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The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Utah is recognized.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I know the distinguished Senator from Washington would like to make some remarks, but let me just make a few comments about the remarks of my distinguished friend from Georgia.

I do not entirely disagree with Senator Nunn, the distinguished Senator from Georgia. At the outset, I want to call my colleagues' attention to the fact that the Congress has already acted in this area this year. Section 378 of the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 1996, which is already law, specifically provides the military can provide training facilities, sensors, protective clothing and antidotes to Federal, State, and local law enforcement in chemical and biological emergencies.

From this country's earliest days, the American people have sought to limit military involvement in civilian affairs. In the wake of the terrible tragedy in Oklahoma, with the heightened sensitivity to the threat of terrorism this country faces, some feel like giving the military a more prominent role in combating terrorism both here and abroad. This is not a policy we should rush into.

I must add, I support the provision, which is known as the Nunn- Thurmond provision, in the Senate bill. Americans have always been suspicious of using the military in domestic law enforcement, and rightly so. Civilian control of the military and separation of the military from domestic law enforcement feature prominently in the early history of this country, from the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence listed among our grievances against the King of England that he had "kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature," and had "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power."

It was abuse of military authority in domestic affairs, especially in the South after the Civil War, that motivated Congress to impose the first so-called posse comitatus statute. The term "posse comitatus" means power of the country and has as its origin the power of the sheriff through common law to call upon people to help him execute the law.

The statute, in 18 U.S.C. 1385, prevents the Federal Government from using the Army or Air Force to execute the law, except where Congress expressly creates an exception. Domestic law enforcement thus remains as is, in the hands of local communities.

Currently, as I understand it, Congress has created only limited exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. The President can call out the military if terrorists threaten the use of nuclear weapons or if the rights of any group of people are denied and the State in which they reside is unable or unwilling to secure their lawful rights.

The military is also authorized to share intelligence information with Federal law enforcement in attempts to combat drug trafficking. These are limited exceptions to the act, however, and do not generally empower the military to be actively involved in the enforcement of domestic laws. We have done well with a separation between military authority and domestic law enforcement. Although this proposal seems sensible and appears simply to expand upon the military's preexisting authority, to become involved if the use of nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons is threatened, it may, in fact, be unnecessary.

The premise underlying this amendment is that there does not exist among civilian law enforcement the expertise to deal effectively with chemical or biological agents. However, I believe that such expertise is available outside of the military. Particularly in the area of chemical agents, civil authorities and even the private sector have considerable experience in containing these substances.

Moreover, the military can already assist civil authorities in all aspects of responding to the type of crisis contemplated by this amendment but one: The actual use of military personnel to disable or contain the device. The military can lend equipment, it can provide instructions and technical advice on how to disable or contain a chemical or biological agent, and it can train civil authorities, if necessary.

The one thing that this amendment adds to the military's ability to assist civil law enforcement is the permission to put military personnel on the scene and inject them directly into civilian law enforcement. This is, in my view, the one thing we should not do.

This amendment would raise troubling implications going to the heart of the Posse Comitatus Act. It recognizes, as it must, that whenever law enforcement personnel are engaged in an evolving criminal event, there are unpredictable and exigent circumstances. The personnel on the scene must be able to take the necessary steps, including making arrests, conducting searches and seizures and sometimes using force to protect lives and property. Yet, the posse comitatus statute was enacted precisely to ensure that the military would not engage in such civilian law enforcement functions.

Let me just say this. I agreed to the language that the distinguished Senator would like to put back in this bill in the Senate bill. I would not be unhappy if that language was in this bill. Unfortunately, the reason it is not is because we have people in the other body who basically are concerned about some of these issues that I have just raised. Rightly or wrongly, they are concerned, and we were unable in our deliberations, as much as we got this bill put together, as much as we have made it a very strong bill, we were unable to get that provision in.

Let us just be brutally frank about this. If there is a motion to recommit on this issue, or any other issue, and that motion is approved by the Senate, then the antiterrorism bill is dead. If we do not, there will be a chance to put it through.

Frankly, we have a very good bill here. It may not have every detail in it that I would like to have. It does not have every detail in it that the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee would like to have or our distinguished colleagues Senators Biden or Nunn would like to have. I might add, it does not have all the provisions in it that Congressmen Barr and McCollum and Buyer and Schiff and others would like to have.

Nobody is totally going to get everything they want in this bill. But what it does have is a lot of good law enforcement provisions that will make a real difference, in fact, right now against terrorism in our country and internationally. We simply cannot shoot the bill down because we cannot get a provision in at this particular time that we particularly want.

We all understand this process. We all understand that we cannot always get everything in these bills that we want to. But I will make a commitment to my friend and colleague from Georgia, as I have on other matters. I do not disagree with him in the sense that this is something that perhaps we should do. I will make a commitment to do everything in my power to make sure we look at it in every way, and if we do not do it here--and I suggest we should not do it here on this bill under these circumstances--then I will try later in a bill that we can formulate that will resolve some of these conflicts that both the distinguished Senator from Delaware and I and the distinguished Senator from Georgia and I would like to see in this bill--and others, I might add.

So there is no desire to keep anybody's provision out of the bill. There is no desire to not solve this problem. The problem is we cannot do it on this bill and pass an antiterrorism bill this year. I think one reason the President called me last Sunday, I am sure, is because he has been asking us to get him a terrorism bill. This is it. This is the week to do it. I think we have done a really extraordinary job of bringing this bill back from what it was when the House passed its bill.

I give credit to the House Members. There have been a lot of wonderful people over there who have worked hard on this. I have mentioned some of them in my remarks here today. But certainly the distinguished chairman over there, Chuck Schumer, and others, and Bob Barr and others, have worked very hard on this bill.

None of us have everything we want in this bill. And none of us want to see it go down to defeat because of any one provision that we can solve later as we continue to study and look at this matter.

Also, one of the problems we have had in trying to bring together people on this very important piece of legislation is that there have been some perceptions over in the House as a result of some of the mistakes that law enforcement has made that perhaps we might be going too far if we follow completely the Senate bill as it came out of the Senate Chamber.

I think those perceptions are wrong, but the fact is they are there. I think we have to work on them and educate and make sure that we, by doing future bills, will resolve these problems, solve them in the minds of not only Members of the House of Representatives who have complaints against some of this information, but also in the minds of others who would like their own provisions in the bill.

