The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, it is very clear to me that we can take significant steps today to give TSA employees more protections, and that is what the amendment I and several others have proposed would do. It would bring TSA employees under the Whistleblowers Protection Act, and it would allow them to appeal any adverse employment action such as a firing or demotion to an independent agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board. These are rights I believe TSA employees should have. They are rights that are similar to those enjoyed by other Federal employees. But what we are trying to do is strike a balance between giving the employees all of the standard collective bargaining rights and the security needs of the TSA.
The TSA security needs are not hypothetical. TSA has shared with us, in a highly classified briefing, details of when they have had to change the employee work conditions or assignments or duties. This isn't just a hypothetical need. It is one we saw last summer be put in place in the wake of a bombing plot that, fortunately, was thwarted. These are needs that came into play in the response to Hurricane Katrina. What I have suggested in my amendment is that we take major steps to afford more employee rights and protections to the TSA personnel, but we do so in a way that maintains the flexibility TSA has told us, both in classified session and in public hearings, they need to help safeguard our country.
The amendment I have proposed also includes other protections for the employees. It makes very clear that they can join a union. There are several TSOs who have joined a union in order for representation, if there is an adverse employment action.
Another provision of the bill recognizes this is not the final word on the issue but asks for TSA and the GAO to take a look at the personnel system for TSA and report back to us in a year's time about whether there should be other changes made to improve the system.
The amendment also provides for a pay-for-performance system which has been successfully implemented at TSA. We want to codify that.
I don't think this is an all-or-nothing debate. We can take some significant steps today. Secretary Chertoff has sent a letter on behalf of the administration that comments on the alternative proposal put forth by my friend from Missouri, Senator McCaskill. I do have a lot of admiration for my friend and colleague, but I think my other colleagues should be aware that the Department says that "this amendment regrettably does not provide a workable solution. Indeed, in some respects it would make it even more difficult for the … (TSA) to manage its workforce than would section 803 [in the underlying bill.]"
I want to make sure my colleagues are aware that the Department of Homeland Security believes the underlying bill, the language authored by the Senator from Connecticut, is preferable to the language offered by the Senator from Missouri.
I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter from Secretary Chertoff be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Department of Homeland Security,,br />Washington, DC, March 6, 2007.
Hon. Susan M. Collins,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Collins: On behalf of the Administration, I would like to comment on the amendment proposed by Senator McCaskill (SA 316 to SA 315). We appreciate Senator McCaskill's effort to resolve the problems created by section 803 of S. 4, but this amendment regrettably does not provide a workable solution. Indeed, in some respects it would make it even more difficult for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to manage its workforce than would section 803--particularly managing its Transportation Security Officers (TSO), who serve on the front lines to secure our nation's civil aviation system.
Most notably, SA 316 could actually expand the opportunities to bargain collectively beyond what is contemplated by section 803 of the underlying bill. The amendment casts doubt on whether bargaining over employee compensation and benefits is prohibited, as it is under current law and section 803. The amendment also does not differentiate between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, or set terms for bargaining over procedures and appropriate arrangements related to changes in conditions of employment. Given the scope of section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-7), these issues will likely become the subject of litigation. Therefore, the amendment could require TSA management to bargain to impasse over matters that no other federal agency engaged in security is required to address. Furthermore, the very definition of "pay" could become the subject of time-consuming litigation.
The amendment also promises to impede the quick and fair resolution of grievances and other workplace disputes for the thousands of TSOs. Although the Administrator of TSA purportedly would not be required to bargain over responses to emergencies or imminent threats, it is inevitable that protracted litigation will ensue over the meaning of these terms. Moreover, the very definition of "emergencies, newly imminent threats, or intelligence indicating a newly imminent emergency risk" could be subject to collective bargaining and subsequent litigation. The resolution of these issues might rest with an arbitrator with no direct knowledge of intelligence, risk and threat assessment, and transportation security. This would place the performance of TSA's security mission in the hands of someone who neither has the expertise needed to make these decisions nor is accountable for them.
