Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my friend, my colleague and chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
Mr. Obey: Mr. Speaker, 4 years ago this Congress voted to authorize the President to engage in a preemptive attack to Iraq, a country that had not attacked the United States. I supported the military action against Afghanistan because they gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and those who attacked us on 9/11. But I opposed the President's unilateral and preemptive attack on Iraq, because I believed that this action would destabilize the Middle East, isolate us in world opinion, and weaken our influence in the world. Our opposition was vilified. Our patriotism was questioned, and that continues today.
We are told that if we oppose the President's intensification of the war, we are giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Well, I, for one, am tired of those who have been consistently wrong about this war lecturing those of us who have been right from the start. I am tired of the manipulation of intelligence by this administration. I am tired of the stubbornness of an administration that didn't have a clue about the Middle East realities when they got us into this mess, and don't have a clue now about how to get us out.
Sadly, there will be no happy endings to this war. The President's policy has done so much damage that there is no good way for us to get out, whether it happens in 6 months or a year or 5 years.
Our troops won the war, God bless them. But the problem with the President's plan is that it calls upon our troops to do something they do not have the power to do, and that is to convince the Iraqi factions to stop killing each other and work together on a political compromise.
Instead of the President's surge, in my view, we should set a rough target for repositioning our troops out of the area. We should recognize that Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, will never join together in a strong central government. We should tell the Iraqis that if they do not amend their Constitution to allow for a loose confederation with an oil sharing agreement between the Sunnis and the Shiites, that we will leave them to each others' tender mercies. We should participate in regional discussions with all parties, including Syria and Iran. We should resume aggressive leadership to resurrect a meaningful Middle East process, peace process, and Congress should pass legislation prohibiting an attack on Iran without authorization by this Congress.
Given the chaos that the administration's policy has produced, none of these suggestions may work. But all of them would be better than continuing to be stuck in another 5-year period in an endless war with endless promises to the American people and with endless failures on the ground.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my friend and colleague, the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz).
(Mr. Ortiz asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Ortiz: Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bipartisan resolution.
I could ask a question, were we ready to go to war? I don't think so.
I just want to put a little of the history of Iraq in context. And we probably remember these names, Specialist Edgar Hernandez, Specialist Joseph Hudson, Specialist Shoshana Johnson, PFC Jessica Lynch, PFC Patrick Miller and Sergeant James Riley. They were all members of the 507th Maintenance Company that went missing after an Iraqi ambush in Nasiriya on March 23, 2003.
They were a maintenance company. They weren't supposed to be in front of the infantry. And, of course, we understand this is war and there is a confusion.
They were taken prisoners. But this illustrates for us again that we were not ready for this war from the beginning. We went in with too few soldiers, who, by the way, were not greeted with flowers or parades. This administration went against the recommendations of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki, who said, you know what, we need no less than 250,000 troops to overwhelm the enemy. So what happened? We went in with less than that. What was the goal? To go straight to Baghdad. And we left the left flank, the right flank completely open. Not only that. With thousands of ammunition dumps all over the place in Iraq, you know what? They were ready for war. They were ready for us. But we were not ready for them. Because a lot of things went wrong in this war. The intelligence was flawed. It was wrong. And, my friends, I am saying this because we cannot afford to make a another mistake such as this.
I was just at a hearing about an hour ago, 2 hours ago, and let me read to you what the Chief of Staff of the Army, Schoomaker, said just a few moments ago. He said, "After years of insufficient investment in the Army, many of our units were underequipped and not ready for deployment, especially in our Reserve units. To meet combatant commanders' immediate wartime needs, we pulled equipment from across the force to equip those soldiers deploying into harm's way, a practice that we are continuing today to meet current operational needs."
My friends, we are at war. We support our soldiers. The men and women in uniform are in dangerous places around the world to do their duty on behalf of all of us, military, civilian, Republicans, Democrats, and independents.
This resolution is very simple: Congress and the American people will continue to support and protect the members of the United States Armed Forces who are serving or who have served bravely and honorably in Iraq; and Congress disapproves of the decision of the President of the United States, George W. Bush, who announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.
Now, it is going to take more than 21,000 soldiers. You have got to send support troops. So I think sometimes I wonder whether if we could just pause or take time off so that we could regroup or correct the mistakes. But you can't do that when you are in the middle of two wars.
This is a different mission, and we ask our soldiers to do the best that they can, and then we say that we need for the Iraqis to stand up so we can stand down. My friends, if we cannot even equip our military, how can we expect to equip the Iraqis so that they can stand up?
Mr. Thornberry: Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a member of the Intelligence Committee and a veteran and retired officer herself.
(Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico: Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor here today, disappointed. Over the next few months, the United States will make some very important decisions, probably the most important national security decisions that we will make in this decade. These decisions are going to affect the size and the composition and the equipment of our military. It will impact our relationships with our allies, the perception of our enemies, and the stability of the Persian Gulf region. These are serious and difficult issues that demand thoughtful leadership and the careful exercise of our considerable responsibilities under the Constitution.
The resolution that we have before us today is not binding in a legal sense. We are not exercising any real power here. But I think it is worse than that. The words in these two brief sentences are vague enough to allow people with very different views on what we should do to feel satisfied whichever way they vote. The language in this resolution is clever, but this isn't a time for clever. Whether I support this resolution or oppose it, this body should say something, say something that matters about what our vital national interests are, about how we should pursue those interests, about what the risks are, what the trade-offs are and the potential consequences. We should say whether we intend to buy the bullets and the body armor for those who are about to deploy and take on the challenges that we face as a Nation.
With power comes responsibility. And rather than do the hard work of building a consensus here in the House and leading the way, it is easier to punt, to be vague and clever, to frame political issues rather than confront forthrightly the difficult problems that we face as a Nation. For that reason I believe this resolution represents a lost opportunity that we cannot afford to lose.
I believe that too often in the last 3½years our goals in Iraq have been described in the lofty and idealistic terms that go far beyond America's vital national interests. There has been a tendency to move beyond the hard-nosed and clear-eyed view of what America's national interests are in Iraq and we have come to emphasize the loftier dreams for the American people.
To be sure, I am glad that Saddam Hussein is dead and gone. And I hope that the Iraqi people seize this opportunity to create a unified state that respects minorities and has robust democratic institutions. But there is a difference between what we would wish for the Iraqi people and what is vital for America's national security.
In thinking about America's vital interests in Iraq, I think it really boils down to two things: First, Iraq must not become a safe haven for al Qaeda; and, second, Iraq must not be a source of instability in the region. These vital interests are actually quite narrow. Some might argue that they are too narrow. But they are most notable for what they do not include. Perhaps most significantly, I don't believe it is vital to America's national interests to stop all sectarian violence in Iraq.
We admire our military because they are forward leading and "can do" people. But in this instance we cannot do for the Iraqis what they will not do for themselves.
The President is sending an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq. The problem isn't the numbers. The problem is the mission and setting the conditions to be able to accomplish that mission. Some of these troops are going to Anbar, and I think that we do need to enforce our troops in the Sunni heartland to fight al Qaeda and to make it less likely that they will be welcomed there for the long term. But I am skeptical about the Baghdad mission. Operation Together Forward, the effort to secure Baghdad last year, failed. The idea was to clear, hold, and build; but the Iraqi units did not show up in enough numbers to be able to hold what America had cleared. In the early days of this surge in Baghdad, there are too many indications that this will be happening again.
The resolution we are considering this week contains only two thoughts. It is only two sentences long. First, that we oppose increasing troop levels in Iraq by 20,000. As I have said, I support increasing troops in Anbar, even though I am skeptical about the likelihood of success in Baghdad.
But the second thought is notable for what it omits. The resolution says that this House will fund our soldiers and our veterans if they are there now or if they have been there before.
This begs the most important question about our real power here in the Congress. What about the five brigades of young Americans who are now preparing their families and packing their gear to deploy? What about them? What are you saying to them? Will we buy body armor for them? Will we have armored Humvees for them? Will they have trucks to take them to their assigned place of action? Will they get the bullets and the night scopes and the sleeping bags and the chow? What about them? Will they get their combat pay? Will they get their family separation allowance?
I believe that the majority in this House and the sponsors of this resolution would support a clear statement that we will fund the troops and the mission they are being ordered to undertake. But, of course, perhaps half of the Democrats in the Congress, from the far left of America's political spectrum, want to stop the funding.
In this war on terrorism, the greatest burdens have fallen on the shoulders of the relatively small number of Americans who have volunteered to take great risks on our behalf. As leaders of this Nation, this House abdicates its responsibility if we fail to make clear to them that they will have the equipment they need to do the job and come home again. The short two sentence resolution we will vote on here this week doesn't address any of these important issues.
