting the United States.

Arguments against? It is a violation of the Constitution because it is an instruction to a member of the Cabinet about what they ought to do.

Here it is for airports. The Secretary of Transportation shall conduct an assessment with foreign countries.

Here it is on voting rights. The Attorney General is authorized and directed to institute suits that are going to be involved in poll taxes.

The Secretary of State shall notify without delay foreign states that are involved in pollution. The list goes on. If we can do it for pollution, we can do it for violation of basic and fundamental rights of Americans overseas.

This is effectively about what we adopted when we adopted the War Crimes Act, which was virtually unanimous, with not a single vote in opposition.

This is basically a restatement. I hope it will be accepted overwhelmingly.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, this is an amendment that requires close attention by all colleagues.

In the preparation of this bill, we defined in broad terms the conduct that is regarded as a grave breach of Common Article 3. These are war crimes. We the Congress should not try to provide a specific list of techniques. We don't know what the future holds. That is not the responsibility of the Congress. We are not going to direct. We try to make a list of techniques, that the United States describe every technique that violates Common Article 3. We cannot foresee into the future every technique that might violate Common Article 3. We should not step on that situation. It is not ours to do.

Under the separation of powers, it is reserved to the executive branch to work this out. But if at any time it is the judgment of any Member of this body, or collectively, that we are not abiding by this law, I am confident that this institution's oversight will correct and quickly remedy the situation.

I yield the floor.

The Presiding Officer: The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. McConnell: The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator from Maine (Ms. Snowe).

The Presiding Officer (Mr. Chafee): Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 46, nays 53, as follows:

Roll No. 258 Leg.
YEAS--46
AkakaBaucusBayhBidenBingaman
BoxerByrdCantwellCarperChafee
ClintonConradDaytonDoddDorgan
DurbinFeingoldFeinsteinHarkinInouye
JeffordsJohnsonKennedyKerryKohl
LandrieuLautenbergLeahyLevinLieberman
LincolnMenendezMikulskiMurrayNelson (FL)
ObamaPryorReedReidRockefeller
SalazarSarbanesSchumerSpecterStabenow
Wyden    
Nays--53
AlexanderAllardAllenBennettBond
BrownbackBunningBurnsBurrChambliss
CoburnCochranColemanCollinsCornyn
CraigCrapoDeMintDeWineDole
DomeniciEnsignEnziFristGraham
GrassleyGreggHagelHatchHutchison
InhofeIsaksonKylLottLugar
MartinezMcCainMcConnellMurkowskiNelson (NE)
RobertsSantorumSessionsShelbySmith
StevensSununuTalentThomasThune
VitterVoinovichWarner  
NOT VOTING--1
Snowe    

The amendment (No. 5088) was rejected.

Mr. Warner: I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. Levin: I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. Warner: I ask the Presiding Officer to read the unanimous consent that is in place so all Members understand what is to take place.

The Presiding Officer: Senator Leahy will be recognized for his remaining 12 minutes. Senator Levin is under the control of 4 minutes, Senator Warner is under the control of 16 minutes, to be followed by closing remarks by the two leaders. Following that time, the Senate will proceed to passage of the bill. Further, that there then be 5 minutes equally divided prior to the vote on the motion to invoke cloture on border fence legislation.

Mr. Warner: The Chair will now recognize Senator Leahy?

Mr. Levin: Mr. President, my understanding is that was the allocation of time, not necessarily the order of speaking.

The Presiding Officer: The agreement does not appear to be in any particular order.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, at the appropriate time, I will allocate 14 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain.

At this point in time, I recognize the extraordinary contributions of the staff persons who worked on this bill, and I shall include the entire list.

We worked under the direction of Charlie Abell, Scott Stucky, David Morriss, Rick DeBobes, Peter Levine, Chris Paul, Pablo Chavez, Richard Fontaine, Jen Olson, Adam Brake, James Galyean, and legislative counsel Charlie Armstrong.

I assure Members it was a challenge from beginning to end. I cannot recall seeing a more professional group of staffers serving their Members in the Senate.

Mr. Levin: I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side or to any party.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Inhofe: I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

Unanimous Consent Request--S. 2781

Mr. Inhofe: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar 625, S. 2781, and I ask unanimous consent that the committee-reported amendment be, for the third time, passed and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. Jeffords: I object. I agree that wastewater security is an important issue. In fact, it is made even more important because the Homeland Security appropriations conferees have exempted these facilities from security requirements--a decision that I understand was due in large part to the Senator's opposition to including these facilities within the protections of that bill.

Although I would like to have seen stronger chemical security provisions than those I understand are forthcoming from the Homeland Security appropriations conference, I anticipate supporting that measure. I would support including wastewater facilities in that measure. But I will not support a bill like S. 2781 that provides weaker protections.

By contrast, I long ago introduced S. 1995, The Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2005. I feel certain that if I asked unanimous consent to pass this bill, the Senator would object to my request. I prefer a more constructive pathway to providing essential protection to our communities.

We should fill this gap in our Nation's security, and in order to do so, we need full and fair opportunity to offer amendments to cure the serious deficiencies in this bill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert a statement in the Record concerning my objection to consideration of the Wastewater Security bill.

The Presiding Officer: The objection is heard.

Mr. Inhofe: Mr. President, I wanted to call the Senate's attention to the fact we do have wastewater legislation that has passed both the House and the Senate, in the House by a vote of 413 to 2. It is something which is desperately needed. We need to attend to that as soon as possible.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The Presiding Officer: Without objction, it is so ordered.

COMMON ARTICLE 3 AND WAR CRIMES PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT

Mr. Levin: Senators Warner and McCain, over the last year, you have played an instrumental role in bringing needed clarity to the rules for the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. I understand that you also played a key role in negotiating the provisions of the military commissions bill regarding the War Crimes Act and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As you said last year when the Detainee Treatment Act was adopted, this is not an area in which ambiguity is helpful. For this reason, I hope that you will help me in providing a clear record of our intent on these issues.

In particular, section 8(a)(3) of the bill provides that "the President has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions", that these interpretations shall be issued by Executive order, and that such an Executive order "shall be authoritative (as to non-grave breach provisions of Common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other administrative regulations."

Would you agree that nothing in this provision gives the President or could give the President the authority to modify the Geneva Conventions or U.S. obligations under those treaties?

Mr. McCain: First, I say to my good friend from Michigan that this legislation clearly defines grave breaches of Common Article 3, which are criminalized and ultimately punishable by death. It is critical for the American public to understand that we are criminalizing breaches of Common Article 3 that rise to the level of a felony. Such acts-- including cruel or inhuman treatment, torture, rape, and murder, among others--will clearly be considered war crimes.

Where the President may exercise his authority to interpret treaty obligations is in the area of "nongrave" breaches of the Geneva Conventions--those breaches that do not rise to the level of a war crime. In interpreting the conventions in this manner, the President is bounded by the conventions themselves. Nothing in this bill gives the President the authority to modify the conventions or our obligations under those treaties. That understanding is at the core of this legislation.