The amendment also fails to alleviate the adverse impact that collective bargaining would have on TSA's day-to-day security operations. TSA is responsible for providing and managing complex, on-site security systems at more than 450 commercial airports, which collectively screen approximately two million passengers a day for thousands of commercial flights. Collective bargaining would limit TSA's management flexibility, which is an indispensable element of this system. TSA must be able to react nimbly, not only to the ever-evolving security threats that confront our Nation, but also to changing air carrier schedules, weather disruptions, and special events that draw large numbers of passengers to particular airports. TSA also needs flexibility to screen not only passengers and their checked baggage, but also air cargo, airport employees, and contractors working at airports. Simply put, collective bargaining remains incompatible with the successful performance of TSA's vital security mission.
In addition, the amendment would prevent TSA from effectively disciplining employees who break the law. The amendment would trigger Title 5's procedural requirements for taking adverse actions against employees, including the 30- day notice provision set forth in Chapter 75. This would eliminate all accelerated adverse action proceedings, even those based on clear and convincing evidence of theft, drug possession or usage, and workplace violence. TSA currently responds to such conduct by ensuring that the employees who commit these violations are removed from the payroll in as few as three days. The amendment also would call into question TSA's ability to remove poor performers. Curtailing any of these procedures would severely compromise TSA's ability to guarantee a safe workplace and assure the traveling public of the uniformly high caliber of its TSO workforce. Ironically, it would also create a situation in which non-TSO employees could be removed from the payroll much more rapidly than TSO employees who directly affect security and customer service and interact daily with the American public on a large scale.
Nor do the amendment's proposed restrictions on TSO activities provide much comfort. The amendment states explicitly that TSOs could not bargain over pay, but that is no different from current law or section 803 of S. 4. Moreover, the amendment specifically prohibits the right of screeners to strike, but federal law already proscribes such actions by each and every member of the federal workforce. These provisions offer no more protection to the traveling public than is found in existing law.
Ultimately, the amendment is unnecessary in light of the significant innovative programs that TSA has implemented to provide for a high performing workforce. These steps include: (1) a comprehensive Model Workplace program; (2) an Office of Occupational Safety, Health, and Environment; (3) a Nurse Care Management program to eliminate or reduce workplace injuries; (4) National Advisory Councils that provide the TSO workforce with direct access to the Administrator and senior management on all issues concerning security and workforce conditions; (5) procedures for Alternative Dispute Resolution; (6) whistleblower protection through a formal agreement with the Office of Special Counsel; (7) a Disputes Resolution Board to provide additional review of workplace grievances; and (8) an extensive on-line training program to provide not only refresher training for TSOs and other TSA employees, but also the bases for career advancement. The recognition of these programs in a modified amendment would provide an appropriate framework to resolve the ongoing issues with section 803 and SA 316. I look forward to working with the Members on this most critical matter.
In the final analysis, the changes that SA 316 would make to section 803 of S. 4 do not resolve the concerns expressed in the Statement of Administration Policy dated February 28, 2007. As such, if section 803 is enacted in its current format, or as amended by SA 316, the President's senior advisors would continue to recommend that he veto the bill.
An identical letter was sent to Chairman Lieberman.
Sincerely,
Michael Chertoff,
Secretary.
Ms. Collins: I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. Coburn: Mr. President, there is no question that unions have these rights for TSO agents. This is a commonsense approach. What is not common sense is to put in jeopardy every traveling American for the sake of paying back a raw political debt. That is what this debate is about. Do we jeopardize safety, do we jeopardize the flexibility, do we jeopardize the fine work that has come from an incentivized system that has very low turnover now compared to the rest of the industry, that has a bonus system for great performance, a performance-based system, to give them what they need and not jeopardize the traveling American public? The McCaskill amendment actually hurts our flexibility and our security.