I have to say there are some--and I do not include the distinguished Senator from Georgia among them--but there are some who are just plain and simply trying to stop this bill. They hate the habeas corpus provisions of this bill. I know the distinguished Senator from Georgia does not, that he is with me on those issues, but they do. And they will use any strategy to try to stop this bill because they do not want to have death penalty reform. This bill is going to bring that to all of us. It is worth it.

If that is all we had in this bill, it is the one provision that every victim who appeared here yesterday and in the past has said they want more than anything else. There is a very good reason to pass this bill for that reason alone. But there are so many other good provisions in the bill that we ought to pass it. We ought to pass it, even though one or more provisions that we think might make the bill better cannot be put into it at this time.

We have really worked our guts out to come out with a bill that I think can be supported in a bipartisan manner. We have really worked hard on that. I do not care who gets the credit for this bill. I can say we have worked very, very hard to have a bill that all of us can be proud of. And I think we do have one. Does it have everything in it? No. But it has so much in it that we really have to go ahead and get it done.

If this motion or any subsequent motions to recommit are passed, this bill will be dead. I think that would be one of the most tragic things that this body could do this week, just a few days before the anniversary date of the Oklahoma City bombing.

Yesterday, we had people from Pan Am 103 here as well. We had others. Frankly, they all asked us to get this bill through. I am doing everything I can to get it through. So I hope people will vote against this motion even though I myself have a great deal of respect for the Senator from Georgia, a great deal of empathy for his position, and I would, even if I did not understand it, I would want to support him as I often have done through the years here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

I think basically that says it. I hope people will vote against any motion to recommit because it would be tragic for this bill to go down. I cannot imagine the majority voting it that way. I hope they will not in this particular instance.

I yield the floor.

Mr. Nunn addressed the Chair.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Georgia is recognized.

Mr. Nunn: Mr. President, I will just make a few brief remarks.

I have tremendous respect for my friend from Utah. He knows that. He and I have been on the same side of the habeas corpus issue for a long time. Now the Governor of Florida, then Senator from Florida, Lawton Chiles, and I came to the floor for 2 or 3 weeks in a row every day back in the 1970's, I believe--time slips by--about the importance of reform in habeas corpus. So I certainly share his view on that.

As much as I think that needs reforming, I do not think that habeas corpus statutes are the problem now. It has been somewhat modified by the courts themselves. I do not think that is as urgent as what we are talking about here, because with the hearings we have had and with the tremendous amount of effort that I have made and Senator Lugar and others have made in this whole problem of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, I do not know whether anything is going to happen next week, next month, or next year.

I do know that we could have some calamity happen without any notice in this area. I hate to see our Nation so ill-prepared to deal with a threat that is much more likely to happen than some of the threats that we are prepared to deal with.

Mr. President, something has happened to our Republican friends in the House of Representatives. I am not sure what deal was struck over there, but I recall very well being on the floor of the Senate--and my friend from Utah probably recalls this, too--when the House of Representatives passed an amendment--this was a good many years ago during the Reagan administration--that basically gave an order, waived the posse comitatus statute, gave the order, I believe by Congressman Hunter from California, to shut the borders down with our military, basically shut them down, I believe, within 45 days saying the military would be deployed all over the borders of the United States to basically close the borders, not let any drugs come through.

We computed that we would have to bring all our military forces back from Europe, from Korea, from Japan, everywhere else to put them side by side virtually on the border to comply with that. It passed the House, and it was a Republican-sponsored amendment. Of course, after some light was shone over here on the floor of the Senate, we rejected that amendment. It did not happen.

I also have a long history in this posse comitatus area because I thought certain carefully crafted exceptions to the statute needed to be made in the law enforcement and drug area, but carefully constructed so we did not get our military involved in search and seizure and arrest on a routine basis. I found myself debating the then-Senator from California, now Governor of California, where he proposed an amendment that would have had the military be able to make any kind of arrest and search and seizure for drug transactions in the domestic United States.

That was another very, very broad waiver of the posse comitatus statute that I would have opposed. This would have made, on a routine basis, a military response for law enforcement. I opposed that. That was going too far.

Here we have my colleagues on the House side, and for some reason now they have switched all the way over and they are worried about even using the military in a situation where we have a desperate situation with chemical and biological weapons where nobody else can handle it. I do not understand it. I do not understand what has transpired. But something strange has taken place here.

I do think we have to approach this whole posse comitatus area with great care. We do not want our military engaged in law enforcement except as an absolute last resort when there is no other alternative and when the result of failure to be involved would be catastrophic.

I also would ask my friend from Utah--and I know he has tried to sustain the Senate position on this; I know him well enough to know that he has done that, and you cannot do it on every item in conference--but I do not understand how people who supported the exception on the nuclear side to the posse comitatus statute that was made at the Reagan administration's request have a different view now. During the Reagan administration, they said they needed this exception. We had the same Constitution then, the same Supreme Court decisions, the same insurrection statute, but they wanted an exemption in the nuclear area so they could clearly have statutory authority. We supported that. That was not a partisan issue at all. Democrats and Republicans supported it. President Reagan signed it into law.

Now we have the same kind of situation, almost identical, in the chemical and biological area. We have a different President in the White House, who is a Democrat, and we have a whole switch in positions where people say, "Oh, we don't need this. We don't need it. We can't give them this authority," and so forth. I do not understand it. I understand partisan positions, but I do not understand completely switching philosophical positions on something of this nature.

I make one other point. The Senator from Utah mentioned the provision we passed recently in the defense authorization bill that allowed the equipment of the military to be used and to be loaned to law enforcement and other domestic officials in situations that are chemical-biological. That is a very useful addition to the present authority. What you have to have there is personnel who are trained to use that equipment. You cannot jump into chemical protective gear and know how to operate it in an emergency situation, if the Defense Department brings it in and hands it to local police. You have to be trained in that.

The military spends hundreds of hours training people in that regard. It will take years and years and years to train our domestic law enforcement and fire officials all over this country in the use of that kind of equipment. Unless they are already trained, that statute will not be available for practical use in an emergency situation. They may try to use it, but it will not do the job because it does not authorize military personnel to operate the equipment.

We simply have a multiple number of cities around this country that could be struck, and we cannot freeze out and prevent our military from being involved in an emergency dire situation as a last resort. We have to have people who are trained and know how to use the equipment, not only protective gear but protective equipment. It cannot be done at the last minute when there is an immediate threat of attack.

Mr. President, I would not be speaking in favor of this motion to recommit on an important bill like this if I did not think that the failure to act in this regard could have a very serious consequence. None of us can predict at what time interval something like this will occur. I hope never.