Mr. Warner: I concur with the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. Levin: Would you agree that nothing in this provision gives the President, or could give the President, the authority to modify the requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act?

Mr. Warner: The purpose of this legislation is to strengthen, not to weaken or modify, the Detainee Treatment Act. For the first time, this legislation is required to "take action to ensure compliance" with the DTA's prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as defined in the U.S. reservation to the Convention Against Torture. He is directed to do so through, among other actions, the establishment of administrative rules and procedures. Nothing in this legislation authorizes the President to modify the requirements of the DTA, which were enshrined in a law passed last December. I would point out as well to the distinguished ranking member that the President himself never proposed to weaken the DTA. Rather, he proposed to make compliance with the DTA tantamount to compliance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. That proposal is not included in this legislation.

Mr. McCain: I agree entirely with Senator Warner's comments.

Mr. Levin: Would you agree that any interpretation issued by the President under this section would only be valid if it is consistent with U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the Detainee Treatment Act?

Mr. McCain: That is correct.

Mr. Warner: I agree.

Mr. Levin: Section 8(b) of the bill would amend the War Crimes Act to provide that only "grave breaches" of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes under U.S. law. The provision goes on to define those grave breaches to include, among other things, torture, and "cruel or inhuman treatment". The term "cruel or inhuman treatment' is defined to include acts "intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering."

Would you agree that the changes to the War Crimes Act in section 8(b) do not in any way alter U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions or under the Detainee Treatment Act?

Mr. McCain: The changes to the War Crimes Act are actually a responsible modification in order to better comply with America's obligations under the Geneva Conventions to provide effective penal sanction for grave breaches of Common Article 3. It is important to note, as has the Senator from Michigan, that in this section "cruel or inhuman treatment" is defined for purposes of the War Crimes Act only. It does not infringe, supplant, or in any way alter the definition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited in the DTA and defined therein with reference to the 5th, 8th, and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Nor do the changes to the War Crimes Act alter U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

Mr. Warner: I would associate myself with the comments from the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. Levin: Would you agree that nothing in this section or in this bill requires or should be interpreted to authorize any modification to the new Army Field Manual on interrogation techniques, which was issued last month and provides important guidance to our solders on the field as to what is and is not permitted to the interrogation of detainees?

Mr. Warner: The executive branch has the authority to modify the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation at any time. I welcomed the new version of the field manual issued last month and agree that it provides critical guidance to our solders in the field. That said, the content of the field manual is an issue separate from those at issue in this bill, and it was not my intent to effect any change in the field manual through this legislation.

Mr. McCain: I concur wholeheartedly with the Senator from Virginia. As the Senator form Virginia is aware, there is a provision in the bill before the Senate that defines "cruel and inhuman treatment" under the War Crimes Act. I would note first that this definition is limited to criminal offenses under the War Crimes Act and is distinct from the broader prohibition contained in the Detainee Treatment Act. That act defined the term "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" with reference to the reservation the United States took to the Convention Against Torture.

In the war crimes section of this bill, cruel and inhuman treatment is defined as an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering. It further makes clear that such mental suffering need not be prolonged to be prohibited. The mental suffering need only be more than transitory. It is important to note that the "nontransitory" requirement applies to the harm, not to the act producing the harm. Thus if a U.S. soldier is, for example, subjected to some terrible technique that lasts for a brief time but that causes serious and nontransitory mental harm, a criminal act has occurred.

Mr. Warner: That is my understanding and intent as well, and I agree with the Senator's other clarifying remarks.

In the same section, the term "serious physical pain or suffering" is defined as a bodily injury that involves one of four characteristics: "a substantial risk of death," "extreme physical pain," "a burn or physical disfigurement or a serious nature," or "significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty." I do not believe that the term "bodily injury" adds a separate requirement which must be met for an act to constitute serious physical pain or suffering.

Mr. McCain: I am of the same view.

Mr. Levin: And would the Senator from Arizona agree with my view that section 8(a)(3) does not make lawful or give the President the authority to make lawful any technique that is not permitted by Common Article 3 or the Detainee Treatment Act?

Mr. McCain: I do agree.

Mr. Warner: I agree with both of my colleagues.

Mr. Kennedy: Mr. President, in times of war, our obligation is to protect our Nation and to protect those men and women who risk their lives to defend us. This bill fails that duty. By failing to renounce torture, it inflames an already dangerous world and makes new enemies for America in our war against terror. This puts cause or people and our troops at greater risk. That is why so many respected military leaders oppose this bill.

Throughout our history, America has led the world in promoting human rights and decency. We have fought wars against tyranny and oppression. Our enemies have employed tactics that were rightly and roundly condemned by the civilized world. We maintained American strength and honor by refusing to stoop to the level of our enemies. And we should not stoop to the level of the terrorists in the war on terror.

I rise to express my profound opposition to this bill both in terms of its substance and the procedure by which it reached the floor. The Armed Service Committee reported out a bill that I supported. That bill was not perfect, but it preserved our commitment to the Geneva Conventions, limited the possibility that detainees would be treated abusively and set up procedures for military tribunals that generally respected the fundamental requirements of fairness.

Republican members of the Armed Services Committee then began a process of secret negotiation with the White House that produced a bill that is far worse than the committee bill. Indeed, we have continued to see changes in that bill as it has been moved toward the floor in a rush to achieve passage before the Senate recesses for the election. This rush to passage to serve a political agenda is no way to produce careful and thoughtful legislation on profound issues of national security and civil liberties. At this point, most Members of this body hardly know what they are being asked to approve.

The bill as it now appears on the floor works profound and disastrous changes in our law.

This legislation sets out an overly broad definition of unlawful enemy combatant. This definition would allow the President to pick up anyone citizen and legal residents included anywhere around the world, and throw them into prison in Guantanamo without even charging or trying them. These people would never get a day in court to prove their innocence. There is no check whatsoever on the President's ability to detain people in an arbitrary manner.

We already know that our military has made mistakes in detaining people. We are currently holding dozens of people at Guanatanamo who we know based on the military's own records are not guilty of anything. Yet they have not been let go.

This legislation also makes a distinction between citizens and lawful permanent residents. Citizens cannot be subject to military commissions and their flawed procedures. Yet lawful permanent residents, those green card holders who are on the path to citizenship, could be sent to military commissions. Green Card holders must obey our laws, pay taxes, and register for the draft. They are serving our country in Iraq. They have an obligation to protect our laws, and they deserve the protection of those same laws.

The Geneva Conventions were adopted in the wake of the horrific atrocities during World War II. These conventions reflect the international consensus on how individuals should be treated in times of war. They set a minimum floor of humane treatment for all prisoners, military and civilian alike. This floor is known as Common Article 3 because it is common to all of the conventions. Yet this bill also gives the President authority to decide what conduct violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Again, the President's authority to define the meaning of Common Article 3 is virtually unreviewable. He is required to publish his interpretation in the Federal Register, but the administration has already made clear that it will not make public which interrogation tactics are being used. Moreover, the bill expressly states that the Geneva Conventions cannot be relied upon in any U.S. court as a source of rights. The President's interpretation may well likely escape judicial review, as well.