As a matter of fact, we had a hearing after this bill was on the floor, wherein Mr. Hawley and Mr. Gage came before us and talked about union representation of the TSO officers. Very revealing statements were said, especially by Mr. Gage. When we raised concerns about flexibility during emergencies and complicated issues that required absolute flexibility to move people around at all times, it was the testimony of Mr. Hawley who said they have to plan, that they are in an emergency all the time, which means they have to have the flexibility all the time. Mr. Gage's response to that was: These are sometimes bogus emergency situations.
Well, the reason we have had such an effective airline screening program is because we call everything an emergency and plan for it as an emergency, so we never have an emergency.
This amendment will gut the flexibility of the TSA in doing the very thing we have asked them to do; that is, protect us and have an institution that is viable, responsive, and nimble to protect us, without having to have a shop steward ask them what we can do and when we can do it.
Now, the McCaskill amendment says we will let you do that in an emergency, but the fact is, we are in an emergency mode all the time. So whatever contract we might have signed is not going to have any bearing anyway. So the contrast for the American public on this vote-- and we know this is going to be a party-line vote. Even those Members who want to vote the other way have been told not to vote the other way. We know this is a party-line vote about paying back, so Mr. Gage and his associates can have 40,000 people a month pay $30 a month to put $12 million to $17 million in the coffers of the employees union. That is what this is about.
This is not about security for this country and flexibility with the TSA. I urge a vote against the McCaskill amendment and a vote for the Collins amendment.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: All time on this amendment has expired.
The Senator from Missouri.
Mrs. McCaskill: Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.
The Presiding Officer: Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 316, as modified.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. Durbin: I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson) is necessarily absent.
The Presiding Officer: Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 48, as follows:
| Rollcall Vote No. 64 Leg. - Amendment 316 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YEAS--51 | ||||
| Akaka | Baucus | Bayh | Biden | Bingaman |
| Boxer | Brown | Byrd | Cantwell | Cardin |
| Carper | Casey | Clinton | Conrad | Dodd |
| Dorgan | Durbin | Feingold | Feinstein | Harkin |
| Inouye | Kennedy | Kerry | Klobuchar | Kohl |
| Landrieu | Lautenberg | Leahy | Levin | Lieberman |
| Lincoln | McCaskill | Menendez | Mikulski | Murray |
| Nelson (FL) | Nelson (NE) | Obama | Pryor | Reed |
| Reid | Rockefeller | Salazar | Sanders | Schumer |
| Specter | Stabenow | Tester | Webb | Whitehouse |
| Wyden | ||||
| Nays--48 | ||||
| Alexander | Allard | Bennett | Bond | Brownback |
| Bunning | Burr | Chambliss | Coburn | Cochran |
| Coleman | Collins | Corker | Cornyn | Craig |
| Crapo | DeMint | Dole | Domenici | Ensign |
| Enzi | Graham | Grassley | Gregg | Hagel |
| Hatch | Hutchison | Inhofe | Isakson | Kyl |
| Lott | Lugar | Martinez | McCain | McConnell |
| Murkowski | Roberts | Sessions | Shelby | Smith |
| Snowe | Stevens | Sununu | Thomas | Thune |
| Vitter | Voinovich | Warner | ||
| NOT VOTING--1 | ||||
| Johnson | ||||
The amendment (No. 316), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. Lieberman: Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. Nelson (NE): I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The Presiding Officer: Under the previous order, there will now be 2 minutes of debate equally divided on amendment No. 342.
Who yields time? The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, this is an attempt to find middle ground on a very difficult issue. The amendment that I and my colleagues offer the Senate would provide TSA employees with the right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board any adverse action taken against them. Those rights would be identical to the rights that other Federal employees have. It would give them the protections of the Whistleblowers Protection Act. It recognizes that TSA employees have the right to join a union, and it calls for us to revisit this issue in a year by having a report from TSA and the GAO.
I think this helps give more rights and employment protections to TSA employees without impeding the necessary flexibility that TSA needs to have for our security.
I urge support of the amendment.