If you are asking the wrong question, perhaps any answer will do. But we will vote anyway, and it will make headlines, and it will accomplish nothing of the hard work we have in front of us. What are our vital national interests in Iraq, and what is not vital? What strategies can we use to protect and promote those vital interests? What are the resources that are required to pursue those strategies? What are the risks and the costs and the choices we must make? Are there ways to mitigate those risks?
These are the important questions, and in the short two-sentence resolution, they remain unresolved, leaving the House with nothing very important to say about what matters to America and what we should do.
I have made my position clear in ways that this resolution fails to do. I will seek to provide leadership in this House to address these important questions, to influence this administration and to focus on what is vital to America. It is for these reasons that I must oppose the resolution in front of us today.
I come to the House floor today disappointed.
Over the next few months, the United States will make some of the most important national security decisions of this decade. Those decisions will play out principally in Iraq, but will affect our broader national security and foreign policy.
The decisions we make will affect the size, composition, and equipment of the American military for many years.
These decisions will impact our relationships with our allies, the perceptions of our enemies, and the stability of the Persian Gulf region.
These are serious and difficult issues that demand thoughtful leadership and the careful exercise of our considerable powers under the Constitution.
We have to do more than debate. We have to take a stand; we have to make tough decisions; we have to clearly articulate what America's vital interests are. We have to do things that matter and build a broad consensus moving forward.
The resolution we have before us today is not binding in a legal sense--we are not exercising any real power here. But it is worse than that. The words in these two brief sentences are vague enough to allow people with quite different views on what we should do to feel satisfied with whatever way they vote.
The language in this resolution is clever. But this isn't a time for clever. We are better than this. Whether I support a resolution or oppose it, this body should say something about what our vital interests are, about why this matters, about what we do recommend and what we do not recommend, about whether or not we will buy the bullets and the body armor for the troops for the next rotation of troops, about the risks and the challenges we face to best protect our Nation.
With power comes responsibility. And perhaps the real truth is that the Congress is as uncertain and divided as the country is on what is best to do in the Middle East. Rather than do the hard work of building consensus and leading the way, it is easier to punt, to be vague and clever, to frame political issues rather than confront forthrightly difficult problems important to the security and future of this country.
For that reason, this resolution represents a lost opportunity that we can ill afford to lose.
Over the last 3 months, I've spent a lot of time thinking about Iraq, reading widely from both classified and unclassified sources, meeting with experts inside and outside of government, spending time with our intelligence agencies and our men and women in the military listening to what they think and drawing on their experience.
At the New Year, I returned to Iraq. I went to Falluja, al Kut, Baghdad and Balad.
At each stop along the way, I was reminded of how fortunate we are to have such dedicated, capable and decent men and women serving us in uniform. They are all committed to their missions and they are performing admirably.
Our forces have the "can do" attitude that we have come to take for granted but never should. They are doing difficult work a long way from home and have been at it for a long time.
There are good reasons to be restrained in public comments about military strategy and operations when we have young Americans in combat. Honest debate about policy can be confused with lack of support for the troops.
There have been times that I have questioned the administration's conduct of the war over the last 3½years--the inadequacy of force levels immediately after the fall of Saddam, the decision to disband the Iraqi army and the slow reconstitution of the Iraqi Army, the need to expand the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps, and the failure to understand the strategic significance of treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. All of these decisions were made at senior policy levels, not by people in the military doing the job.
I'm from the old school that believes partisan politics should stop at the water's edge. The security of this country is too important to make it subservient to domestic political maneuvenng.
It was clear to me in late October that it was time for a complete review of American strategy in Iraq. That means we must: Fully understand the situation we face in Iraq and be honest with ourselves and the American people about the challenges we face; clearly define and build a broad consensus on exactly what the vital national interests of the United States in Iraq are and, conversely, what is not vital; and develop strategies, plans, and resources to pursue those vital national interests fully vetting the alternatives and the risks of those alternatives.
Iraq is a country of 26 million people in a land area about twice the size of the state of Idaho. About 6.5 million people live in the capitol, Baghdad.
Ethnically, Iraq is 75-80 percent Arab and 15-20 percent Kurdish with the remainder Turkoman, Assyrians and others.
Iraq is 97 percent Muslim by religious faith. It is one of four countries in the world where there are more Shi'a (60-65 [percent) than Sunni (32-37 percent) Muslims. Shiite populations constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Worldwide, about 10-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite branch of Islam. Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets. Their differences have sometimes been the basis for sectarian violence and political infighting.
The Iraqi people have made substantial progress in governing themselves over the past two years. They have written a Constitution, conducted elections under that new Constitution and formed a government. The Iraqi people as a whole voted in the face of death threats and Iraqi elected officials serve in spite of risks to themselves and their families. If you are wondering whether there are Iraqi's who are willing to take great risks to build their future, you should visit the military hospital at Balad. Two thirds of the casualties brought to our great surgeons and trauma teams are Iraqi, not American.
Our admiration for their progress and their courage cannot blind us to some other realities.
The central government in Iraq is weak. In part, that weakness is inherent in the Constitution under which the Prime Minister does not form his own government. Ministers of Health, Interior and Defense for example are chosen separately and do not serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.
Ministers are loyal to different parties and factions. Corruption, a long established practice in that region of the world, is endemic. Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense are heavily penetrated by militias loyal to factions rather than loyal to the national government. As one officer involved in training local Iraqi police told me, "The head of training for the police in this province has no experience and is not qualified for the job. He has the job because he is a member of the Badr Organization."
Another officer involved with training the Iraqi border patrol said, "The commander in my sector was given a list by the Ministry of the Interior of 42 people he was supposed to hire. They were all militia."
The Iraqi central government and its ministries do not have the capacity and, in some cases, perhaps the will to support operations in the 18 provinces. Even though the central government has money, it can't seem to spend it. There is no national banking system so soldiers and police are paid sporadically and in cash. They must travel home to give their pay to their families.
The combination of factionalism within the ministries and weak logistics systems are used to undermine units in the field. As another officer told me, "If I train a really good Iraqi police SWAT team that's going after the `wrong' people, they can be strangled by logistics. No bullets. No gasoline. No SWAT team."
The national police are heavily infiltrated by the militias, particularly Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM, which is loyal to Shia firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr.
A principal characteristic of a sovereign government is that it has a monopoly of the use of force within its borders. The central government of Iraq has not yet consolidated this monopoly for itself.
The Iraqi Army is more reliable and has made significant progress over the last 18 months. But the quality and capability of its units varies. Even units that are fully manned usually have half of their soldiers on leave at any time. During Operation Together Forward, the joint Iraqi-American operation to secure Baghdad this summer, some Iraqi Army units refused to be deployed to Baghdad, a clear indication of the weakness of the central government and the questionable effectiveness of these units.
There is not a single insurgency or source of violence in Iraq. There are a number of interrelated and overlapping conflicts.
In the south, while there has been less violence, different Shi' a factions, principally those associated with Muqtada al-Sadr (JAM) and the Supreme Council for Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) (the Badr organization) periodically fight each other for local advantage and attack coalition forces as well.
In the northern Kurdish region the Kurdish Peshmerga has made the area mostly secure and stable. We can expect violence to increase in Kirkuk in the run-up to the referendum on whether this oil rich city will be associated with the Kurdish region.
Anbar province, the large province in western Iraq that borders Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, is predominantly Sunni. While there is a Sunni insurgency and rejectionists in this region, it has also been fertile territory for al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters. In recent months, some key Sunni tribal leaders have started working together to resist al Qaeda in this region, opening opportunities for United States forces to work more cooperatively with local leaders to fight al Qaeda.
Overlaying these regional fights is a rise in sectarian violence that has increased substantially since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. Anger and distrust between Sunni and Shiite is very high and plays out in death squad killings, torture, intimidation and what amounts to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods in Baghdad.
This summer, the Iraqi government with the multinational force in Iraq launched Operation Together Forward to reduce widespread sectarian violence in Baghdad. U.S. Forces, including the American striker Brigade, were sent to Baghdad as part of an effort to "clear and hold" those neighborhoods. The operation failed, as did Operation Together Forward II this fall. Levels of sectarian violence are high and are not improving.
The concept was for U.S. forces to "clear" violent neighborhoods and the Iraqi Army would "hold" the neighborhoods providing security after they had been cleared out. The Iraqi Army forces didn't show up in the size required and were not able to provide security. As one Army officer told me, "It wasn't clear and hold. It was clear and fold."