As the final method of concealing its activities, the administration has stripped the courts of their ability to review the confinement or treatment of detainees. The administration won a provision that eliminates the ability of any detainee anywhere in the world to file a habeas corpus petition challenging the justification for or conditions of his or her confinement. The provision applies to all existing petitions and would require their dismissal, including the Hamdan case itself. There is no justification for stripping courts of jurisdiction to issue the great writ of habeas corpus, which has been a foundation of our legal system with roots in the Magna Carta. The availability of the Great Writ is assured in the Constitution itself, which permits its suspension only in times of invasion or rebellion. This provision of the bill is most likely unconstitutional.

The administration has pursued a strategy to defeat accountability since it first began to take detainees into custody. It chose Guantanamo and secret prisons abroad because it thought U.S. law would not apply. It fought hard to prevent detainees from obtaining counsel and then argued that U.S. Courts lacked jurisdiction to hear detainees' complaints. It sought the prohibition on habeas corpus petitions adopted in the Detainee Treatment Act and then urged courts to misconstrue it to wipe out all pending habeas cases. This new effort to prohibit habeas petitions is a continuation of this effort to escape judicial scrutiny.

The bill also for the first time in our history would authorize the introduction of evidence obtained by torture in a judicial proceeding. Our courts have always rejected this type of evidence because it is inconsistent with fundamental notions of justice, and also because it is unreliable. We know that detainees were subjected to harsh interrogation techniques, and made statements as a result. Under this legislation, if those statements were made before the passage of the McCain Amendment last winter, then they are admissible. The Congress is saying for the first time in our nation's history that statements obtained by torture are admissible. This fact, alone, is a stunning statement about how far we have strayed from our bedrock values.

It defines conduct that can be prosecuted as a war crime in a very narrow way that appears designed to exclude many of the abusive interrogation practices that this administration has employed. While some have argued that cruel and inhumane practices such as waterboarding, induced hypothermia and sleep deprivation would surely be covered, the White House and the Republican leadership have refused to commit to this basic interpretation of the bill.

We tried to improve this bill. A number of amendments were offered and should have been adopted. I offered an amendment that responds to the lack of clarity about which practices are prohibited by the bill. Because the administration has refused to commit itself to stop using specific abusive interrogation procedures, our commitment to the standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is in doubt. That puts our own people at risk. As military leaders have repeatedly stated, our adherence to the Geneva Conventions is essential to protect our own people around the world. America has thousands of people across the globe who do not wear uniforms, but put their lives on the line to protect this country every day. CIA agents, Special Forces members, contractors, journalists and others will all be less safe if we turn our backs on the standards of Common Article 3.

The bill as it has reached the floor would diminish the security and safety of Americans everywhere and further erode our civil liberties. I strongly oppose this bill.

Mr. Grassley: Mr. President, we hear on a daily basis about the war we are currently engaged in, the war on terror, but I don't think most of us stop to think about what that actually means.

As citizens of the greatest country in the world, we have become so accustomed to all the rights afforded us by our Constitution that we now take them for granted. We are incredibly fortunate to live in a nation where our freedom and safety is our Government's first priority.

We aren't living in the world I grew up in. Our Nation was rocked to its core 5 years ago when we were attacked on our own soil. Thousands of innocent Americans were murdered simply because they lived in the one country that, above all others, embodies freedom and democracy. The mastermind behind those attacks was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who is now in custody and soon will be brought to justice.

In the aftermath of these attacks, Congress authorized our President to "use all necessary force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons." President Bush used this authorization, combined with his constitutional powers to make these sorts of judgments during times of war, to try enemy combatants in military commissions.

Earlier this month, we observed the 5-year anniversary of the horrific attacks on America. I cannot imagine the reaction that would have come if, 5 years ago, Members of Congress had stood on this floor and suggested that we wouldn't do all we could to prevent another attack on our country. Five years ago, with the images of the collapsing Twin Towers and the burning Pentagon and the smoldering Pennsylvania field seared into our memories, we stood united in the proposition that we intended to protect Americans first.

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which the Supreme Court decided earlier this year, the Court ruled that the administration's use of military commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants violated international law. This decision forced our interrogators, key in defending America from terrorist attack, to curtail their investigations. Without a clarification of the vague requirements, these interrogators might be subject to prosecution for war crimes. It also brought to an end the prosecution of unlawful enemy combatants through the military commissions.

It is key to point out that military commissions have been used throughout American history to bring enemy combatants to justice since before the United States was even officially formed. George Washington used them during the American Revolution, and since our Constitution was ratified, Presidents have used military commissions to try those who seek to harm Americans during every major conflict. Some of our most popular Presidents from history have taken this route, including Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Whenever the leaders of this great Nation have seen threats posed by those who refuse to abide by the rules of war, they have taken the necessary steps to protect us.

Our President has come to us and asked for help in trying these terrorists whose sole goal is to kill those who love freedom. He has asked for our help in ensuring that those investigating potential terrorist plots against our Nation and our citizens are secure from arbitrary prosecution for undefined war crimes. These people are part of our first line of defense in securing the safety of our country--we owe it to them to protect them. Because of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan, the only way these terrorists will be brought to justice and our interrogators will be protected for doing their jobs is for Congress to write a new law codifying procedures for military commissions and clarifying our obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

I firmly believe that enemy combatants in our custody enjoyed ample due process in the military commissions established by the administration, which were brought to a halt by the Supreme Court. The compromise that we are considering here today gives more rights to terrorists who were caught trying to harm America and our allies than our own servicemembers would receive elsewhere, more than is required by the Geneva Conventions--yet some are still demanding more.

Mr. President, it is essential that we protect human dignity at every opportunity, but we have gone well beyond that with this legislation. The legislation before us responds to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan and seeks to protect national security while ensuring that the terrorists who seek to destroy America are properly dealt with. This bill affords these unlawful enemy combatants rights that they themselves would never consider granting American soldiers. It is beyond reasonable, beyond fair, and beyond time for Congress to act. We must pass this bill and reinstate the programs that, I believe, have been a crucial part of our Nation's security over the last 5 years.

Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a joint statement regarding alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Joint Statement of Senators McCain, Warner, and Graham on Individual Rights Under the Geneva Conventions, September 28, 2006

Mr. President, we are submitting this statement into the record because it has been suggested by some that this legislation would prohibit litigants from raising alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions. This suggestion is misleading on three counts.

First, it presumes that individuals currently have a private right of action under Geneva. Secondly, it implies that the Congress is restricting individuals from raising claims that the Geneva Conventions have been violated as a collateral matter once they have an independent cause of action. Finally, this legislation would not stop in any way a court from exercising any power it has to consider the United States' obligations under the Geneva Conventions, regardless of what litigants say or do not say in the documents that they file with the court.

The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan left untouched the widely-held view that the Geneva Conventions provide no private rights of action to individuals. And, in fact, the majority in Hamdan suggested that the Geneva Conventions do not afford individuals private rights of action, although it did not need to reach that question in its decision. This view has been underscored by judicial precedent--and even Salim Hamdan himself did not claim in his court filings that he had a private right of action under Geneva.