I must say, the probability of having some kind of chemical or biological attack in the United States in the next several years is, in my view, a rather high probability. We will have to do a lot more than we have done so far to get ready for it. I hope that somehow the House of Representatives will recognize that.

I know the Senator from Utah is absolutely sincere in his willingness to revisit this issue and try to put it on another bill. If this motion does not pass, I will work with him in that regard. I hope that those in the House will reexamine their position. I hope they get some of their staff to go through the records. We have had a considerable number of hearings on this explicit point.

We have had all sorts of expert testimony from the fire chiefs around the country, from law enforcement officials, from Justice Department officials, the FBI, the military. We have had detailed hearings on the attack in Tokyo, what occurred there. Not only are we not prepared law enforcement-wise in this regard, we do not have the emergency medical training required in most of our American cities to deal with the aftermath of this kind of event if it did occur. We would simply be overwhelmed, and people would ask all of us, "Where were you when this threat was being discussed, when you were, basically, responsible for doing something about it? Why did somebody not try to prevent it from happening, or at least prepare us to deal with the terrible medical, tragic consequence of this kind of attack?"

Again, I urge the Biden amendment be adopted.

Mr. Gorton:. Mr. President, in monitoring the beginning of this debate, a set of lyrics from a source that I usually do not use came to mind as a bit of advice for the distinguished Senator from Delaware. These lyrics come from the Rolling Stones: "You can't always get what you want. But if you try real hard you just might find, you just mind find, you get what you need."

Now, Mr. President, the conferees have tried real hard. They have tried real hard and I think indisputably, they have produced a bill that we very, very much need.

Most of this afternoon, however, has been spent pointing out the bill's shortcomings, elements that the Senator from Delaware or the Senator from Georgia or, for that matter, the Senator from Utah wish were in the bill but are not. Certainly, this bill is not everything that the Senator from Delaware wishes, but it does contain a lot of what he thinks is constructive. Even he admits, and I think I am quoting correctly, it is a "useful, if frail" antiterrorism bill.

Senator Hatch, the distinguished Senator from Utah, has already outlined the positive steps in connection with a campaign against terrorism which are included in the conference report that is before the Senate now. I will not take up the time of the Senate simply by repeating them now. What we are faced with in the course of the current debate, however, is the question of whether or not we should reject what the conference committee has done, send it back, and ask that the committee effectively start all over again.

This conference committee has labored long enough. I do not believe that the Senator from Utah has left anything on the table. I do not think that he walked away having omitted anything from this bill that his very best efforts and the help of other Senate Members in both parties could possibly have gotten included for us to make better an already fine proposition.

What we have here is a meaningful antiterrorism bill, one that will make the law better than it is at the present time, one that will help the President and our Federal law enforcement officers by adding to the tools to deal with a new, highly regrettable situation with which our society is faced.

But there is something else in this bill, Mr. President. That something else is highly controversial, something that I believe the President of the United States would just as soon not have in it, something that I think a number of other Members wish were not a part of this bill. Something, however, that I think is particularly important. That is the reform of our entire habeas corpus procedures in connection with the conviction for serious crimes.

Doing something about a flawed habeas corpus system has been discussed in this Senate since I began serving here over a decade ago. We finally have an opportunity this evening in connection with this bill to do something positive about it.

I believe that the Senator from Delaware has complained that habeas corpus reform is not relevant to an antiterrorism bill. Just as an aside, Mr. President, I find it a charming argument coming from the side of the aisle which insists on our voting on Social Security amendments and minimum wage amendments as a part of the debate over immigration. I am tempted to say that we might have stronger rules of relevance in connection with all of our debates. Be that as it may, I am convinced that habeas corpus is relevant to a bill with respect to terrorism.

Mr. President, to deal effectively with any criminal challenge, we must have effective, clear, and cogent criminal statutes. We must have strong and skilled law enforcement officers to enforce those statutes and to arrest people who violate them. It is also absolutely vital, Mr. President, that when we do so, that when our system of justice has moved from apprehension through trial and conviction, that the people of the United States have a degree of confidence in the finality of those convictions after appropriate appeals, and that the punishments prescribed in those statutes will actually be carried out. That is an area, a field in which we have been a significant failure, Mr. President, because of the almost unlimited nature of our habeas corpus provisions.

We talk of doing something about terrorism and the fear it instills because the people of the United States lack trust and confidence in their criminal justice system and feel unsafe on their streets, at least in part because they see delay after delay, appeal after appeal, a total lack of finality, thousands of dollars after thousands of dollars going into the endless delays in the execution of sentences, particularly related to capital punishment.

Now, reforming habeas corpus is vitally important in that connection, Mr. President, and not just with respect to antiterrorism legislation, but with respect to all of the other serious crimes principally contained in our State and Federal criminal codes.

Let us move from the abstract to the concrete for just a few moments. I would like to remind my colleagues of the subject on which I have spoken a number of times in the course of the last Congress--one particular case in the State of Washington, which illustrates the frustration that our people feel with a system of endless appeals.

Charles Campbell was tried and sent to jail for the rape of a particular woman in a county just north of Seattle, WA. When he was on work release he went back to the home of this woman and murdered her, together with her 8-year-old daughter and a neighbor who just happened to be in the way. In 1982, he was charged with capital murder for those offenses and convicted. By 1984, that conviction had gone through the entire State court system, and the conviction and sentence had been affirmed by the Supreme Court for the State of Washington. From 1984 to 1994, Mr. President--10 additional years--57 separate actions were taken in the Federal courts of the United States--a first direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was turned down, followed by innumerable petitions for habeas corpus and appeals from various orders in those habeas corpus petitions.

Remember, Mr. President, that even after a capital case has gone through all of its State court appeals and has been appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which has either affirmed it or failed to act, a single Federal district court judge can interrupt the process. That single judge can make a determination that all of the previous judges were wrong and send the case back to the State courts. More frequent than that, of course, is that the single Federal court judge, and then a circuit court of appeals, and perhaps then, again, the Supreme Court of the United States, finds nothing in error in these processes and affirms the State court decisions, at which point the process often starts over again with the filing of another petition for habeas corpus.

That, Mr. President, more than any other single factor, I think, has caused the people of the United States to lose an important degree of faith in their criminal justice system.

A reform of that system, not to deny a right of appeal, but in effect--except under extraordinary circumstances--to give only a single bite at the apple through the Federal court system, is the subject of the habeas corpus provisions that have been shepherded through both Houses of Congress by the distinguished Senator from Utah.