Confidence in the ability of the central government, the Army and the national police force to provide security has declined causing people to rely on local militias and neighborhood security to protect their families. In some cases, JAM, Muktada al-Sadr's militia, has built confidence and support by blocking emergency response by the central authorities while JAM members help victims, thereby increasing local trust of the militias and further undermining the credibility of the government.
Finally, while the Sunni insurgency may have been spurred by al Qaeda in Iraq and various Shi'a groups get support from Iran, at this point, the violence in Iraq is largely internal and self-sustaining.
In summary: The overall security situation in Iraq is grave and is not improving. Strategies to quell violence have not been effective; while some violence is anti-coalition, the most dangerous trend has been the rise of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite militias and death squads in a cycle of violence and retaliation; while the unity government of Nouri al-Maliki says all the right things, there are strong doubts about the ability of the unity government to reduce widespread sectarian violence; further political evolution in Iraq is likely as factions maneuver for power relative to one another and decisions are made on critical issues including federalism, distribution of oil revenues, and the militias. Iraq will make more and more of its own political choices, less and less influenced by America.
Too often in the last three and a half years, our goals in Iraq have been described in lofty and idealistic terms that go far beyond America's vital national interests.
Most of us in the Congress voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein because the intelligence said he had or was seeking to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and that he intended to use them against the United States.
In my case, it was the intelligence on biological weapons that was the deciding factor, reaching the high threshold required for pre- emptive military action.
As we all now know, the intelligence was wrong in several important respects. Perhaps in part because it was wrong, there has been a tendency to move beyond a hard-nosed, clear-eyed view of our national interests in Iraq to emphasize loftier dreams for the Iraqi people.
To be sure, I'm glad that Saddam is dead and gone, and I hope the Iraqi people build a unified state with a society that respects minorities with robust democratic institutions. But there is a difference between what we would wish for the Iraqi people and what we need for American security.
The American military should only be used to protect America's vital national interests, under American command, with the resources necessary to win and come home again.
When it comes to clearly defining our vital national interests in Iraq, we have lost our way in mushy rhetoric. These words matter because they set the goals we ask our military to achieve and drive the strategies and resources to achieve them. There has been far too little debate and discussion on what our vital interests are and what they are not in Iraq.
Every discussion of what path forward we should choose in Iraq should start with clearly defining our vital national interests. As the saying on the classroom wall goes, "If you don't know where you are going, you're likely to end up somewhere else."
In thinking about America's vital interests in Iraq, it seems to me there are only two: Iraq must not become a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates; Iraq must not be a source of instability in the region.
These vital interests are really quite narrow--some might argue too narrow--and probably most notable for what they do not include.
It's not vital to America that Iraq be able to defend itself from outside powers. Iraq is unlikely to have an Army that can defend against external threats for a long time and we should not define success this broadly or even raise the possibility of arming them with indirect fire weapons, tactical air forces and so forth.
It is not vital to American interests that Iraq remain unified except to the extent dissolution of Iraq as a strong nation contributes to regional instability or creates ungoverned areas where al Qaeda could thrive. Iraq was created after World War I from three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. The country has a history of instability as a result of ethnic, religious and regional rivalries. It is not vital to American national interests that we resolve these tensions and probably not reasonable to expect to do so.
There are a variety of governing models from a loose confederation to de facto local arrangements that are consistent with the vital national interests of the United States.
The Iraqi constitution allows for regional arrangements and we need not spend too much capital resisting new arrangements that might emerge.
Perhaps most significantly, it is not vital to American interests to stop all sectarian violence in Iraq. Certainly if sectarian violence escalates to a conflagration that affects stability in the region, it could affect our vital interest in regional stability. But the Iraqi's must decide to quell sectarian violence. While we might assist and support Iraqi efforts, we cannot and should not do this for them. They must take the lead.
We admire our military because they are forward leaning and "can do". But in this instance, we cannot do for the Iraqi's what they will not do for themselves.
There are other things that do not appear in a clear statement of America's vital interests like making Iraqi into a model of democracy in the region and ensuring its economic prosperity. Both of these things are desirable. Iraq certainly has the oil, natural gas, and two fertile river valleys to sustain itself and prosper economically. But these desirable things are not vital to America's national interests and what is vital should drive American strategy.
If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. What is vital, it seems to me, boils down to two things: No al Qaeda safe haven and an Iraq that is not a source of instability in the region.
The shear breadth of the policy options for Iraq put forward in recent months by thoughtful people is striking.
Quit and withdraw. Reposition in neighboring countries. Increase U.S. forces temporarily. Increase forces substantially and with no deadline.
Side with the Shia because they are likely to win. Befriend the Sunnis. Destroy the Sunnis.
Withdraw U.S. forces from the cities. Start with Baghdad and the cities first.
Divide the country into three pieces. Insist on unity.
These debates are healthy when they get beyond the brainstorming stage--which they rarely do--but the breadth of the options out there is partially due to a lack of clarity and consensus about America's vital interests.
We should also be clear that no strategy is without risk. There are no easy or obvious paths here.
Al Qaeda in Iraq principally thrives in the Sunni regions of the country. Defeating al Qaeda and denying them sanctuary must be a central objective for U.S. Forces in Iraq. This must be an area of focus and, to some extent, we have lost that focus over the last six months as we have emphasized the fight for Baghdad.
Using U.S. special forces, conventional U.S. military forces and American intelligence capabilities, the United States should target, kill or capture and detain al Qaeda leadership in Iraq.
U.S. forces have had some significant success in recent months capturing middle and high ranking al Qaeda operatives in Iraq in spite of the reduction of emphasis and fewer troops in the Sunni dominated areas of the country.
But there is an infuriating fact seldom discussed: fully half of the high value al Qaeda targets in Iraq have been captured and released before. As one senior officer put it, "I have great photographs of half the people we are hunting. They are wearing orange jumpsuits in the mug shots we took of them when we captured them the first time."
Weare operating a catch and release program for al Qaeda in Iraq. This is inexcusable and frustrating as all get out for our men and women in the fight.
American soldiers are capturing terrorists trying to kill Americans and Iraqis and they are turned over to an Iraqi run detention system that is likely to release them.
Indeed, some officers whose opinions I trust describe detention as training camp for al Qaeda where they share information and contacts improving their skills and enhancing their position within al Qaeda when they are released.
We cannot afford to spend half our resources hunting al Qaeda members we have already caught before. We need to change our detention policy so that there are no high value targets with orange jumps suit mug shots in "wanted" posters hanging on the walls in the operation centers of our special forces units in Iraq.
Using classic counter-insurgency strategies and tactics, the United States military and intelligence services should build relationships with tribal and local leaders in the Sunni-dominated regions who will deny al Qaeda safe haven for the long term.
We are having some recent and fragile success with this approach to security in al Anbar. Sunni tribal leaders, with the support and encouragement of U.S. forces, are recruiting men from their tribe into security units.
These counter-insurgency efforts building on established local tribal relationships and indigenous leadership must be supported financially directly by the U.S. military. Large U.S. aid programs run at the national level have been slow and ineffective at engaging the Iraqi people and getting things done.
The American military has the capability to use funds to support counter-insurgency operations at the community level rapidly and where needed without a lot of hassle. This mechanism has been used successfully in Iraq before, although it is not universally supported. It's a turf and power thing. To a certain degree, we have a choice. We can micro-manage contracts from Washington and Baghdad or we can get things done rapidly and effectively giving authority within broad guidelines for Lieutenant Colonels to use their judgment.
While al Anbar is a very large area, it is sparsely populated with about 1.2 million people, the vast majority of whom live in the Euphrates river valley. An intense counterinsurgency strategy in the Sunni areas can help to root out al Qaeda today and make their brand of extremism unwelcome for the long term.
Strengthen both technical intelligence collection and human intelligence collection in the Sunni regions of Iraq.
Intelligence is the first line of defense in the war on terror and we are doing a lot of things right. But there continues to be a need to strengthen technical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection so that more requirements can be met.
More importantly, we continue to lag behind in human intelligence collection capability.
We are five years after 9/11 and we still are desperately short of linguists in strategic languages. We need more soldiers trained in basic 30 and 60-day language programs in order to effectively conduct a counter-insurgency effort.
At a higher level, we need more military members and intelligence specialists who are fluent in languages like Arabic, Farsi, Pashtun and Dari. Heretofore, this has just not been a national priority and it must change.
The training of the Iraqi Army has gone slower than any of us want. They are still heavily dependent on the U.S. for logistics and their capability and effectiveness is limited by the practice of allowing military members to go home for about two weeks of each month.
Still, the Iraqi Army offers the best possibility for the Iraqi government to consolidate its authority and quell violence.
The United States should continue to accelerate training and equipping the Iraqi Army so that they can take responsibility for internal security.