Still, this legislation would not bar individuals from raising to our Federal courts in their pleadings any allegation that a provision of the Geneva Conventions--or, for that matter, any other treaty obligation that has the force of law--has been violated. It is not the intent of Congress to dictate what can or cannot be said by litigants in any case.

By the same token, this legislation explicitly reserves untouched the constitutional functions and responsibilities of the judicial branch of the United States. Accordingly, when Congress says that the President can interpret the meaning of Geneva, it is merely reasserting a longstanding constitutional principle. Congress does not intend with this legislation to prohibit the Federal courts from considering whether the obligations of the United States under any treaty have been met. To paraphrase an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts recently, if treaties are to be given effect as Federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of Federal law is the province and duty of the judiciary headed by the Supreme Court. So, though the President certainly has the constitutional authority to interpret our Nation's treaty obligations, such interpretation is subject to judicial review. It is not the intent of Congress to infringe on any constitutional power of the Federal bench, a co-equal branch of government.

Most importantly, the lack of judicial enforceability through a private right of action has absolutely no bearing on whether Geneva is binding on the executive branch. Even if the Geneva Conventions are not enforceable by individuals in our Nation's courts, the President and his subordinates are bound to comply with Geneva, a set of treaty obligations that forms part of our American jurisprudence. That is clear to us and to all who have negotiated this legislation in good faith.

Mrs. Boxer: Mr. President, I view this bill as a weak plan that will lead to delay after delay in convicting terrorists, endanger our troops on the field, and surrender one of the bedrock constitutional principles of our justice system--habeas corpus.

We had a chance to improve this bill with amendments, but this rubber stamp Senate defeated them one after another, leaving us with a flawed plan that will face a serious court challenge, and that makes us less safe.

The Republicans even voted against a bipartisan bill that came out of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Mr. McConnell: Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. I support this legislation, first and foremost, because this bill recognizes that we are a Nation at war. We are a Nation at war, and we are at war with Islamic extremists. We are not conducting a law enforcement operation against a checkwriting scam or trying to foil a bank heist. We are at war against extremists who want to kill our citizens, cripple our economy, and discredit the principles we hold dear--freedom and democracy.

Once you accept the premise that we are at war, the most important consideration should be, Does this bill protect the American people? I submit that this bill does just that. It does so by permitting the President's CIA interrogation program to continue. This is of profound importance.

If the attacks of September 11, 2001, taught us anything, it is that self-imposed limitations on our intelligence-gathering efforts can have devastating consequences. For instance, the wall of separation between the intelligence community and the law enforcement community that existed prior to 2001 proved to be an imposing hurdle to foiling the September 11 attacks. According to the report of the 9/11 Commission, in late summer 2001, the U.S. Government, in effect, conducted its search for 9/11 hijacker Khalid Mihdhar with one hand tied behind its back. As we all know, that search was unsuccessful. Comparable pre-9/11 efforts with respect to Zacarias Moussaoui were similarly frustrated in large part due to this wall.

Thankfully, with the PATRIOT Act, we removed this wall of separation, and now the intelligence and law enforcement arms of our Government can share information and more effectively protect us here at home.

Another lesson of September 11 was the premium that should be placed on human intelligence. Prior to September 11, we were woefully deficient in our human intelligence regarding al-Qaida. Al-Qaida is an extremely difficult organization to infiltrate. You can't just pay dues and become a member. But interrogation offers a rare and valuable opportunity to gather vital intelligence about al-Qaida's capabilities and plans before they attack us.

The CIA interrogation program provided crucial human intelligence that has saved American lives by helping to prevent new attacks. As the President has explained, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA about planned attacks on U.S. buildings in which al-Qaida members were under orders to set off explosives high enough in the building so the victims could not escape through the windows.

As the President also noted, the program has also yielded human intelligence regarding al-Qaida's efforts to obtain biological weapons such as anthrax. And it has helped lead to the capture of key al-Qaida figures, such as KSM and his accomplice, Ramzi bin al Shibh.

Another means of evaluating the importance of this program is by considering a grim hypothetical. What if al-Qaida or other terrorists organizations were able to get their hands on nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and were trying to attack a major U.S. city? Thousands or even millions of lives could be at stake. Under such a chilling scenario, wouldn't we want our intelligence community to have all possible tools at its disposal? Would we want our intelligence community to respond with one hand tied behind its back as it did before September 11?

Unfortunately, that threat is all too real. The potential for al- Qaida to attack a U.S. city with a device that could kill millions of people reflects how vital it is to permit the intelligence community to make full use of the tools it needs to continue protecting American lives. The compromise preserves this crucial intelligence-gathering tool and allows the CIA and others on the front lines to continue protecting America.

In addition, this bill protects classified information from being released to al-Qaida terrorists. This also is a serious concern. The identities of U.S. intelligence officials and informants--men and women who put their lives at risk to defend this Nation--must be protected at all costs.

If we needed any reminding why terrorists should not be given sensitive information, we should just look at the prosecution of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. According to the man who prosecuted these Islamic extremists, intelligence from U.S. Government files was supplied to the defendants through the discovery process.

This information was later delivered directly to Osama bin Laden while he was living in Sudan. Let me repeat that. Information given to the jihadist defendants, individuals who tried to destroy the World Trade Center in 1993, was later given directly to bin Laden himself.

Since we are at war, we should not be revealing classified information to the enemy. That is just common sense. This bill protects classified information.

Finally, while this bill preserves our ability to continue to protect America, it also provides detainees with fair procedural rights.

In fact, this legislation provides broader protections for defendants than did Nuremberg. Liberal law professor Cass Sunstein has written that the military commissions authorized by the President in 2001 "provide far greater procedural safeguards than any previous military commission, including Nuremberg." Let me say that again: liberal law professor Cass Sunstein noted that the President's 2001 military order provided far greater procedural safeguards than any previous military commission, including Nuremberg. And in this legislation, we provide defendants with even broader procedural safeguards than the President's 2001 military order.

This system is exceedingly fair since al-Qaida in no way follows the Geneva Conventions or any other international norm. Al-Qaida respects no law, no authority, no legitimacy but that of its own twisted strain of radical Islam.

Al-Qaida grants no procedural rights to Americans they capture. Look at journalist Daniel Pearl, who was beheaded by al-Qaida in Pakistan in 2002. Al-Qaida simply executes those they capture, even civilians like Pearl. Not only do they unapologetically kill innocent civilians, they broadcast these brutal executions on the Internet for all to see.

Mr. President, I would just conclude by stating that this legislation is vitally important. It is vitally important because it is wartime legislation. It is vitally important because this bill protects our national security, it protects classified information, and it protects the rights of defendants. Most important, it protects America. For these reasons, I urge its passage.

Mr. Cornyn: Mr. President, once the Military Commissions Act, MCA, is signed into law and section 7 is effective, Congress will finally accomplish what it sought to do through the Detainee Treatment Act-- DTA--last year. It will finally get the lawyers out of Guantanamo Bay. It will substitute the blizzard of litigation instigated by Rasul v. Bush with a narrow DC Circuit -only review of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal--CSRT--hearings.