It is my opinion, Mr. President, that these provisions complement, and are as important, or more important, than the strictly antiterrorism elements of this legislation. It is my opinion that the more strictly antiterrorism provisions of this legislation are themselves important. I find myself in agreement with all of those here, and I think that includes every Member of the Senate who has spoken on this subject, that we ought to do better, that we ought to have more antiterrorism legislation. I think it very unlikely that that is going to happen in the course of this Congress.

As I have said before, I think the Senator from Utah got everything out of this conference committee that he could get, and the effect of a motion to recommit would simply be that we would either have no legislation on this subject, or this identical legislation, which is important, would be delayed.

Delays have already been too long, Mr. President. I sincerely hope that the Members of the Senate will reject a motion to recommit and will promptly pass this legislation. The House is certain to do the same. We will, when the President has signed it, move forward on two distinct but related fields--significant progress with respect to antiterrorism, and significant progress with respect to reforming our habeas corpus system. For that, the Senator from Utah, and all who have worked on this legislation, deserve our grateful thanks and the thanks of the American people.

Mr. Biden: Mr. President, I am sure my friend from Washington is aware that these are Federal offenses we are creating here. They have nothing to do with State habeas corpus. He is aware of that, is he not?

Mr. Gorton: Yes. I think the Senator from Washington said when the Senator from Delaware was off the floor that he regards it as rather touching that the Senator from Delaware wants to make sure everything we do is relevant to Federal antiterrorism legislation, when I believe he has been supporting the proposition on the other side of the aisle that immigration legislation should carry Social Security amendments with it and a number of other subjects of that sort.

This legislation is, of course, dealing with Federal statutes and with Federal courts. Habeas corpus legislation, of course, deals primarily with State laws and State convictions, but with the interference by the Federal courts in those procedures.

If the Senator would further yield a moment, I ask unanimous consent that a chronology of the Campbell case be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

April 14, 1982:	Campbell beats and murders Renae Wickland, in her Clearview, WA home, then beats and murders Wickland's 8-year-old daughter, along with a neighbor who stopped by the home.
November 26, 1982:	Campbell is convicted of aggravated first degree murder in Snohomish County Superior Court.
December 17, 1982:	Campbell is sentenced to death in Snohomish County Superior Court.
November 6, 1984:	Washington State Supreme Court affirms Campbell's conviction and sentence.
April 29, 1985:	The United States Supreme Court denies Campbell's request to hear an appeal of his conviction.
July 22, 1985:	Campbell files an appeal in federal district court.
February 16, 1986:	Federal district court denies Campbell's appeal after an evidentiary hearing.
February 18, 1986:	Campbell appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
October 6, 1987:	The Ninth Circuit Court affirms the district court's decision denying Campbell's appeal.
June 8, 1988:	The State of Washington moves to remove the stay on Campbell's execution.
July 10, 1988:	Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denies the state's request.
August 19, 1988:	Campbell appeals his case again to the United States Supreme Court.
November 7, 1988:	The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to hear Campbell's appeal.
November 8, 1988:	State of Washington files motion to move forward with execution of Campbell.
December 6, 1988:	State Supreme Court agrees with State's motion, denying the stay of execution.
January 25, 1989:	Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with State Supreme Court, dissolving the stay of execution.
February 15, 1989:	Snohomish County Superior Court issues a death warrant for Campbell's execution for March 30, 1989.
March 7, 1989:	Campbell files appeal with State Supreme Court and a motion to stay the execution. In both documents he raises several unsupported challenges to hanging as a method of execution.
March 23, 1989:	The State Supreme Court unanimously rejects all of Campbell's challenes against hanging and denies his motion to stay the execution. The court concludes that none of his issues warrant further consideration.
March 24, 1989:	Federal District Court Judge John Coughenour, anticipating another appeal by Campbell in federal court, summons attorneys for both sides into his chambers to discuss the matter. Upon learning from Campbell's attorneys that they intended to file an appeal the following Monday, March 27, the judge calls for an evidentiary hearing that day and in no way limits the issues that Campbell and his attorneys will be allowed to raise. The judge also orders Campbell and his former trial attorney to be present regarding Campbell's claim of ineffective counsel.
March 27, 1989:	Campbell files another appeal and, at the evidentiary hearing, raises three issues regarding hanging: (1) hanging will deprive him of constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment; (2) the state has no one qualified to perform the hanging; and (3) having to choose between execution by lethal injection or hanging violates his protection against cruel and unusual punishment and his First Amendment freedom of religion. Campbell and his attorneys offer no evidence to substantiate these issues and he again claims he was represented by ineffective counsel. Later that day, Judge Coughenour rejects Campbell's charges against hanging, and denies his motion to stay the execution.
March 28, 1989:	Campbell appeals Judge Coughenour's denial to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit stays Campbell's execution, pending the appeal.
June 27, 1989:	Attorneys for the State and for Campbell present oral argument to the Ninth Circuit Court.
February 21, 1991:	The Ninth Circuit orders the withdrawal of Campbell's latest appeal, pending responses by the attorneys on the question of whether Campbell has exhausted all legal avenues in state court.
March 4, 1991:	The State responds to the 2/21/91 order, demonstrating that Campbell has exhausted all other state remedies.
June 3, 1991:	Campbell's attorneys inform the State Supreme Court that they intend to file another appeal. This will be his third separate appeal.
August 7, 1991:	The Ninth Circuit grants Campbell's request to discharge his attorney, and delays its ruling on other issues, pending review of Campbell's new appeal, which has not yet been filed.
September 13, 1991:	Campbell files his third appeal.
October 25, 1991:	Bypassing the Ninth Circuit, the State asks the U.S. Supreme Court to compel the Ninth Circuit to resolve Campbell's earlier appeal (not the third appeal filed on 9/13/91).
January 13, 1992:	The U.S. Supreme Court denies the State's request to compel the Ninth Circuit to rule on Campbell's appeal, but indicates the State may make additional requests "if unnecessary delays or unwarranted stays" occur in the Ninth Circuit's handling of the Campbell case.
March 9, 1992:	The U.S. District Court dismisses Campbell's third appeal filed on 9/13/91.
April 1, 1992:	The Ninth Circuit Court affirms the district court's denial of Campbell's earlier appeal (not the appeal denied by the district court on 3/9/92).
April 22, 1992:	The State asks the Ninth Circuit to allow Campbell's execution to move forward and to conduct an expedited review of Campbell's third appeal (the appeal filed on 9/13/91).
May 5, 1992:	The Ninth Circuit denies both requests by the state.
May 14, 1992:	The State asks the Ninth Circuit to reconsider both of its May 5 rulings.
May 15, 1992:	Campbell's attorney and Campbell himself ask the Ninth Circuit Court for a rehearing.
June 4, 1992:	Campbell's attorney files legal brief in Campbell's third appeal.
December 24, 1992:	The Ninth Circuit affirm's the district court's denial of Campbell's third appeal.
January 20, 1993:	The Ninth Circuit hears oral arguments on Campbell's second appeal.
January 26, 1993:	The Ninth Circuit grants a request by Campbell's attorney for a rehearing of Campbell's third appeal, the denial of which the court affirmed on 12/24/92.
January 29, 1993:	The Ninth Circuit, in its reconsideration of Campbell's second appeal, orders attorneys for Campbell and the State to submit written arguments on whether hanging is cruel and unusual punishment, and whether an evidentiary hearing should be held in federal district court on the issue of hanging.
April 28, 1993:	The Ninth Circuit orders Campbell's case back to federal district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether hanging is cruel and unusual punishment.
May 4, 1993:	The State asks the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its April 28 order.
May 7, 1993:	The Ninth Circuit denies the State's request.
May 10, 1993:	The State appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking it to set aside the evidentiary hearing in federal district court and to require the Ninth Circuit court to rule on whether hanging violates the Constitution.
May 14, 1993:	Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor issues a four-page chamber opinion indicating a single high court justice does not have the authority to overrule an order by the Ninth Circuit. She cites the "glacial progress" of the Campbell case and dismisses the State's appeal "without prejudice," leaving open the door for the state to press its case before the full Supreme Court.
May 17, 1993:	The State appeals the Ninth Circuit order to the full Supreme Court.
May 24-26, 1993:	Judge Coughenour conducts an evidentiary hearing on whether hanging is cruel and unusual punishment.
June 1, 1993:	The U.S. Supreme Court denies without comment the State's request to vacate the Ninth Circuit's order to conduct the evidentiary hearing.
June 1, 1993:	Judge Coughenour issues his findings and conclusions, ruling that Washington's judicial hanging protocol fully comports with the Constitution and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
February 8, 1994:	The Ninth Circuit rules 6-5 that hanging does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and that being forced to choose death by lethal injection, or face death by hanging does not violate Campbell's constitutional rights. The ruling states that the stay of execution will be lifted and the mandate ordering the execution will be issued 21 judicial days following the order.
February 15, 1994:	Attorney General Christine O. Gregoire files a motion with the Ninth Circuit to lift the stay of execution. Attorneys for Campbell also file motions to continue the stay of execution and to request reconsideration of the Ninth Circuit's February 8 ruling by the full Circuit Court.
March 21, 1994:	After waiting more than one month for the 9th Circuit to act on her motion, Attorney General Gregoire asks the U.S. Supreme Court to remove the stay of execution. Also on this date, the U.S. Supreme Court rejects Campbell's appeal for a hearing on his third habeas petition.
March 25, 1994:	Justice Sandra Day O'Connor refuses to lift the stay of execution.
March 28, 1994:	This date marks the fifth anniversary of the stay of execution imposed by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
April 14, 1994:	This date marks the 12th anniversary of the three murders committed by Campbell.
April 14, 1994:	9th Circuit Court of Appeals lifts stay of execution.
April 15, 1994:	State sets May 27, 1994 executive date.
May 3, 1994:	Campbell asks U.S. Supreme Court to stay execution and rule on claim that hanging is unconstitutional method of execution.
May 27, 1994:	Campbell is executed.