I am not convinced that embedding large numbers of U.S. soldiers in Iraqi units is the most effective way to train Iraqis. I'm not convinced that it is not effective either. There are differing views by thoughtful people and I don't have the experience to know. But it is an important question for the military and its training elements to assess. We should pursue training strategies that are most likely to make Iraqi units effective and independent in the shortest time.
There are two disadvantages of embedding Americans in Iraqi units. First, it is harder to protect and support the Americans to the standards we expect for our soldiers when they are detached. Second, some American trainers who have been embedded express concern that it is difficult to get the Iraqis to stand on their own and take responsibility because they think the Americans will do things for them. An embedded American trainer told me, "I have to decide that I'm not going to do the maintenance for them even though I can. That's hard to do."
Assist the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense in establishing logistics and service support for the Army.
While we have focused on training military units--and Iraq may need more of them than they initially planned--the systems for payroll and logistics support just do not exist. We need to put effort into helping them develop those systems so that the Iraqi army is fed, paid, has gasoline and trucks and uniforms.
The Iraqi police and border patrol are infiltrated by militia and ineffective. We should not expect that the police will be effective as other than a mechanism to employ and occupy young men anytime soon.
I do not believe that the United States should take the lead in resolving sectarian violence between Shi'a and Sunni or between different militias vying for power in Shi'a areas. The Iraqi government and Iraqi leaders must take the lead. We cannot and should not do this for them.
I told the President this before he announced his new plan for Iraq and I have been clear about this publicly both in New Mexico and here, in Washington.
American soldiers should not be in a situation as reportedly happened on October 24th when they raided an area looking for a leader of a Shi'a militia group and were told by the Iraqi government to stand down.
We cannot do for the Iraqis what they will not do for themselves. If they do not choose to disarm the militias and stop the death squads, Baghdad will continue to be a violent place.
I believe it is unlikely that this violence will rise to a level where Iraq becomes a source of regional instability even if it does threaten the internal stability and political direction of the country. As cold as it sounds, the sectarian violence is not something we can stop by getting in the middle of it and it is not vital to American national interests that we do so.
This is where we are at most risk, again, of losing our way by reaching beyond our grasp.
The President is sending an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq. The problem isn't the numbers. The problem is the mission and setting the conditions to be able to accomplish that mission.
Some of those troops are going to Anbar, and I think we do need to reinforce our troops in the Sunni heartland to fight al Qaeda in Iraq and strengthen relationships that will make it less likely that they will be welcome there over the long term.
But I am skeptical about the Baghdad mission.
Operation Together Forward, the effort to secure Baghdad, failed because there was no "holding" after a neighborhood was "cleared". The Iraqis did not show up. And the "building" never really happened at all. It was a failed approach without adequate resources from the Iraqis to follow through. We probably made plenty of enemies without making people feel safer or more confident in the ability of their government to protect them.
Rather than "clearing" neighborhoods where there is sectarian violence, we should focus on strengthening indigenous security in cooperation with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army in neighborhoods and villages where there is stability or leadership to work with. This is an inside-out approach that builds indigenous capacity rather than an outside-in approach.
In the Kurdish region, the Peshmerga protect the Americans, not the other way around. That is a relationship we built over a decade. Al Qaim on the Syrian border used to be a hotbed of foreign fighter activity. Now it is largely peaceful and led by strong local tribal leaders who cooperate with the Americans and own their community.
In 2003 and 2004, immediately after the fall of Saddam when there was no Iraqi government, I believe a large U.S. presence that took charge and visibly controlled the streets killing or disarming any Iraqi with a weapon would have made a difference. When it comes to occupation, quantity has a quality all of its own.
But we are beyond that now. Iraq has its own government with an Army that is getting better. They must own their own neighborhoods. We can help them, but we cannot do it for them.
In the early days of this "surge" there are too many indications that we will be doing this for them. Two units of Iraqis have showed up to help secure Baghdad, and they are at about half strength.
Like Operation Together Forward, the units committed by the Iraqi government have shown up far below strength, which means the effort is unlikely to have enough reliable soldiers and police to conduct an effective counter-insurgency in a city of 6 million people.
Perhaps more importantly, as projected by the intelligence community in Congressional testimony, the Jaish al-Mahdi militia loyal to Muqtada al Sadr seems to have decided to lay low, put away their arms and wait out the surge calculating that they can afford to bide their time.
In contrast, the Sunni insurgents have escalated their attacks in recent weeks. As a result, it is possible that U.S. forces will concentrate on putting down Sunni insurgents and possibly rogue elements of Sadr's Shiite militia who don't keep their heads down. The irony here is that we risk strengthening radical anti-American cleric Muqtada al Sadr in the medium and long term by taking out his enemies now while his militia lays low waiting for America to leave.
While this scenario is not inevitable, we need to understand that US forces in the midst of sectarian violence may be helping consolidate the power of a radical anti-American Shiite.
The resolution we are considering this week contains only two thoughts. First, that we oppose increasing troop levels in Iraq by 20,000.
The second thought is notable for what it omits. The resolution says that this House will fund our soldiers and veterans if they are there now or if they have been in Iraq before. This begs the most important question about our real power as the Congress.
What about the five brigades of young Americans who are now preparing their families and packing their gear to deploy? Will we buy body armor for them? Will they have armored Humvees and trucks and bullets and night scopes and sleeping bags and chow? Will they get their combat pay and their family separation allowances?
Most of you know that I served in the United States military. I'm the only woman in the House or Senate who has. Some of you know that I am married to a man who continues to serve as a drilling reservist in the Air Force Reserve. A lot of our closest friends in the world still wear the uniform. These are not idle questions if you are the parent or the spouse or the child of a soldier who is being called up to do their duty.
I believe the majority of this House would support a clear statement that we will fund the troops and the mission they are being ordered to carry out. But, of course, perhaps close to half of the Democrats, from the far left of the American political spectrum, want to stop funding.
In this war on terrorism, the greatest burdens have fallen on the shoulders of a relatively small number of Americans who have volunteered to take great risks on our behalf. As leaders of this nation, this House abdicates its responsibility if we fail to make clear to them that they will have the equipment they need to do the job we are asking them to do.
The short two sentence resolution we will vote on this week does not address any of these important issues. If you are asking the wrong question, perhaps any answer will do.
But we will vote on it anyway, and it will make headlines and accomplish nothing of the hard work we have in front of us. It is a disappointing abdication of our responsibility to grapple seriously with defining and protecting vital US national interests in the Persian Gulf.
What are our vital national interests and what is not vital? What strategies can we use to protect and promote those interests? What resources are required to pursue these strategies? What are the risks and the costs of the choices we might make? Are there ways to mitigate those risks? These are the important questions and, in this short two sentence resolution, they remain unresolved leaving this House with nothing very important to say about what matters to America and what we should do.
I support increased troops in al Anbar--the Sunni region where al Qaeda thrives. These forces are part of the 20,000 referred to in the resolution. It is vital to U.S. interests that we destroy al Qaeda in Iraq and deny them a safe haven from which to operate. The resolution makes no distinction or even reference to these forces.
I am skeptical that increasing U.S. forces in Baghdad in the quantity and with the mission and tactics described by the President and his military commanders will quell the sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni, nor do I think it is vital to America's national interests to do so. The Iraqis must resolve these sectarian rivalries. The President believes the Baghdad security plan is the most realistic path forward. I disagree with the President on this point and I have told him so directly. It's not about the troop numbers, it's about their mission.
The resolution intentionally leaves unanswered the question of whether we will fund the bullets and body armor for troops who are not there yet but are going. I believe a majority of this House would vote to equip and support the men and women being sent there, even if they question the President's strategy. The resolution's silence on this important reassurance to our troops and their families brings discredit on this House.
I have made my position clear in ways that this resolution fails to do. I will seek to provide leadership in this House to address these important issues and to influence the administration to focus on what is vital to America. We must adopt strategies, tactics and apply resources to secure those vital interests and garner the support of the American people for doing so. It is for these reasons that I will oppose the resolution before us.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my friend the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan), who is also the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Meehan: Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.
With all due respect to my friend from New Mexico, I want to make the point that this resolution does not do anything to stop funding for the troops. As a matter of fact, it was this administration that sent 140,000 troops into harm's way without up-armoring Humvees. There is nothing in this to cut funding for the troops. But this administration sent 140,000 troops into harm's way without up-armored Humvees, without Kevlar vests. And what did Secretary Rumsfeld say? He said you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you wish you had.
We are the United States of America. We should never go into harm's way, never go into harm's way, without up-armored Humvees and Kevlar vests.
The Washington Post did a front page piece just the other day. It says that we still don't have the most effective up-armored Humvees that are available in the United States. It is not acceptable. It is inexcusable and indefensible.