Perhaps even more important than the narrow standards of review created by the DTA is the fact that that review is exclusive to the court of appeals. This is by design. Courts of appeals do not hold evidentiary hearings or otherwise take in evidence outside of the administrative record. The DC Circuit will operate no differently under the CSRT review provisions of the DTA. The circuit court will review the administrative record of the CSRTs to make sure that the right standards were applied, the standards that the military itself set for CSRTs. And it will determine whether the CSRT system as a whole is consistent with the Constitution and with Federal statutes.

There is no invitation in the DTA or MCA to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence. Weighing of the evidence is a function for the military when the question is whether someone is an enemy combatant. Courts simply lack the competence--the knowledge of the battlefield and the nature of our foreign enemies--to judge whether particular facts show that someone is an enemy combatant. By making review exclusive to the DC Circuit, the DTA helps to ensure that the narrow review standards it sets do not somehow grow into something akin to Federal courts' habeas corpus review of State criminal convictions. The court's role under the DTA is to simply ensure that the military applied the right rules to the facts. It is not the court's role to interpret those facts and decide what they mean.

Because review under the DTA and MCA will be limited to the administrative record, there is no need for any lawyer to ever again go to Guantanamo to represent an enemy combatant challenging his detention. The military, I am certain, will make the paper record available inside the United States. This is one of the major benefits of enacting the MCA. As I and others have noted previously, the hundreds of lawyer visits to Guantanamo sparked by Rasul have seriously disrupted the operation of the Naval facility there. They have forced reconfiguration of the facility and consumed enormous resources, and have led to leaks of information that have made it harder for our troops there to do their job, to keep order at Guantanamo. Some of these detainee lawyers have even bragged about what a burden their activities have been on the military, and how they have disrupted interrogations at Guantanamo. Putting an end to that was the major purpose of the DTA. Today, with the MCA, we see to it that this goal is effectuated.

Another major improvement that the MCA makes to the DTA is that it tightens the bar on nonhabeas lawsuits contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(e)(2). That paragraph, as enacted by the DTA, barred postrelease conditions-of-confinement lawsuits, but only if the detainee had been found to be properly detained as an enemy combatant by the U.S. Court of Appeals on review of a CSRT hearing. Although nothing in the DTA or MCA directly requires the military to conduct CSRTs, this limitation on the bar to non-habeas actions effectively did compel the military to hold CSRTs--and to somehow get the detainee to appeal to the DC Circuit. The alternative would have been to allow the detainee to sue U.S. troops at Guantanamo after his release.

The MCA revises section 2241(e)(2) by, among other things, adopting a much narrower exception to the bar on post-release lawsuits. Under the MCA, 2242(e)(2) will bar nonhabeas lawsuits so long as the detainee "has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination." This new language does several things. First, it eliminates the requirement that the DC Circuit review a CSRT, or that a CSRT even be held, before nonhabeas actions are barred. This is important because many detainees were released before CSRTs were even instituted. We do not want those who were properly detained as enemy combatants to be able to sue the U.S. military. And we do not want to force the military to hold CSRT hearings forever, or in all future wars. Instead, under the new language, the determination that is the precondition to the litigation bar is purely an executive determination. It is only what the United States has decided that will matter.

In addition, the language of (e)(2) focuses on the propriety of the initial detention. There inevitably will be detainees who are captured by U.S. troops, or who are handed over to us by third parties, who initially appear to be enemy combatants but who, upon further inquiry, are found to be unconnected to the armed conflict. The U.S. military should not be punished with litigation for the fact that they initially detained such a person. As long as the individual was at least initially properly detained as an enemy combatant, the nonhabeas litigation is now barred, even if the U.S. later decides that the person was not an enemy combatant or no longer poses any threat. The inquiry created here is not unlike that for reviewing, in the civilian criminal justice context, the propriety of an arrest. An arrest might be entirely legal, might be based on sufficient probable cause, even if the arrestee is later conclusively found to be innocent of committing any crime. The arresting officer cannot be sued and held liable for making that initial arrest, so long as the arrest itself was supported by probable cause, simply because the suspect was not later convicted of a crime. Similarly, under 2241 (e)(2), detainees will not be able to sue their captors and custodians if the United States determines that it was the right decision to take the individual into custody.

Mr. Sessions: Mr. President, I would like to make a few comments about section 7 of the bill that is before us today. This section makes a number of improvements to the Detainee Treatment Act, which was passed by the Congress and signed into law on December 30 of last year. First, section 7 will fulfill one of the original objectives of the DTA: to get the lawyers out of Guantanamo Bay. As my colleague Senator Graham has noted, these lawyers have even bragged about the fact that their presence and activities at Guantanamo have made it harder for the military to do its job. Mr. Michael Ratner, the director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which coordinated much of the detainee habeas litigation, had this to say about his activities to a magazine:

The litigation is brutal for [the United States.] It's huge. We have over one hundred lawyers now from big and small firms working to represent the detainees. Every time an attorney goes down there, it makes it that much harder [for the U.S. military] to do what they're doing. You can't run an interrogation . . . with attorneys. What are they going to do now that we're getting court orders to get more lawyers down there?

This is what Congress thought that it was putting an end to when it enacted the DTA in 2005. That act provided that "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" claims filed by Guantanamo detainees, except under the review standards created by that Act. The DTA was made effective immediately upon the date of its enactment. And as Justice Scalia noted in his Hamdan v. Rumsfeld dissenting opinion, the DTA's jurisdictional removal made no exception for lawsuits that were pending when the statute was enacted. Justice Scalia also pointed out that "[a]n ancient and unbroken line of authority attests that statutes ousting jurisdiction unambiguously apply to cases pending at their effective date." He also noted that up until the Hamdan decision, "one cannot cite a single case in the history of Anglo-American law . . . in which a jurisdiction-stripping provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases, absent an explicit statutory reservation."

The Hamdan majority, on the other hand, found that the Supreme Court's precedents governing jurisdictional statutes were trumped in that case by a legislative intent to preserve the pending lawsuits. This congressional intent, the majority concluded, was manifested in minor changes that had been made to the language of the bill and, most expressly, in statements made by Senators regarding the intended effect of the bill. As Senator Graham has explained in detail in remarks in the Congressional Record on August 3, at 152 Cong. Rec. S8779, it appears that the Supreme Court was misled about the legislative history of the DTA by the lawyers for Hamdan. Those lawyers misrepresented the nature of the statements made in the Senate and caused the court to believe that Congress had an intent other than that reflected in the text of the statute. It certainly was not my intent, when I voted for the DTA, to exempt all of the pending Guantanamo lawsuits from the provisions of that act.

Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act fixes this feature of the DTA and ensures that there is no possibility of confusion in the future. Subsection (b) provides that the bill's revised litigation bar "shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001." I don't see how there could be any confusion as to the effect of this act on the pending Guantanamo litigation. The MCA's jurisdictional bar applies to that litigation "without exception."