The Acting President pro tempore: The Senate will be in order. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. Lieberman: Mr. President, this is one of those rare occasions when the Senator from Maine and I disagree. I appreciate the fact that Senator Collins is trying to find a middle ground in this contentious debate. She gives the Transportation Screening Officers at TSA some employee rights but not the right to collectively bargain, which most employees in the Department of Homeland Security, and throughout our Government has. Presumably, the contention is that the right to collective bargaining would interfere with the security responsibility of the agencies, but TSA in the underlying bill and under Senator McCaskill's amendment would have absolute authority to take whatever actions are needed to carry out its mission in an emergency without bargaining with any units, without even considering any collective bargaining agreement.
The fact is that Federal security forces generally have the right to collectively bargain: Border Patrol agents, immigration officers, Customs, Federal Protective Services, and the U.S. Capitol Police. Those collective bargaining rights do not interfere with their protection of our security, nor would those rights for TSOs at TSA.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The Acting President pro tempore: Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 342. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. Durbin: I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson) is necessarily absent.
The Acting President pro tempore: Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 47, nays 52, as follows:
| Rollcall Vote No. 65 Leg. - Amendment 342 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YEAS--47 | ||||
| Alexander | Allard | Bennett | Bond | Brownback |
| Burr | Chambliss | Coburn | Cochran | Coleman |
| Collins | Corker | Cornyn | Craig | Crapo |
| DeMint | Dole | Domenici | Ensign | Enzi |
| Graham | Grassley | Gregg | Hagel | Hatch |
| Hutchison | Inhofe | Isakson | Kyl | Lott |
| Lugar | Martinez | McCain | McConnell | Murkowski |
| Roberts | Sessions | Shelby | Smith | Snowe |
| Stevens | Sununu | Thomas | Thune | Vitter |
| Voinovich | Warner | |||
| Nays--52 | ||||
| Akaka | Baucus | Bayh | Biden | Bingaman |
| Boxer | Brown | Bunning | Byrd | Cantwell |
| Cardin | Carper | Casey | Clinton | Conrad |
| Dodd | Dorgan | Durbin | Feingold | Feinstein |
| Harkin | Inouye | Kennedy | Kerry | Klobuchar |
| Kohl | Landrieu | Lautenberg | Leahy | Levin |
| Lieberman | Lincoln | McCaskill | Menendez | Mikulski |
| Murray | Nelson (FL) | Nelson (NE) | Obama | Pryor |
| Reed | Reid | Rockefeller | Salazar | Sanders |
| Schumer | Specter | Stabenow | Tester | Webb |
| Whitehouse | Wyden | |||
| NOT VOTING-- | ||||
| Johnson | ||||
The amendment (No. 342) was rejected.
Mr. Lieberman: I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. Leahy: I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. Cornyn: Mr. President, on rollcall vote 65, I voted "nay," but it was my intention to vote "yea." Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to change my vote, since it will not affect the outcome.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Cornyn: I thank the Chair.
(The foregoing tally has been changed to reflect the above order.)
The Acting President pro tempore: The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. Lieberman: Mr. President, I rise to offer a unanimous consent request for the order of the speakers to follow. It would be, Senator Bunning of Kentucky be recognized for 5 minutes to call up an amendment and then set it aside; that Senator Schumer of New York then be recognized for up to 5 minutes to call up three amendments and set them aside; that Senator Kerry of Massachusetts be recognized for up to 10 minutes to offer a tribute to former Senator Tom Eagleton; that Senator Graham of South Carolina be recognized for up to 15 minutes to speak on an amendment; that Senator Wyden and Senator Bond be recognized for up to 10 minutes to call up an amendment; that Senator Kyl be recognized for up to 5 minutes; and, finally, that Senator Landrieu be recognized for up to 10 minutes to do a tribute.
The Acting President pro tempore: Is there objection?
Mr. Lieberman: Excuse me. Is Senator Kyl for 5 minutes or 15 minutes? I said 5 minutes only because it is on my piece of paper as 5, but it is 15 minutes we want to give to Senator Kyl.
The Acting President pro tempore: The Senator from Maine.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, I do object at this time because we have not seen this agreement. It has not been discussed with the manager or the staff on this side. I do object, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The Acting President pro tempore: Objection is heard. Without objection, the clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. Bunning: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, I object.