I will be going to Iraq in a few days. I expect to see a country, unfortunately, that has gotten worse and worse in terms of the level of violence than the one I visited in 2003 and in January of 2005.
When I came back in January of 2005 I presented a strategy, a white paper, entitled "Iraq: The Light at the End of the Tunnel." Many of those recommendations were included in a bipartisan Iraq Study Group with distinguished experts on foreign policy and military affairs. They didn't call for more troops in Iraq. What they called for was for America to go into the background.
The simple facts bear out a true grim reality. We are told that we are going to rebuild the country's infrastructure. But here are the facts. Iraq has less electricity than it did before the war. Residents of Baghdad get 4½hours of electricity now, one-quarter of what they expected before the war.
We were told that oil revenues would pay the entire cost of the way. But here are the facts. Iraq produces less oil today than it did before the war. Instead of funding the war, oil is turned out at about half the rate it was when Saddam was in power.
The bad news continues. Skyrocketing unemployment, decreasing levels of drinkable water and a security situation that has deteriorated into a full-blown civil war.
Now the President wants, in face of the recommendations of experts, to send 21,500 more troops into this situation. Does the President really think that the surge will stabilize the security system long enough to undo all the failures of the last 4 years? I cannot honestly believe that this is the best strategy and the collective wisdom of the Department of Defense, of the State Department and of the intelligence community.
You know what I see? I see a President who seems to be desperate to divert attention away from the missteps, away from holding people accountable, and to just hold on to Iraq as long as he can and let the next administration deal with it. When I watched his speech, when I listened to Secretary Gates describe it, I saw nothing that gave me the impression that the escalation would do any good in the long term.
When we need to encourage them, Shias, Sunnis and Kurds, instead we are alienating. When we need to be standing up Iraqi security forces so our men and women can stand down, instead we are undercutting. When we need to be engaging Iraq's neighbors, instead we are on a war path with Iran. We need to fundamentally change our approach in Iraq, and this plan is more of the same.
I admit that the escalation we are debating will accomplish a number of things. It will endanger more American lives. It will continue to erode our national security. It will continue around the world to keep America up front in the war in Iraq, creating more terrorists and more insurgents, not less. It will deplete our military's resources, which are already stretched to the limit. And this plan will again ask our soldiers and marines to leave their families and return to the war zone that they have just left.
I stand here today with a simple message: Mr. President, the American people want a policy that changes direction. We urge you to rethink this policy of escalating the war in Iraq.
Mr. Renzi: Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) to respond.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico: Mr. Speaker, I wonder if my colleague from Massachusetts, given his comments about the resolution and the support for the troops we are deploying, would join me in a unanimous concept request to amend the resolution to express our intent and the intent of this House to support those in the U.S. Armed Forces who are serving and who will serve in Iraq.
Mr. Meehan: Mr. Speaker, if the gentlewoman will yield, if I may, we have supported the troops. In fact, if it were not for this Congress working in a bipartisan way with Republicans and Democrats, we never would have gotten up-armored Humvees into the field. We never would have gotten Kevlar vests.
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico: Reclaiming my time, this is exactly my point, is the gentleman will not support those who are deploying, and the resolution does not do so. I thank my colleague from Arizona for the time.
Mr. Renzi: Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
Mr. Hunter: Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding, and I just wanted to address a point that my friend from Massachusetts just made.
He said that we always need to have up-armored Humvees in any war that we enter into. We had at the end of the Clinton administration about 112, as I recall, up-armored Humvees, only for VIPs and for diplomats. We have today 15,000 up-armored 114s. This is the first war in our history since the beginning of this country in which we have had up-armored tactical vehicles.
With respect to the SAPI vests, that is, the bulletproof vests and body armor that our troops wear, we had at the end of the Clinton administration this many, zero pieces of body armor for our troops. We have today over 400,000 sets. That is enough sets for two sets for everybody who is in theater, and everybody has them.
I have said for the last several years if there is anybody who has a son or daughter who does not have body armor who is in theater, call me personally at my office. In the last 2 years, I have received zero calls.
So we have, we feel, the new equipment, not just up-armored Humvees but body armor, which incidentally is very heavy and, to some degree, does result in some degradation of mobility, but we have put in hundreds of new systems, weapons and equipment systems, since the year 2000 which have accrued to the benefit of our troops.
I just wanted to set the record straight. I appreciate the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Larsen) who is also a member of the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Larsen of Washington: Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Skelton for yielding time, and I rise today certainly in support of this resolution.
I rise also today in support of a strong U.S. military, a military that is ready to combat terrorists and a military that is ready for the challenges of this century. And for these reasons, I have to oppose the President's plan to escalate the war in Iraq and support the resolution before us.
The President's announcement to add 21,500 U.S. troops to Iraq is a step in the wrong direction. The American public does not want an escalation of the Iraq war, especially without an explanation of what we are trying to achieve. The President promised a new approach, but more troops does not equal a new way forward.
The United States has a choice. We can stay in Iraq to keep a lid on Iraq's civil war or we can devote enough time and attention to fighting terrorists wherever they are and securing a military that is prepared to protect our national security.
I choose the latter. At a time when we need to manage our strategic risk in the face of terrorists and nuclear uncertainty, at a time when our enemies are numerous, unpredictable and dangerous, this administration has made the wrong choice.
I believe this approach damages our military readiness today and damages our ability to prepare for threats in the future.
This war has strained our ability to train here at home with functional equipment. It has strained the ability of our services to recruit for the future. It has strained our ability to prepare a defense budget that can prepare us for 21st century threats.
Every State in this Union, including Washington State, has National Guard units that are depleted. They do not have the equipment that they need to train and are forced to leave equipment in theater, making it harder to do their job at home.
In Washington State, 90 percent of the Army National Guard and 65 percent of the Air National Guard have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and performed admirably and honorably; but at home, they only have 55 percent of their required equipment on hand, equipment that is integral to the training of these Guardsmen.
The President's escalation plan will not solve these problems. It will make them worse. The President's plan will not decrease our strategic risk. It will exacerbate it.
Units at home are struggling just to meet the training requirements necessary to deploy to Iraq. With this escalation plan, units at home will suffer as the Army and Marine Corps are forced to take more of their equipment to supply the additional brigades going into Iraq, depleting their training opportunities.
Equipment shortages at home are what we hear about most, but the war's effect on our prepositioned equipment abroad may be as serious a threat.
The Army relies on prepositioned sets of equipment in strategic locations around the world. This equipment ensures that our troops are able to deploy at a moment's notice. A large portion of this equipment has been taken to support the troop increase, increasing the chance that equipment will not be available in the case of an emerging crisis.
I personally have lost confidence in the Iraqi Government to fulfill its commitments to the United States. I want our women and men in the military to know that we have a strategy that is worthy of their individual actions and sacrifice and that they will have the resources necessary to do their job. But most of all, I am concerned that the President's decisions have led us away from our greatest national security threat; that is, fighting terrorists who will do us harm.
Make no mistake, while some of us support this escalation and some of us oppose it, all of us can agree on the need to support our women and men in the military, honor their commitment, and make sure they get the resources they need to do their jobs.
I recently heard from a friend of mine who, I will conclude with this, who served in the Army Reserve in Iraq and likely will return. This is what he said.
"Here I am, socially and culturally aware of the greater world. I am educated and a father of two beautiful children, children who have not been touched by war or tragedy. People tell me I should get out of the military because I have done my part, I don't need to serve again; but I do because if not me, then whom? I serve as an instrument of the State because I believe in the institution which is the Army and in turn with what that institution supports. As an officer, I have a duty to provide leadership to those under my command, and if it means I give my life at the expense of my children and all the things I love and hold so dear in life, then that is what I will have to do. I do not seek this action blindly. I am cognizant of the dangers inherent in soldiering and understand the risks and rewards involved. As a soldier, I will always pray for peace, but in a time of war, I am willing to move towards the sounds of the guns. I will fight for the Army and I will fight for my country, but most importantly, I will fight so others will not have to experience the mental anguish and soul-crushing reality which is war. For in the end, I know that I can love the Army all I want, but the Army and this country will never love me back, no matter what the sacrifice. I am at peace with this dichotomy."
We owe my friend and his brothers-in-arms the training and equipment he deserves, and we owe him a national strategy that honors our military and our safety. That is why I ask everyone to vote for H. Con. Res. 63 to show that this escalation is a step in the wrong direction.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the majority leader.
Mr. Hoyer: Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding. I was watching this debate from my office, and I was constrained to come to the floor.