The new bill also bars all litigation by anyone found to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant, regardless of whether the detainee has been through the DC Circuit under the DTA or has been through a Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing. The previous version of this bar, in the DTA, allowed detainees to bring conditions- of-confinement lawsuits after their release if their detention was not reviewed by the DC Circuit. Obviously, the Government could not force the detainee to appeal, and there are some who were released before CSRT hearings were instituted. The new bill states that as long as the military decides that it was appropriate to take the individual into custody as an enemy combatant, as a security risk in relation to a war, that person cannot turn around and sue our military after he is released. It should not be held against our soldiers that they take someone into custody, believing in good faith that he appears to be connected to hostilities against the United States, and then determine that the individual is not an enemy combatant and release the person. The fact of release should not be an invitation to litigation, so long as the military finds that it was appropriate to take the individual into custody in the first place.

The biggest change that the MCA makes to section 2241(e) is that the new law applies globally, rather than just to Guantanamo detainees. We are legislating through this law for future generations, creating a system that will operate not only throughout this war, but for future wars in which our Nation fights. In the future, we may again find ourselves involved in an armed conflict in which we capture large numbers of enemy soldiers. It is not unlikely that the safest and most secure place to hold those soldiers will be inside the United States. The fact that we hold those enemy soldiers in this country should not be an invitation for each of them to sue our Government. We held very large numbers of enemy soldiers in this country during World War II. They did not sue our Government seeking release. The Rasul decision would seem to have required that enemy combatants held in this country during wartime can sue. If that court allowed enemy combatants held in Cuba to sue, it is inevitable that those held inside this country would have been allowed to sue as well. That is simply not acceptable. It would make it very difficult to fight a major war in the future if every enemy war prisoner detained inside this country could sue our military. Through section 7 of the MCA, we not only solve our current problems with Guantanamo, but we plan for future conflicts as well. We ensure that, if need be, we can again hold enemy soldiers in prison camps inside our country if we need to, without becoming embroiled in a tempest of litigation.

I imagine that, now that Congress has clearly shut off access to habeas lawsuits, the lawyers suing on behalf of the detainees will shift their efforts toward arguing for an expansive interpretation of the judicial review allowed under the DTA. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 1005(e) of the DTA allow the DC Circuit to review a CSRT enemy combatant determination. The Government has provided a CSRT hearing to every detainee held at Guantanamo, with the likely exception of those transferred there this month, so all of those detainees will now be allowed to seek DTA review in the DC Circuit. Paragraphs 2 and 3 allow the DC Circuit to ask whether the military applied its own standards and procedures for CSRTs to the detainee, and they allow the court to ask whether those standards are constitutional and are consistent with nontreaty Federal law. I think that those standards speak for themselves, that they clearly allow only a very limited review. In particular, they do not allow the courts to second-guess the military's evidentiary findings. The courts simply are not in a position, they do not have the expertise, to judge whether particular evidence suggests that an individual is an enemy combatant.

I would like to note here that this is the consensus view of the DTA at this time, at least for now. I have no doubt that in the future, lawyers will argue that these standards invite the court to reweigh the evidence, to take in evidence outside of the CSRT record, and to decide if the military was right about its factual judgment. At this time, however, both proponents and opponents of section 7 of the MCA seem to agree on what kind of review it will allow. Earlier today, for example, I heard Senator Specter, who opposes section 7, criticize the paragraph 2 and 3 review standards on the Senate floor. He said, "the statute provides that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia only to the extent that it was--the ruling was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense. Now, to comply with the standards and procedures determined by the Secretary of Defense does not mean--excludes on its face--a factual determination as to what happens to the detainees."

I have also come into possession of a so-called fact sheet on the DTA review standards that is being distributed on Capitol Hill by Human Rights First, a group that is lobbying Senators to oppose the MCA and to support the Specter amendment that was defeated earlier today. This fact sheet is titled, "The Limited Review Allowed Under the DTA is No Substitute for Habeas." Here is what the Human Rights First fact sheet says:

The DTA restricts the court to determining whether the prior CSRTs followed their own procedures.


It has been suggested that the court of appeals, in reviewing the CSRT decisions, can fix the problem simply by choosing to review the evidence itself. But that is simply not the way the statute reads. The government has taken the firm position in Bismullah that no review even of "significant exculpatory evidence" is permitted under the DTA. If Congress believes that the courts should be allowed to review the evidence--and they clearly should be--then it should change the statute to say so. It is no solution to hope that the courts will ignore the actual statutory language and rewrite the statute to correct the deficiency.

There you have it. Senators have been told in floor debate by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee that the DTA "excludes on its face" any factual determination with regard to the Guantanamo detainees. The groups lobbying Senators with regard to the MCA have pointed out that having courts make their own factual determinations, to judge the sufficiency of the evidence behind the military's findings, "is simply not the way the statute reads." We are informed that the Justice Department has taken the "firm position" that no evidentiary review is permitted under the DTA. And we are told that if we disagree with this system, if we think that "the courts should be allowed to review the evidence," then we "should change the statute to say so." The Senate is clearly on notice as to how the DTA review will work, what the statute says on its face, how the Justice Department has construed that statute. By rejecting the Specter amendment earlier today, and by passing the MCA later today, the Senate makes clear that it does not disagree with the Justice Department and does not want to change this system.

I will close my remarks by quoting at length from the testimony of U.S. Attorney General William Barr, who spoke on the matters addressed by this legislation before the Judiciary Committee on June 15, 2005. Mr. Barr's testimony informs our understanding of the history, law, and practical reality underlying the DTA and the MCA. I would commend his statement to anyone seeking to understand these statutes and the complex relationship between the President's war-making power and the judiciary. This relationship is superficially similar to, but is fundamentally different from, the judiciary's oversight of the civilian criminal justice system. I particularly found to be true Mr. Barr's emphasis that the proper role of the courts in this area is not accurately described as "deference" to military decisions because deference implies that the ultimate decisions still lie with the courts. As Mr. Barr notes, "the point here is that the ultimate substantive decision rests with the President and that the courts have no authority to substitute their judgments for that of the President."

Here is an extended excerpt from Attorney General Barr's testimony regarding the detention of alien enemy combatants:

The determination that a particular foreign person seized on the battlefield is an enemy combatant has always been recognized as a matter committed to the sound judgment of the Commander in Chief and his military forces. There has never been a requirement that our military engage in evidentiary proceedings to establish that each individual captured is, in fact, an enemy combatant. Nevertheless, in the case of the detainees at Guantanamo, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy have established Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRTs") to permit each detainee a fact- based review of whether they are properly classified as enemy combatants and an opportunity to contest such designation.

As to the detention of enemy combatants, World War II provides a dramatic example. During that war, we held hundreds of thousands of German and Italian prisoners in detention camps within the United States. These foreign prisoners were not charged with anything; they were not entitled to lawyers; they were not given access to U.S. courts; and the American military was not required to engage in evidentiary proceedings to establish that each was a combatant. They were held until victory was achieved, at which time they were repatriated. The detainees at Guantanamo are being held under the same principles, except, unlike the Germans and Italians, they are actually being afforded an opportunity to contest their designation as enemy combatants.