Mr. Biden: Mr. President, once again, my friend misses the point. I am not objecting to the State portion being put in here. That is not relevant. It has nothing to do with terrorism. It is not going to effect the bill. My colleague talks about this having an impact on terrorism. I believe we should reform State habeas corpus. We should, and it is appropriate to do it in this bill, as long as my friend from Washington does not have any illusions that he can go back and tell the people of Washington that by effecting State habeas corpus he has done something about terrorism. That is the point. It is relevant, just not relevant to stopping terrorism.

The second point I will make--and then I will make my motion--is that people have been asking me about time. I am willing to enter into a time agreement. There are a maximum of a possible 14 motions. I doubt whether they will all be used. I am prepared to agree to one-half hour, equally divided, and to a time certain to vote tomorrow, or tonight, or whenever anybody wants to vote on it. So I want everybody to know that. I understand we may be trying to work that out now.

Mr. Hatch: If the Senator will yield, that would be fine with me-- one-half hour equally divided. I am prepared to go and get it done. This is that important. The President has asked for it. He said he wants it as quickly as we can do it. We have all week, but we might as well find out whether we can do it at all. I believe we can, and with cooperation we can get this done. I am happy to cooperate and do it that way--just go bing, bing, bing, from here on out.

Mr. Biden: I have no objection to keep going now. That is a call of the leadership. That is up to them. In the meantime, while we are figuring out how long we are going to go----

Mr. Hatch: If the Senator will yield, we need to see what all the motions are. We need to know what those are. We would appreciate that.

Mr. Biden: I would be happy to do that.

Motion to Recommit

Mr. Biden: I offer a motion on behalf of Senator Nunn and myself to recommit the conference report with instructions to add a provision to give the military authority in the cases of emergency involving chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. President, once I formally make that motion, I would suggest to my colleagues that we will regret mightily if there is a chemical attack and this does not pass.

I now formally offer that motion to recommit.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The clerk will read the motion.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden], for Mr. Nunn, for himself and Mr. Biden, moves to recommit the conference report with instructions to add provisions.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the motion be dispensed with.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered. The motion is as follows:

Motion to recommit the conference report on the bill S.735 to the committee of conference with instructions to the managers on the part of the Senate to disagree to the conference substitute recommended by the committee of conference and insist on inserting the following:

SEC. . AUTHORITY TO REQUEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE WITH RESPECT TO OFFENSES INVOLVING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

(a) Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Section 175 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

(c)(1) Military Assistance.--The Attorney General may request that the Secretary of Defense provide assistance in support of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of this section in an emergency situation involving biological weapons of mass destruction. Department of Defense resources, including personnel of the Department of Defense, may be used to provide such assistance if--

(A) the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General determine that an emergency situation involving biological weapons of mass destruction exists; and

(B) the Secretary of Defense determines that the provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.