There are legitimate issues raised by this resolution as to whether or not you support or do not support the escalation that has been proposed by the President. But no one ought to hide behind the troops. No one ought to come to this floor and say that this Congress, 435 of us, will not support whatever soldier or sailor or marine is deployed to Iraq. Whether it is today or tomorrow, they will have our support.
And when we say in this resolution they are serving, it means if they are serving, if the Commander in Chief has sent them there, we will support them.
And very frankly, for my friend from New Mexico to come to this floor and make the representation that somehow we have limited that support to those who currently are on the ground is not an honest representation, in my opinion.
There are those of us who disagree as to what supporting the troops means. My friend, the former chairman of the committee, just got up and said he has not gotten any calls lately, but we got a lot of calls in in 2003 and 2004 and 2005. And today, Chairman Murtha of the Appropriations Committee is saying we do not have the armored Humvees for these new troops that are going to be deployed or in the process of being deployed.
So when you come to the floor, my friends, debate the substance of this policy, but do not hide behind the troops, do not assert that anybody on this floor does not have every intention and commitment to supporting to whatever degree necessary our young men and women and, as I have said, some not so young, who are deployed in harm's way at the point of the spear. Because no one in this Congress, and our troops ought to know, that no one in this Congress will not support them when they are deployed at the point of the spear.
Mr. Hunter: Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Hoyer: I will be glad to yield to my friend.
Mr. Hunter: I thank the gentleman for yielding. The point that I made----
Mr. Hoyer: I was not referring to you, my friend. I want to make that clear.
Mr. Hunter: I am talking about the armor issue. The point that I made is the idea of coming to the floor and implying that somehow there was bad faith in this government for not having the new body armor that our troops presently have to the tune of 400,000 sets, that somehow that was a dereliction of duty is also a disservice, not only to the former Congresses, but also to the former administrations. Because the last administration in the year 2000 had zero sets of body armor.
Body armor is a new advent, it is a new system. We now have hundreds of new systems that we have injected into the warfighting theater. So the idea that we had a ragtag military moving across the berm into Iraq is also not accurate.
And I would hope that the gentleman would admonish his colleagues who come to the floor who imply that our people went across that berm unequipped is also not accurate. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Hoyer: I thank the gentleman for his observation. I am not sure the gentleman and I agree. I am not an expert in this area; I do not serve on the subcommittee or the committee. But the information that I have is that the troops that we sent in 2003 and 2004 on the ground did not have sufficient quantities of body armor for each one of them. Now, that may be inaccurate, and if the gentleman thinks that assertion is inaccurate I would be glad to yield.
Mr. Hunter: My point is to the gentleman.
Mr. Hoyer: Is that inaccurate?
Mr. Hunter: That is inaccurate if you refer to the historic amount of body armor that our troops have had.
Mr. Hoyer: Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Hunter: Then I would say, yes, that is inaccurate. The way the gentleman stated and if he is not going to qualify it, then that is inaccurate, because we have never had body armor until this war.
Mr. Hoyer: Reclaiming my time, is the gentleman asserting that all of the troops who were in Humvees in 2003 and 2004 had armored Humvees or that they had all of the troops deployed in harm's way, and, by the way, being in Iraq is in harm's way wherever they may be, had sufficient body armor? Is that what the gentleman is asserting?
Mr. Hunter: The gentleman and I are good enough friends, if the gentleman will allow me to make a one-sentence answer.
The answer is, not since 1776 until just a few years ago have American troops in Vietnam and Korea and World War II, in any war, had what is known as ballistic body armor. It is a brand-new thing. And we have got yet new systems that we are going to be putting into the field shortly. So they don't have the newest and they didn't have the newest. They now have 400,000 sets. But to imply that that lack of having them from 1776 to 2000 made them into some type of an unequipped force is also not fully true.
Mr. Hoyer: I thank the gentleman for his observation. But, of course, my assertion was not 1776 to 2000; it was 2003 and 2004.
But the point that I will make, and if I can conclude, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. The point that I wanted to make, though, is irrespective of that assertion one way or the other, I believe every one of our colleagues, whatever their view on this resolution might be, all 435 have every intention and will in fact do whatever they need to protect and promote the safety of our men and women in harm's way. And the assertion, I tell my friend, that was made by the gentlewoman from New Mexico that the verbiage of this resolution says, because serving, it does not mean those who will serve, obviously, as soon as they are sent into theater, they are serving in Iraq and they are covered by this resolution. There ought to be no confusion on that issue by anybody on the floor or anybody who might be listening to this debate.
Mr. Hunter: Will the gentleman yield one last time?
Mr. Hoyer: I will be glad to yield to my friend.
Mr. Hunter: I thank the gentleman for yielding. And let me say to my friend, and I listened to the gentlewoman's discussion. The gentlewoman is a very careful Member of Congress, and she looked at the words and she asked the question: Does this include, because it appeared that it refers, the equipage language refers to people who are presently there but does exclude, and she is a very careful person and I have been in markups with her and committee meetings before. She is very careful about wording; words mean things. That it doesn't refer to people who are going to be deployed by the President in the future. And her worry, and I think it was a sincere concern, is that people who may be sent by the President in the future may end up seeing a cutoff of funds, of supplies, O&M dollars, as a result of this Congress.
So if the gentleman is assuring us that that is not going to happen, I think that is good news to the gentlewoman from New Mexico.
Mr. Hoyer: Reclaiming my time, I am glad that it is good news. I will repeat: No one in this Congress, not Chairman Skelton or Chairman Murtha or any Member on this side, will take any action that will put at risk the men and women whom we have placed at the point of the spear in harm's way. I make that representation to you, that assertion, and I make it as strongly as I can possibly make it.
This is about a policy, a policy as to whether or not we ought to send 21,000 additional people. And as the gentlewoman from New Mexico said she herself has great reservations about that policy, but rationalizes voting against the resolution which opposes that policy on an assertion that I think was not correct. And if she wanted that clarification, I am glad that I could give it to her. I thank the gentleman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Renzi: Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the dialogue, and I thank the gentleman from California. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I also could benefit from the wisdom of the gentleman from Maryland. In defense of my neighbor from New Mexico, she articulately pointed out that the resolution also talks about the fact that the flawed language in this resolution, and I quote, says that Congress disapproves of deploying more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.
Certainly you do not disapprove of the several thousand troops that will be sent to al-Anbar province. I mean, after all, that is where we are engaging al Qaeda, the folks who attacked us. I mean, after all, that is where the generals are asking for those several thousand troops.
So you throw out a number of 20,000 troops. Not all of them are going to downtown Baghdad. Many of them are going to al-Anbar. A funny thing about al-Anbar province and Fallujah. The tribal authorities in that area who were with al Qaeda have now turned against al Qaeda. They are looking to join the American forces. They are looking to take advantage of this new enthusiasm, this new troop deployment.
Certainly when you put down 20,000 troops, you don't mean the 4,000 or 5,000 going to fight al Qaeda that attacked us. Do you? Because that portion of the resolution is flawed.
I was recently in Iraq and had the honor of meeting Major General Moore. Major General Moore reminded me, "Al Qaeda is a hyena waiting in the dark, ready to rip apart innocent Americans. And they are coming. We need to be lions, fiercely defending our people, ferocious in the face of enemy."
You know, unfortunately, this nonbinding resolution is a political whimper rather than a roar of support for our troops. The language undermines our battlefield plans, it fails to offer any alternatives, it offers no hope, encourages no victory, and contains no solutions.
Mr. Speaker, this resolution is a cruel message to our brave soldiers on the front lines and it undermines their fighting spirit and their morale. It pushes for an abrupt exit to Iraq, sidesteps the dire consequences of leaving Iraq, not just of the country but of the people.
On a recent trip to Baghdad I was stunned by the honorable Iraqi families who live in the Sunni-Shia fault line neighborhoods, families who have lived together despite ethnic differences and religious differences. These are neighborhoods that are a model for religious tolerance. Can you imagine enduring religious bigotry and living peacefully alongside a different Muslim sect, and yet in exchange for your moderation and understanding your family is hunted, you are forced to move by armed militia at gunpoint, and these are the same radicals that pursue and round up your husbands and your sons and torture them and kill them?
And then you are left as a single mother in downtown Baghdad with children, and all you have to hold on to is a fledgling government and American soldiers, these same American soldiers that are already deployed and being sent and are already on their way to Baghdad to protect your home and your children's future. And yet this morning you awake in Baghdad, you await the news of politicians in Washington arguing about taking away this little bit of security that you have.