Second, once hostile forces are captured, the subsidiary question arises whether they belonged to an armed force covered by the protections of the Geneva Convention and hence entitled to POW status? If the answer is yes, then the captives are held as prisoners of war entitled to be treated in accord with the various requirements of the Convention. If the answer is no, then the captives are held under humane conditions according to the common law of war, though not covered by the various requirements of the Convention. The threshold determination in deciding whether the Convention applies is a "group" decision, not an individualized decision. The question is whether the military formation to which the detainee belonged was covered by the Convention. This requires that the military force be that of a signatory power and that it also comply with the basic requirements of Article 4 of the Treaty, e.g., the militia must wear distinguishing uniforms, retain a military command structure, and so forth. Here, the President determined that neither al- Qaeda nor Taliban forces qualified under the Treaty.

The third kind of action we are taking goes beyond simply holding an individual as an enemy combatant. It applies so far only to a subset of the detainees and is punitive in nature. In some cases, we are taking the further step of charging an individual with violations of the laws of war. This involves individualized findings of guilt. Throughout our history we have used military tribunals to try enemy forces accused of engaging in war crimes. Shortly after the attacks of 9/11, the President established military commissions to address war crimes committed by members of al- Qaeda and their Taliban supporters.

Again, our experience in World War II provides a useful analog. While the vast majority of Axis prisoners were simply held as enemy combatants, military commissions were convened at various times during the war, and in its immediate aftermath, to try particular Axis prisoners for war crimes. One notorious example was the massacre of American troops at Malmedy during the Battle of the Bulge. The German troops responsible for these violations were tried before military commissions.

Let me turn to address some of the challenges being made to the way we are proceeding with these al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees.

I. The Determination That Foreign Persons Are Enemy Combatants

The Guantanamo detainees' status as enemy combatants has been reviewed and re-reviewed within the Executive Branch and the military command structure. Nevertheless, the argument is being advanced that foreign persons captured by American forces on the battlefield have a Due Process right under the Fifth Amendment to an evidentiary hearing to fully litigate whether they are, in fact, enemy combatants. In over 225 years of American military history, there is simply no precedent for this claim.

The easy and short answer to this claim is that it has been, as a practical matter, mooted by the military's voluntary use of the CSRT process, which gives each detainee the opportunity to contest his status as an enemy combatant. As discussed below, those procedures are clearly not required by the Constitution. Rather they were adopted by the military as a prudential matter.

Nonetheless, those procedures would plainly satisfy any conceivable due process standard that could be found to apply. In its recent Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court set forth the due process standards that would apply to the detention of an American citizen as an enemy combatant. The CSRT process was modeled after the Hamdi provisions and thus provides at least the same level of protection to foreign detainees as the Supreme Court said would be sufficient to detain an American citizen as an enemy combatant. Obviously, if these procedures are sufficient for American citizens, they are more than enough for foreign detainees who have no colorable claim to due process rights.

Moreover, most of the guarantees embodied in the CSRT parallel and even surpass the rights guaranteed to American citizens who wish to challenge their classification as enemy combatants. The Supreme Court has indicated that hearings conducted to determine a detainee's prisoner-of-war status, pursuant to the Geneva Convention, could satisfy the core procedural guarantees owed to an American citizen. In certain respects, the protocols established in the CSRTs closely resemble a status hearing, as both allow all detainees to attend open proceedings, to use an interpreter, to call and question witnesses, and to testify or not testify before the panel. Furthermore, the United States has voluntarily given all detainees rights that are not found in any prisoner-of- war status hearing, including procedures to ensure the independence of panel members and the right to a personal representative to help the detainee prepare his case. Nevertheless, there appear to be courts and critics who continue to claim that the Due Process Clause applies and that the CSRT process does not go far enough. I believe these assertions are frivolous.

I am aware of no legal precedent that supports the proposition that foreign persons confronted by U.S. troops in the zone of battle have Fifth Amendment rights that they can assert against the American troops. On the contrary, there are at least three reasons why the Fifth Amendment has no applicability to such a situation. First, as the Supreme Court has consistently held, the Fifth Amendment does not have extra-territorial application to foreign persons outside the United States. As Justice Kennedy has observed, "[T]he Constitution does not create, nor do general principles of law create, any juridical relation between our country and some undefined, limitless class of non-citizens who are beyond our territory." Moreover, as far as I am aware, prior to their capture, none of the detainees had taken any voluntary act to place themselves under the protection of our laws; their only connection with the United States is that they confronted U.S. troops on the battlefield. And finally, the nature of the power being used against these individuals is not the domestic law enforcement power--we are not seeking to subject these individuals to the obligations and sanctions of our domestic laws--rather, we are waging war against them as foreign enemies, a context in which the concept of Due Process is inapposite.

In society today, we see a tendency to impose the judicial model on virtually every field of decision-making. The notion is that the propriety of any decision can be judged by determining whether it satisfies some objective standard of proof and that such a judgment must be made by a "neutral" arbiter based on an adversarial evidentiary hearing. What we are seeing today is an extreme manifestation of this--an effort to take the judicial rules and standard applicable in the domestic law enforcement context and extend them to the fighting of wars. In my view, nothing could be more farcical, or more dangerous.

These efforts flow from a fundamental error--confusion between two very distinct constitutional realms. In the domestic realm of law enforcement, the government's role is disciplinary--sanctioning an errant member of society for transgressing the internal rules of the body politic. The Framers recognized that in the name of maintaining domestic tranquility an overzealous government could oppress the very body politic it is meant to protect. The government itself could become an oppressor of "the people."

Thus our Constitution makes the fundamental decision to sacrifice efficiency in the realm of law enforcement by guaranteeing that no punishment can be meted out in the absence of virtual certainty of individual guilt. Both the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights contain a number of specific constraints on the Executive's law enforcement powers, many of which expressly provide for a judicial role as a neutral arbiter or "check" on executive power. In this realm, the Executive's subjective judgments are irrelevant; it must gather and present objective evidence of guilt satisfying specific constitutional standards at each stage of a criminal proceeding. The underlying premise in this realm is that it is better for society to suffer the cost of the guilty going free than mistakenly to deprive an innocent person of life or liberty. The situation is entirely different in armed conflict where the entire nation faces an external threat. In armed conflict, the body politic is not using its domestic disciplinary powers to sanction an errant member, rather it is exercising its national defense powers to neutralize the external threat and preserve the very foundation of all our civil liberties. Here the Constitution is not concerned with handicapping the government to preserve other values. Rather it is designed to maximize the government's efficiency to achieve victory--even at the cost of "collateral damage" that would be unacceptable in the domestic realm.

It seems to me that the kinds of military decisions at issue here--namely, what and who poses a threat to our military operations--are quintessentially Executive in nature. They are not amenable to the type of process we employ in the domestic law enforcement arena. They cannot be reduced to neat legal formulas, purely objective tests and evidentiary standards. They necessarily require the exercise of prudential judgment and the weighing of risks. This is one of the reasons why the Constitution vests ultimate military decision-making in the President as Commander-in-Chief. If the concept of Commander-in-Chief means anything, it must mean that the office holds the final authority to direct how, and against whom, military power is to be applied to achieve the military and political objectives of the campaign.