(2) As used in this section, `emergency situation involving biological weapons of mass destruction' means a circumstance involving a biological weapon of mass destruction--

(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States; and

(B) in which--

(i) civilian expertise is not readily available to provide the required assistance to counter the threat posed by the biological weapon of mass destruction involved;

(ii) Department of Defense special capabilities and expertise are needed to counter the threat posed by the biological weapon of mass destruction involved; and

(iii) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired if the Department of Defense assistance were not provided.

(3) The assistance referred to in paragraph (1) includes the operation of equipment (including equipment made available under section 372 of title 10) to monitor, contain, disable, or dispose of a biological weapon of mass destruction or elements of the weapon.

(4) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly issue regulations concerning the types of assistance that may be provided under this subsection. Such regulations shall also describe the actions that Department of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to the provision of assistance under this subsection. Such regulations shall not authorize arrest or any direct participation in conducting searches and seizures that seek evidence related to violations of this section, except for the immediate protection of human life, unless participation in such activity is otherwise authorized under paragraph (3) or other applicable law.

(5) The Secretary of Defense shall require reimbursement as a condition for providing assistance under this subsection in accordance with section 377 of title 10.

(6)(A) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise the authority of the Attorney General under this subsection. The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's authority under this subsection only to the Associate Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General and only if the Associate Attorney General to whom delegated has been designated by the Attorney General to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the Attorney General.

(B) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may exercise the authority of the Secretary of Defense under this subsection. The Secretary of Defense may delegate the Secretary's authority under this subsection only to an Under Secretary of Defense or an Assistant Secretary of Defense and only if the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary to whom delegated has been designated by the Secretary to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the Secretary.

(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the executive branch in the use of military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond that provided by law before the date of enactment of [this Act].".

(b) Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction.--The Chapter 113B of Title 18, United States Code, that relates to terrorism, is amended by inserting after section 2332a the following:

Sec. 2332b. Use of chemical weapons

(a) Offense.--A person who without lawful authority uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a chemical weapon--

(1) against a national of the United States while such national is outside of the United States;

(2) against any person within the United States; or

(3) against any property that is owned, leased or used by the United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is within or outside of the United States.

shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--

(1) the term `national of the United States' has the meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); and

(2) the term `chemical weapon' means any weapon that is designed to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors.

(c)(1) Military Assistance.--The Attorney General may request that the Secretary of Defense provide assistance in support of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of this section in an emergency situation involving chemical weapons of mass destruction. Department of Defense resources, including personnel of the Department of Defense, may be used to provide such assistance if--

(A) the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General determine that an emergency situation involving chemicals weapons of mass destruction exists; and

(B) the Secretary of Defense determines that the provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.

(2) as used in this section. `emergency situation involving chemical weapons of mass destruction' means a circumstance involving a chemical weapon of mass destruction--

(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States; and

(B) in which--

(i) civilian expertise is not readily available to provide the required assistance to counter the threat posed by the chemical weapon of mass destruction involved;

(ii) Department of Defense special capabilities and expertise are needed to counter the threat posed by the biological weapon of mass destruction involved; and

(iii) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired if the Department of Defense assistance were not provided.

(3) The assistance referred to in paragraph (1) includes the operation of equipment (including equipment made available under section 372 of title 10) to monitor, contain, disable, or dispose of a chemical weapon of mass destruction or elements of the weapon.

(4) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly issue regulations concerning the types of assistance that may be provided under this subsection. Such regulations shall also describe the actions that Department of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to the provision of assistance under this subsection. Such regulations shall not authorize arrest or any direct participation in conducting searches and seizures that seek evidence related to violations of this section, except for the immediate protection of human life, unless participation in such activity is otherwise authorized under paragraph (3) or other applicable law.

(5) The Secretary of Defense shall require reimbursement as a condition for providing assistance under this subsection in accordance with section 377 of title 10.

(6)(A) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise the authority of the Attorney General under this subsection. The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's authority under this subsection only to the Associate Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General and only if the Associate Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General to whom delegated has been designated by the Attorney General to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the Attorney General.

(B) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may exercise the authority of the Secretary of Defense under this subsection. The Secretary of Defense may delegate the Secretary's authority under this subsection only to an Under Secretary of Defense or an Assistant Secretary of Defense and only if the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary to whom delegated has been designated by the Secretary to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the Secretary.

(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the executive branch in the use of military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond that provided by law before the date of enactment of [the Act].".

(c)(1) Civilian Expertise.--The President shall take reasonable measures to reduce civilian law enforcement officials' reliance on Department of Defense resources to counter the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States, including--

(A) increasing civilian law enforcement expertise to counter such threat;

(B) improving coordination between civilian law enforcement officials and other civilian sources of expertise, both within and outside the Federal Government, to counter such threat.

(2) Report requirement.--The President Shall Submit to the Congress--

(A) ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act, a report describing the respective policy functions and operational roles of Federal agencies in countering the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States.

(B) one year after the date of enactment of this Act, a report describing the actions planned to be taken and the attendant cost pertaining to paragraph (1); and

(C) three years after the date of enactment of this Act, a report updating the information provided in the reports submitted pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B), including measures taken pursuant to paragraph (1).

(D) Clerical amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2332a the following:

2332b. Use of chemical weapons.

(e) Use of weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting "without lawful authority" after "A person who".

Mr. Grassley: Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the antiterrorism bill. In my view, this bill strikes a reasonable balance between the needs of the law enforcement and national security communities and the constitutional rights of the American people. I applaud the efforts of Senator Hatch and other conferees in crafting this important and much-needed piece of legislation.

Perhaps one of the more important provisions of this bill relates to restitution to victims of crime in Federal courts. I am proud to say that key provisions of S. 1404, the Victim Restitution Enhancement Act of 1995, which I introduced on November 8, 1995, with Senator Kyl, have been incorporated into the conference report. This bill, I believe, provides victims of crime with a valuable and important way of vindicating their rights and obtaining restitution. S. 1404 provides that court orders requiring restitution will act as a lien which the victims themselves can enforce. I think this lets victims help themselves and ensures that crime victims will receive the restitution they are entitled to.