And if you can't imagine that, and a lot us have traveled together who have been to the Iran-Iraq border, go with me to al-Kut, where we are developing evidence of Iran's active engagement in exporting weapons and money and support for radical Islamists. Could the news be true that the Americans are talking about leaving the border, about leaving the several hundred El Salvadoran and multinational forces that are serving there with us? Those are the El Salvadorans from our own hemisphere. These are the El Salvadorans that survived death squads in their own country. These are the El Salvadorans who will return home. And what will they say about America? Did we leave too soon? Did we leave that border unguarded? Did we turn it over to the Iranians? Did we allow that little city called al-Kut to revert back to the city named "Little Teheran"?
The State Department has warned us that a retreat of American military forces at this time could trigger ethnic cleansing. The resulting humanitarian crisis could be one of the worst in the region, and genocide could trigger a refugee exodus into Jordan and Syria and the surrounding regions.
My friends, should we lose our resolve, it is likely death squads will roam and will become immediately more emboldened and more murderous, and what is now referred to as violence in Baghdad will quickly regress into mass killings.
Mr. Speaker, genocide is what caused our involvement in the Clinton administration to put us into Bosnia. Eventually the cry from mass slaughter of innocent civilians in Baghdad could cause us to reenter Iraq. We need to take responsibility, all of us, for our words and our actions. We need to understand the effect this flawed resolution has on the morale of our soldiers overseas, and the effect it will have on the desires of our allies to team with us in the future.
Finally, we need to take responsibility, all of us, for the encouragement this resolution gives to our enemies.
I was up in Bilad recently with General McCrystal. After a long briefing and discussion, we were ready to depart the region and General McCrystal said to me, You know, tell the folks back home that I am going to stay and fight until somebody makes me leave.
General McCrystal, today we are trying to stop that from happening until your work is done.
Mr. Speaker, the American people must demand that the authors of this resolution tell us what their better plan is for al Anbar province. Tell us what your better plan is for the tribal authorities who have just joined us in the fight against al Qaeda in our national interests. Tell us, my colleagues, explain to me the consequences of withdrawing from downtown Baghdad and the slaughter that that could have on the tens of thousands of innocent families.
Tell me what we say to the Salvadorans serving with us on the Iraq- Iranian border if we are about to leave that border unguarded. Please explain to me how this measure of discouragement, this flawed resolution, doesn't affect the performance and the morale of our troops. Please tell me how this political debate doesn't weaken the resolve of our country to win, to endure, and to prevail.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague, a fellow member of the Armed Services Committee, the gentlelady from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California:
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this resolution and in opposition to the President's decision to send more of our troops to Iraq.
I was against this war from the onset. On October 10, 2002, I was one of the few who voted against the resolution authorizing the President to use military force in Iraq. But the authorization passed, and we went to war. At that point we supported our troops and we wanted to win, and we want win. And I have voted for every appropriation bill to give our troops what they need to achieve their mission.
So here we are, more than 4 years later, and what do we have to show for this war? Violence in Iraq continues to skyrocket. This past December was the deadliest month for Iraqi civilians since the war began.
Over the course of this war, 45,000 to 65,000 Iraqi civilians have lost their lives, maybe more; we really don't know, because nobody is counting here in America. And over 3,000 brave American troops, men and women in our Armed Forces, have lost their lives. My home State of California sends the most to the services. We alone have lost 325 men and women in Iraq, and we have sustained about 2,500 injuries to our military personnel, more than any other State in the United States.
And Iraqis have paid the price. Our military, their families; the families of our military are the ones sacrificing in this war. They have paid the price, and our country has paid the price for this President's war.
Yet Iraq is less secure than ever, even before the President's "mission accomplished" declaration. There is no functioning infrastructure, no banking system, zero economic stability. Iraq is not secure, Baghdad is not secure. The Iraq Study Group reported that the President's strategy in Iraq is failing. It is failing.
And how does our President respond? With more of the same. He wants to send 21,500 more of our men and women into Iraq to carry out the same failure.
The President has failed to articulate what these new troops will do that is different from what has been done over the past few years. What is his plan? Four surges? Four surges that didn't work. He wants to do it again?
And believe me, sitting on the Armed Services Committee, I have been here to see it. I was the one in the first few months who told General Franks, this is an insurgency, it is guerrilla warfare. He refused to call it that. I was the one that went to Iraq when General Odierno told me there were only 359 insurgents left, that we were almost there, while the day before, his boss, Abizaid, had said he thought there were about 5,000. That was 2 years ago.
I was there when Secretary Rumsfeld was saying we have trained 89,000; 2 days later, 95,000; a week later, 160,000 Iraqi Army. This was 2 years ago. Just pulling numbers out of the air, that is what they were doing to America.
And I was there in Iraq the day that General Petraeus, who was successful in Mosul, and then Mosul fell because he pulled his troops from there to Fallujah, and to try to take Fallujah. And he said to me with tears in his eyes, We couldn't hold Mosul because we had to take the troops to go to Fallujah.
At that point he said, We didn't have enough troops. But the President didn't listen. The President fails to grasp that military action alone is not sufficient to stabilize Iraq. And without a legitimate diplomatic component, there will be no end to the civil war in Iraq. But the President has refused to engage the powers in the region. He has outright rejected the notion of dialogue with Iran and Syria, a key suggestion from the Iraq Study Group. It is not the role of Congress to command our forces. That is the constitutional responsibility given to the Commander in Chief. But he has to do it right. And we have to hold him accountable for our failures in Iraq.
As Commander-in-Chief, that responsibility is up to President Bush.
The President must be frank with Congress and with the American people, and admit that the strategy in Iraq to date has been a complete failure.
The President must come up with a new strategy to stabilize the situation in Iraq, one that ends with the redeployment of our troops home. What is his plan?
My message for the President is this:
The voters have told you, Mr. President, that they have had enough of your failed strategy in Iraq.
And today, Mr. President, this Congress is telling you that we too have had enough of your failed strategy in Iraq.
Our troops deserve more from you. You have ignored the American people's wishes. You have ignored the Iraq Study Group's recommendations.
Today, I hope you will not ignore this Congress. I hope you will not send any more of our Armed Forces into harm's way, until you have a plan to win.
Our military is the strongest and most capable in the world, but they cannot continue to be overextended and asked to participate in your failing strategy.
Mr. President, I ask you to listen to the American people, the Iraq Study Group, and this Congress.
We are telling you clearly that we do not want you to send any more troops to participate in a failing strategy. It is your responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief, to come up with an actual plan to stabilize Iraq and begin bringing our troops home to their families.
Mr. Hunter: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Crowley): Will the gentleman suspend momentarily.
The Chair will remind all persons in the gallery that they are here as guests of the House and that any manifestation of approval or disapproval of proceedings or other audible conversation is in violation of the rules of the House.
The gentleman from California may proceed.
Mr. Hunter: Mr. Speaker, thank you, and I wanted to take this couple of minutes to expand on my conversation with the majority leader.
Mr. Speaker, it has been said a number of times that we went over the berm and went into Iraq without body armor. In fact, no American troops until just a couple of years ago, from the time that we were first a Nation and deployed military forces on our homeland or around the world, in all those years, in that entire history of the United States, we never had body armor. I never had body armor in Vietnam. Nobody ever saw it. We had no body armor in Korea. We had no body armor in World War II, except perhaps in very, very specialized operations where perhaps specialized custom-made body armor, that is, bulletproof armor would be manufactured for some special forces teams or special operations.
Now, I have in front of me a comparison. This comparison is between a soldier in 1999, at the end of the last administration and the equipment that he has, and a soldier today. Now, as you can see, this is a soldier in 1999. He has a number of accessories. In fact, he has an M-16; he has a flak jacket; he has gloves; he has load-carrying equipment; he has protective goggles. He does have a night vision device. He has also got a helmet and accessories that can be utilized when he is in combat.
Now, the soldier today has a lot more. That soldier has, for example, instead of an M-16, he has an M-4 carbine. He has now body armor, including an outer tactical vest body armor. He has enhanced small arms protective inserts, called SAPI plates. He has deltoid auxillary protection and side plates. He has knee pads. He has more sophisticated aiming equipment and night vision equipment than his counterpart of just a couple of years ago.
My point is that whenever new systems are introduced into the force, and the first thousand or so systems or several thousand systems go into the force and a battalion or even a brigade has those pieces of equipment, you can by definition say that everybody else that doesn't have them is now deficient in equipment. But, in fact, they are not deficient in equipment. This point was made by a leader in the 101st Airborne who pointed out that one of his battalions that they looked at, which was rated the top level of readiness, that is C-1 readiness, ready to go, ready to fight, in 1999. If you took all of the new equipment that troops have today and put that new equipment on as a requirement for that same battle-ready battalion in 1999, they would be rendered C-4, or unready for battle by definition because they don't have the new equipment.