I am not speaking here of "deference" to Presidential decisions. In some contexts, courts are fond of saying that they "owe deference" to some Executive decisions. But this suggests that the court has the ultimate decision-making authority and is only giving weight to the judgment of the Executive. This is not a question of deference--the point here is that the ultimate substantive decision rests with the President and that courts have no authority to substitute their judgments for that of the President.

The Constitution's grant of "Commander-in-Chief" power must, at its core, mean the plenary authority to direct military force against persons the Commander judges as a threat to the safety of our forces, the safety of our homeland, or the ultimate military and political objectives of the conflict. At the heart of these kinds of military decisions is the judgment of what constitutes a threat or potential threat and what level of coercive force should be employed to deal with these dangers. These decisions cannot be reduced to tidy evidentiary standards, some predicate threshold, that must be satisfied as a condition of the President ordering the use of military force against a particular individual. What would that standard be? Reasonable suspicion, probable cause, substantial evidence, preponderance of the evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt? Does anyone really believe that the Constitution prohibits the President from using coercive military force against a foreign person--detaining him--unless he can satisfy a particular objective standard of evidentiary proof?

Let me posit a battlefield scenario. American troops are pinned down by sniper fire from a village. As the troops advance, they see two men running from a building from which the troops believe they had received sniper fire. The troops believe they are probably a sniper team. Is it really being suggested that the Constitution vests these men with due process rights as against the American soldiers? When do these rights arise? If the troops shoot and kill them--i.e., deprive them of life--could it be a violation of due process? Suppose they are wounded and it turns out they were not enemy forces. Does this give rise to Bivens' Constitutional tort actions for violation of due process? Alternatively, suppose the fleeing men are captured and held as enemy combatants. Does the due process clause really mean that they have to be released unless the military can prove they were enemy combatants? Does the Due Process Clause mean that the American military must divert its energies and resources from fighting the war and dedicate them to investigating the claims of innocence of these two men?

This illustrates why military decisions are not susceptible to judicial administration and supervision. There are simply no judicially-manageable standards to either govern or evaluate military operational judgments. Such decisions inevitably involve the weighing of risks. One can easily imagine situations in which there is an appreciable risk that someone is an enemy combatant, but significant uncertainty and not a preponderance of evidence. Nevertheless, the circumstances may be such that the President makes a judgment that prudence dictates treating such a person as hostile in order to avoid an unacceptable risk to our military operations. By their nature, these military judgments must rest upon a broad range of information, opinion, prediction, and even surmise. The President's assessment may include reports from his military and diplomatic advisors, field commanders, intelligence sources, or sometimes just the opinion of frontline troops. He must decide what weight to give each of these sources. He must evaluate risks in light of the present state of the conflict and the overall military and political objectives of the campaign.

Furthermore, extension of due process concepts from the domestic prosecutive arena as a basis for judicial supervision of our military operations in time of war would not only be wholly unprecedented, but it would be fundamentally incompatible with the power to wage war itself, so altering and degrading that capacity as to negate the Constitution's grant of that power to the President.

First, the imposition of such procedures would fundamentally alter the character and mission of our combat troops. To the extent that the decisions to detain persons as enemy combatants are based in part on the circumstances of the initial encounter on the battlefield, our frontline troops will have to concern themselves with developing and preserving evidence as to each individual they capture, at the same time as they confront enemy forces in the field. They would be diverted from their primary mission--the rapid destruction of the enemy by all means at their disposal--to taking notes on the conduct of particular individuals in the field of battle. Like policeman, they would also face the prospect of removal from the battlefield to give evidence at post-hoc proceedings.

Nor would the harm stop there. Under this due process theory, the military would have to take on the further burden of detailed investigation of detainees' factual claims once they are taken to the rear. Again, this would radically change the nature of the military enterprise. To establish the capacity to conduct individualized investigations and adversarial hearings as to every detained combatant would make the conduct of war--especially irregular warfare--vastly more cumbersome and expensive. For every platoon of combat troops, the United States would have to field three platoons of lawyers, investigators, and paralegals. Such a result would inject legal uncertainty into our military operations, divert resources from winning the war into demonstrating the individual "fault" of persons confronted in the field of battle, and thereby uniquely disadvantage our military vis-a- vis every other fighting force in the world.

Second, the introduction of an ultimate decision maker outside of the normal chain of command, or altogether outside the Executive Branch, would disrupt the unitary chain of command and undermine the confidence of frontline troops in their superior officers. The impartial tribunals could literally overrule command decisions regarding battlefield tactics and set free prisoners of war whom American soldiers have risked or given their lives to capture. The effect of such a prospect on military discipline and morale is impossible to predict.

The Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush does not undercut these long-standing principles. In Rasul, the Supreme Court addressed a far narrower question--whether the habeas statute applies extraterritorially--and expressly refrained from addressing these settled constitutional questions. The Court, in concluding that the habeas statute reached aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, relied on the peculiar language of the statute and the " `extraordinary territorial ambit' of the writ at common law." Of course, the idiosyncrasies of the habeas statute do not have any impact on judicial interpretation of the reach of the Fifth Amendment or other substantive constitutional provisions. Moreover, the Court's recognition in Rasul that the United States exercises control, but "not ultimate sovereignty" over the leased Guantanamo Bay territory confirms the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment to aliens held there.

Nevertheless, even if Guantanamo Bay is somehow deemed sovereign United States territory, the Fifth Amendment is still inapplicable. The Supreme Court, in addition to the requisite detention on sovereign United States territory, demands that the aliens only "receive constitutional protections" when they have also "developed substantial connections with this country." Thus, under the Court's formulation, "lawful but involuntary" presence in the United States "is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country" sufficient to trigger constitutional protections. The "voluntary connection" necessary to trigger the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee is sorely lacking with respect to enemy combatants.

Whatever else may be said, there can be no dispute that these individuals did not arrive at Guantanamo Bay by free choice. Captured enemy combatants that have been transported to Guantanamo Bay for detention thus are not entitled to Fifth Amendment due process rights. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul was a statutory ruling, not a constitutional one. In other words, the Court concluded only that the federal habeas statute confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear claims brought by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay. The Court nowhere suggested that the Constitution grants such aliens a right of access to American courts.

An important consequence follows: Congress remains free to restrict or even to eliminate entirely the ability of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay to file habeas petitions. Congress could consider enacting legislation that does so--either by creating special procedural rules for enemy alien detainees, by requiring any such habeas petitions to be filed in a particular court, or by prohibiting enemy aliens from haling military officials into court altogether."

Mr. President, with the Military Commissions Act, the Senate today enacts Mr. Barr's third suggestion. We create a system that is consistent with our treaty obligations but that also is consistent with military tradition and the needs of our fighting forces in a time of war. It is a system that will serve this Nation well. I look forward to the act's passage and enactment.

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