To understand why giving victims of Federal crimes the ability to seek restitution from their victimizers is a positive development, you need to understand the nature of most of the Federal crimes which give rise to restitution liability. Federal Crimes, by and large, are not crimes of violence like State crimes are. Once you exclude Federal drug prosecutions--which do not give rise to restitution liability as that term is generally understood--many Federal prosecutions are for fraud and other so-called white crimes. With fraud and white collar crimes, the victims may have substantial resources. These persons may wish to obtain restitution themselves, rather than relying on overworked prosecutors to do that job. That's what the lien does, its gives victims a powerful tool use to get restitution.

With respect to terrorism, and the Oklahoma City bombing, this means that the families of the bombing victims can seek restitution. So if the bombers come into money from any source, the victims' families can receive restitution. This is very positive development.

How does the current bill, like S. 1404, do this? Section 206(m) of the conference report establishes a lien in favor of crime victims, very similar to the lien procedure contained in S. 1404. I believe that this section will prove to be of enormous value.

Also, the conference report, section 206(n), drew on provisions in S. 1404, which provided that should prisoners who have been ordered to pay restitution file a prisoner lawsuit and receive a windfall, that windfall will go to the victims and not to the prisoner. This should take some of the lure out of prisoner lawsuits. Importantly, the conference report we are debating today also provides that windfalls received by prisoners from all sources, including lawsuits, will go to pay victims.

This conference report, in section 206(d)(3), like S. 1404, requires criminals to list all their assets under oath. This way, if criminals who owe victims try to hide their assets, they can be prosecuted for perjury. This too should help make sure that victims receive more of what they are entitled to.

While the restitution provisions of this bill are an important step in the right direction, I would also like to point out that unlike S. 1404, the conference report does not establish a hard-and-fast time limit within which restitution liability must be paid off. I think that this is a serious shortcoming. Without a bright-line for the payment of restitution, well-financed criminal defense lawyers will use legal technicalities to delay payment as long as possible. The reason that no definite time limit was included is that some Members of the minority opposed a definite time limit. So, in this respect, I believe that S. 1404 is superior to the current bill.

The conference report also makes serious and much-needed reforms of habeas corpus prisoner appeals. As even a casual observer of the criminal justice system knows, criminals have abused habeas corpus to delay just punishment.

I believe that this conference report strikes exactly the right balance on habeas corpus reform. It provides enough in the way of habeas appeals to ensure that unjustly convicted people will have a fair and full opportunity to bring forth new evidence or contest their incarceration in numerous ways. But the conference report sets meaningful limits, which should go a long way toward eliminating many of the flagrant abuses that make a mockery of justice.

If we do not pass this bill, with this habeas corpus reform package, we can pretend that we are for the death penalty. But, in reality, the death penalty will be virtually meaningless and toothless. The families of the bombing victims in Oklahoma City know this, and they support this bill.

Let us not get ourselves in the position of making mere symbolic gestures, which do not really help the American people and which do not really restore faith in the justice system. I agree with President Clinton: Punishment should be swift and sure. Just punishment must be meted out in an appropriate amount of time.

I strongly support these reforms, and again applaud the conferees for bringing this bill to the floor. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Ms. Snowe: Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the conference report on S. 735, the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act. I would like to congratulate Chairman Hatch, Senator Biden, and the other Senate conferees on both sides of the aisle for their diligent work in conference with the other body. This bill left the Senate June 7, 1995, having passed by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 91 to 8. Then the bill went over to the House, where it languished for 9 months. When it finally came up in the House for a vote on March 13, the most important anti-terrorism provisions were stripped from the bill.

When this occurred, many of us who strongly supported the Senate bill were dismayed and wondered whether it would even be possible for a conference committee to fashion a final bill that would garner the strong bipartisan support that the original Senate bill enjoyed. To emphasize the importance of this bipartisan support, I joined with Senator Lieberman on March 29, in sending a letter to all five Senate conferees urging that they work to defend in conference key Senate provisions dealing with international terrorism. These included authority to exclude from the United States members of terrorist groups and authority to prohibit terrorist fundraising within the United States, both of which were indeed retained in this final conference report.

Mr. President, I am pleased to support this conference report, and I heartily congratulate our conferees for preserving these provisions. In fact, they went even further, and have given us a strong, positive antiterrorism bill that deserves our wholehearted support.

This legislation contains a broad range of needed changes in the law that will enhance our country's ability to combat terrorism, both at home and from abroad. The managers of this bill have described its provisions in some detail, so I will not repeat their comments. Briefly, however, this bill would increase penalties: For conspiracies involving explosives, for terrorist conspiracies, for terrorist crimes, for transferring explosives, for using explosives, and for other crimes related to terrorist acts.

The bill also includes provisions to combat international terrorism, to remove from the United States aliens found to be engaging in or supporting terrorist acts, to control fundraising by foreign terrorist organizations, and procedural changes to strengthen our counterterrorism laws.

This legislation will enhance the ability of our law enforcement agencies to bring terrorists to justice, in a manner mindful of our cherished civil liberties. This bill will enact practical measures to impede the efforts of those violent rejectionists who have launched an unprecedented campaign of terror intended to crush the prospects for peace for the Israeli and Palestinian people. Most important is the provision in this bill that will cut off the ability of terrorist groups such as Hamas to raise huge sums in the United States for supposedly "humanitarian" purposes, where in reality a large part of those funds go toward conducting terrorist activities. These accomplishments are real, and this legislation deserves our support.

Mr. President, I would like to concentrate the remainder of my comments on two provisions of mine that were retained in this conference report. These two provisions are the Terrorist Exclusion Act and the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Sources Protection Act, both of which I introduced separately last year.

Traditionally, Americans have thought of terrorism as primarily a European, Middle Eastern, or Latin American problem. While Americans abroad and U.S. diplomatic facilities have been targets in the past, Americans have often considered the United States itself largely immune to acts of terrorism. Two events have changed this sense of safety. The first was the internationally-sponsored terrorist attack of February 26, 1993 against the New York World Trade Center, and the second was the domestic terrorist attack just a year ago on April 19 in Oklahoma City.

I first introduced the Terrorist Exclusion Act in the House three years ago, and last year I reintroduced the legislation in the Senate with Senator Brown as my original cosponsor. The Terrorist Exclusion Act will close a dangerous loophole in our visa laws which was created by the Immigration Reform Act of 1990. With its rewrite of the McCarran-Walters Act, Congress eliminated then-existing authority to deny a U.S. visa to a known member of a violent terrorist organization.

The new standards required knowledge that the individual had been personally involved in a past terrorist act or was coming to the United States to conduct such an act. This provision will restore the previous standard allowing denial of a U.S. visa for membership in a terrorist group.