So I think one thing we need to do, as we lean on the Army, the Marine Corps, and the other services to move equipment into the field quickly, let's not penalize them, and when they move the first several thousand sets into the field, let's not say, Congratulations, you've just rendered on paper the rest of your units unready because they don't have the new stuff you're moving in. That will have a chilling effect on what is already a very cumbersome process and a very steep bureaucracy to get through in terms of moving equipment to the field.
I wanted to just make that point.
What I would like to do at this point is yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
Mr. Forbes: Mr. Speaker, I rise this afternoon among a sea of voices that I quickly confess I do not understand. Now, some of them are my friends and some of them are very good people and I don't want to make any mistake about it. I understand the pressures they are under. I understand what it is like when you have major news media outlets who will not even take individuals who attack innocent civilians in the United States and destroy our property and they won't even call them terrorists. I understand the pressure when they control much of the media that we get across the country.
I also understand what it is like, Mr. Speaker, when we have Web sites that are filled with hate, that spew poison out throughout all of our congressional districts, and I understand the pressure that we get when we have people who don't want to listen but simply want to scream, who stand outside and protest at our offices. I understand those pressures. What I don't understand is the response that I am seeing here today on this floor.
Just a few years ago, I had the privilege of traveling with then Speaker Denny Hastert to the 60th anniversary of one of the greatest military achievements the United States has ever seen, and that was the invasion of Normandy. Almost every historian agrees it was the battle that literally saved the world. It was of particular importance to me because my dad had died just a few months before and he was there during World War II. Mr. Speaker, I sat that day in the sun among a sea of heroes who didn't come up to the microphone and pound the desk and they didn't speak in shrill voices. They sat with quiet silence because they had done the hard work and they had literally saved the world. And after that ceremony, I had the honor of just walking with them, in the same presence with them, as we walked down on the beach at Omaha Beach and stood there literally speechless as the military historians first told us that that was a victory that didn't necessarily have to be a victory, that we could have easily lost that battle. And if we had lost Omaha Beach, we would have lost that invasion. If we had lost that invasion, Germany would have signed a treaty and Europe would have looked much different than it looks today.
And they told us about the guns that were pointed up and down Omaha Beach, huge cannons and the machine guns locked on the front that created virtually killing fields for our young men that would have to come on that beachhead.
And then, Mr. Speaker, they told us about the very first Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, who had warned against doing exactly what we are doing today when he said this: "Do not have efforts that end in the production of nothing but paper, but we must contrive to produce action, not paper, if our goal is victory, not defeat."
Mr. Speaker, they described how when General Eisenhower, one of the most beloved generals of our time, when he was strategizing that great vision, his own generals disagreed with him on many issues. In fact, some of them threatened to quit because there were different strategies. Some said don't go today, some said go today, some said do it a different way.
But then as they watched that invasion, greatest victory of all times, let me tell you what happened early that morning. Our airborne men, some of them were dropped into the flooded lowlands, and they drowned without a bullet ever being fired on them because we dropped them in the wrong places. Some of them were dropped in the midst of German positions, and they were captured or they were killed.
Less than a half of the 82nd Airborne's gliders ever reached their assigned landing fields. By early morning, 4,000 men of the 82nd and 60 percent of their equipment was unaccounted for.
The high seas that day swamped many of our boats, and we lost our radios in the bottom of the sea, and only three out of 16 of our bulldozers survived. But what was worse, in the first 4 minutes we had 97 percent casualties on that beach. The Germans were elated.
Mr. Speaker, as I have listened to this debate, I could only think what would happen if the leadership controlling this floor had been on the command ships sitting off of Omaha Beach, because you and I know what would have happened. One by one, they would could came up to the podium, they would have grabbed a microphone, they would have pounded, and they would have looked at all the things that happened. At the end of all that, do you know what it would have resulted in?
It would have had a note that they would have passed to the 29th Division, and those young boys on that beach, some of them 17, 18, 19 years old, who were hunkered down on that beach in the sand, some of them paralyzed with fear not knowing what to do. That note would have said, we love you, we support you, we just want to let you know we disagree with the action that you are taking. We don't know what to tell you, we just disagree with the action that got you here.
But fortunately, that was not the leadership that governed that day. The leadership that governed that day was people like Brigadier General Cota who went up and down that beach and he looked at those young boys and he said, essentially, don't look at the beach. Don't look at the bullets that are flying here at you, because if you do you are going to die on this beach and you are going to lose everything you believed in.
What he told them to do, he said, Look at that hill. We have got to take that hill. He said, Rangers, lead the way. Americans, lead the way. You know what? They took that hill, and they won the greatest military victory in the history of this country. As a result, they saved the world.
Mr. Speaker, I hope and I pray that we will continue to birth voices that say don't look down, don't look at the mistakes, look at that hill. We have got to take this hill, and we have got to save the world from this threat of terrorism that so threatens us.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, may I inquire about the time that has been consumed and the time remaining, please?
The Speaker pro tempore: The gentleman from Missouri has 3 hours, 3 minutes remaining. The gentleman from California has 3 hours and 4 minutes remaining.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, it is interesting to note that this debate is about so many things other than the resolution that is before us. Simple, straightforward, in plain English language, two points. The first is, we in this Congress fully support those wonderful young men and women in uniform.
Secondly, we do not agree with the addition of 21,500 troops into Iraq. That is what we ought to be debating.
I listened to my good friend from Virginia speak of Normandy, I was there with him. I saw my friend, Dr. Tommy MacDonnell, with a worn Purple Heart and a Cluster and his Silver Star in his uniform that day. Great memories, great American victory. But what in the world is the debate involving other battles, other days, other conditions, when we ought to be talking about this? This is a simple, straightforward debate.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Georgia, a member of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. Marshall).
Mr. Marshall: I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, we are debating today a nonbinding resolution to disapprove the Iraqi-American military surge in Baghdad. We do so knowing Congress cannot manage a war, let alone micromanage one. We do so knowing the surge has begun, and we will continue despite our debate and vote. We do so hoping our debate will not discourage those called upon to execute the surge, but we also do so knowing that it might.
Mr. Speaker, that is enough for me to oppose the resolution. I will vote "no" on the anti-surge resolution, despite the fact that for 3 years now I have consistently contended that we should have fewer troops in Iraq, not more. Clearly, the surge is inconsistent with my general view with how to make our effort in Iraq sustainable and winnable.
But the anti-surge resolution is akin to sitting on the sidelines booing in the middle of our own team's play because we don't like the coach's call. I cannot join mid-play naysaying that might discourage even one of those engaged in this current military effort in Baghdad.
To those soldiers and marines who are engaged, I would say the following. Don't be discouraged by this debate and vote. It is birthed by the very democracy that you are defending. If you are successful, Iraqis may one day enjoy the same right to debate and vote like we are debating and voting. If they do, they may well look back at you as having birthed that right for them.
Nearly 40 years ago, I was a grunt platoon sergeant in Vietnam, a kid who dropped out of college and enlisted specifically to go to Vietnam. And at the very time that I was fighting insurgents in Vietnam, our country was torn by antiwar protests and debate. I didn't worry about that. You should not either. I didn't let it discourage me. You should not let it discourage you. You should simply do your duty and be proud of the fact that you have done it. Do it to the best of your ability.
I made tons of mistakes, failed many, many times to do what I should have done. But do what you can to discharge your duty on behalf of the country and let others, the President and the Congress, debate what that duty actually is. There are legitimate differences of opinion in the United States among the leadership concerning the best way forward in Iraq, how to get to the best possible result. Don't worry about that.
No doubt you have your own ideas. I certainly did when I was in Vietnam. While in combat in Vietnam, I was convinced that the tactics that we were using needed to be dramatically changed. But, nevertheless, I continued to do the best I could as I was instructed to do.
I gave a eulogy for Sergeant Victor Anderson of the Georgia National Guard about 2 years ago, 39 years old, disqualified because of diabetes when the National Guard was called up. He fought his disqualification, he went to Iraq.
The week before he died, hit by an IED, he saw some of his men killed. He sent an e-mail back to his family. In that e-mail, he explained this, people ask me why I fight. I do not fight for some ideology. I fight for that man to my left and the one to my right. They are men of their honor. When called, they responded and did their duty. They did not run away. If you believe in nothing else, believe in them.
It is that kind of spirit that I hope you have. I hope, in fact, that I can look at you when you come back from Iraq and be as proud of you as I am of so many others who have fought for us in Iraq and elsewhere. I am a good bit older. It has been 40 years since I was in combat. When I look back at combat, I remember the things that I failed. I forget the things that went particularly well.
Don't fail, do as well as you can. Don't be discouraged by this debate, and we will continue to have additional debates. There will be laws, et cetera, passed. Just do your duty as best you can.