I discovered this dangerous weakness in our visa laws in early 1993 during my investigation of the State Department failures that allowed the radical Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, to travel to, and reside in, the United States since 1990. I undertook this investigation in my role as ranking Republican of the House International Operations Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over terrorism issues, a role I have continued in the Senate as Chair of the International Operations Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Sheikh Rahman is the spiritual leader of Egypt's terrorist organization, The Islamic Group. His followers were convicted for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. The Sheikh himself received a life sentence for his own role in approving a planned second wave of terrorist acts in the New York City area.

The case of Sheikh Abdel Rahman is significant because he was clearly excludable from the United States under the pre-1990 law, but the legal authority to exclude him ended with enactment of the Immigration Reform Act that year. He was admitted to this country through an amazing series of bureaucratic blunders.

Then in 1990, as the U.S. government was building its deportation case against him, the law changed. As a result, the State Department was forced to try to deport him on the grounds that he once bounced a check in Egypt and had more than one wife, rather than the fact that he was the known spiritual leader of a violent terrorist organization.

A high-ranking State Department official informed my staff during my investigation that if Sheikh Abdel Rahman had tried to enter after the 1990 law went into affect, they would have had no legal authority to exclude him from the United States because they had no proof that he had ever personally committed a terrorist act, despite the fact that his followers were known to have been involved in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

It is urgent that we pass this provision. Every day in this country American lives are put at risk out of deference to some imagined first amendment rights of foreign terrorists. This is an extreme misinterpretation of our cherished Bill of Rights, which the founders of our nation intended to protect the liberties of all Americans.

In my reading of the U.S. Constitution, I see much about the protection of the safety and welfare of Americans, but nothing about protecting the rights of foreign terrorists to travel freely to the United States whenever they choose.

The second of my bills contained in S. 735 is the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Sources Protection Act. This legislation would significantly increase the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information with the State Department for the purpose of denying visas to known terrorists, drug traffickers, and others involved in international criminal activities.

This provision would permit a U.S. visa to be denied for law enforcement purposes without a detailed written explanation, which current law requires.

These denials could be made citing U.S. law generically, without further clarification or amplification. Individuals who are denied visas due to the suspicion that they are intending to immigrate to the U.S. would still have to be informed that this is the basis, and they would then be allowed to compile additional information that may change that determination.

Under a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a precise written justification, citing the specific provision of law, is required for every alien denied a U.S. visa. This requirement was inserted into the INA out of the belief that every non-American denied a U.S.-visa for any reason had the right to know the precise grounds under which the visa was denied, even if it was for terrorist activity, narcotics trafficking, or other illegal acts. This has impeded the willing- ness of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share with the State Department the names of excludable aliens.

These agencies are logically concerned about revealing sources or compromising an investigation by submitting the names of people known to be terrorists or criminals--but who do not know that they are under investigation by U.S. officials--if that information is then revealed to a visa applicant, as current law requires. This is information the United States should be able to protect until a case is completed and, hopefully, law enforcement action is taken. But for the protection of the American people we should also make this information available to the Department of State to keep these individuals out of our country.

Mr. President, I again congratulate Chairman Hatch, and all of the other Senate conferees on this bill for their achievements in negotiations with the House. Obviously, there were some Senate provisions that had strong bipartisan support in this body that I regret could not be sustained in conference. But I urge my colleagues to concentrate on the very substantial and important achievements of this conference report, and I urge broad bipartisan support for its adoption.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. Chafee: I wonder if the Senator might yield for a question before the quorum call.

The Presiding Officer: Will the Senator withhold his quorum call?

Mr. Hatch: Yes. I am happy to.

Mr. Chafee: I am a little confused why we do not vote on this motion right now. Everybody is familiar with the issue.

Mr. Hatch: I think we are but the majority leader asked me to put the quorum call.

Mr. Chafee: Could I safely say that, if things go right, we are going to vote in a very few minutes?

Mr. Hatch: I hope so. I think so.

The Presiding Officer: Is there further debate on the motion?

Mr. Hatch: I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Utah.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The Presiding Officer: The pending business is the motion to recommit, by the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I move to table the motion and ask for the yeas and nays.

The Presiding Officer: Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. Biden: Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The absence of a quorum has been noted. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

Unanimous-Consent Agreement

Mr. Hatch: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the consideration of the conference report to accompany the terrorist bill, the time on the conference report be limited to 20 minutes equally divided in the usual form, and all motions to recommit be limited to the following time restraints; that they be relevant in subject matter of the conference report or Senate- or House-passed bills and that they not be subject to amendments: 30 minutes equally divided in the usual form on each motion.

I further ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of all motions to recommit, if defeated or tabled, the Senate proceed to vote on adoption of the conference report, all without any intervening action or debate.

The Presiding Officer: Is there objection to the unanimous consent request? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the Biden motion to recommit.

The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr.Lott: I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] and the Senator from Florida [Mr. Mack] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], is absent due to death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Alaska, [Mr. Murkowski] would vote "yea."

Mr. Ford: I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mrs. Murray] is necessarily absent.

The result was announced--yeas 50, nays 46, as follows:

Roll No. 62 Leg.
YEAS--50
Abraham	Ashcroft	Bennett	Bond	Brown
Burns	Campbell	Chafee	Coats	Cochran
Cohen	Coverdell	Craig	D'Amato	DeWine
Dole	Domenici	Faircloth	Feingold	Frist
Gorton	Gramm	Grams	Grassley	Gregg
Hatch	Helms	Hutchison	Inhofe	Jeffords
Kassebaum	Kempthorne	Kyl	Lott	Lugar
McCain	McConnell	Nickles	Pressler	Roth
Santorum	Shelby	Simpson	Smith	Snowe
Stevens	Thomas	Thompson	Thurmond	Warner
Nays--46
Akaka	Baucus	Biden	Bingaman	Boxer
Bradley	Breaux	Bryan	Bumpers	Byrd
Conrad	Daschle	Dodd	Dorgan	Exon
Feinstein	Ford	Glenn	Graham	Harkin
Heflin	Hollings	Inouye	Johnston	Kennedy
Kerrey	Kerry	Kohl	Lautenberg	Leahy
Levin	Lieberman	Mikulski	Moseley-Braun	Moynihan
Nunn	Pell	Pryor	Reid	Robb
Rockefeller	Sarbanes	Simon	Specter	Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--4
Hatfield	Mack	Murkowski	Murray

Mr. Hatch: I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr.Lott: I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.