The Acting President pro tempore: Objection is heard. The clerk will continue with the call of the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The Acting President pro tempore: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, I am just going to make a brief statement before the Senator from Connecticut propounds the unanimous consent request. Now that I have seen the unanimous consent request, I am not going to object to it, but I do want to comment briefly on the two votes that we have just taken on the issue of the TSA employees.
I think those votes were extremely unfortunate because everyone in this Chamber knows that the President is going to veto this important bill if the provisions remain in the bill as the Senate just voted.
If that happens, it means the TSA employees will not receive the additional protections and rights that I advocated for in the amendment that I presented to the Senate. They will be back to a situation where they cannot appeal adverse employment actions to an independent agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board. They will be back in the situation where they cannot be protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act.
It is unfortunate that the votes we have just taken will actually set back the cause of providing employee protections that the TSA screeners should have.
I want to make sure that my colleagues are aware of what the practical implications and what the results will be of the votes just taken because there are clearly sufficient votes in this Chamber to sustain the President's veto, and I think it is very unfortunate that we are not going to be able to proceed to give these employees rights they deserve, rights they should have, and rights that would not impair our security.
I thank the Chair.
The Acting President pro tempore: The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. Lieberman: Mr. President, I express my regrets to Senator Collins that she had not seen this list. I thought she had. We don't like to do it that way. It is a bipartisan list, as it turns out. I am going to propound a unanimous consent request again and do it in summary fashion without mentioning the topics again.
I ask unanimous consent that the order of speakers be as follows: Senator Bunning for 5 minutes; Senator Schumer for 5 minutes; Senator Kerry for 10 minutes; Senator Graham for 15 minutes; Senator Wyden and Senator Bond to share 10 minutes; Senator Kyl for 15 minutes; and Senator Landrieu for 10 minutes. In each case, it is up to that amount. I know the Senate would be grateful if the Senators choose not to use the full amount of time.
The Acting President pro tempore: Is there objection?
Mr. Allard: Mr. President, I would like to have permission to alternate between Republicans and Democrats. If I could be lined up to speak after--who was the first Democrat after Senator Bunning? Senator Schumer. If I may be allowed to speak next, I would appreciate it. I was lined up to speak at 2 o'clock originally, but we had the vote at 2 o'clock and, obviously, that has been slid out now. If the Senator from Connecticut can move me in there, I would appreciate it. We have always alternated between Republicans and Democrats.
Mr. Lieberman: We have Republicans and Democrats running together. It is a totally nonpartisan list.
Mr. Allard: All right. I was set up to speak at 2 o'clock, and then we had the vote at 2 o'clock.
Mr. Lieberman: There was no order for the Senator from Colorado to speak. How much time would the Senator like?
Mr. Allard: Mr. President, 10 minutes. Senator Cornyn and I want to engage in a colloquy, and then I have a few comments. We just need 10 minutes.
Mr. Lieberman: Mr. President, I amend the request for the Senator from Colorado, Mr. Allard, to have 10 minutes after Senator Schumer's 10 minutes.
Mr. Allard: I thank the Senator.
The Acting President pro tempore: Is there objection to the request, as modified? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Under the unanimous consent agreement, the Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
Mr. Bunning: Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 334 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Acting President pro tempore: Is there objection to setting aside the pending amendment? Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] proposes an amendment numbered 334 to amendment No. 275.
Mr. Bunning: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The Acting President pro tempore: Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To amend title 49, United States Code, to modify the authorities relating to Federal flight deck officers)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ___. FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICERS.
(a) In General.--Section 44921(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish the Federal flight deck officer program to deputize eligible pilots as Federal law enforcement officers to defend against acts of criminal violence or air piracy. Such an officer shall be known as a 'Federal flight deck officer'.".
(b) Authority To Carry Firearms.--Section 44921(f) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
(f) Authority To Carry Firearms.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall authorize a Federal flight deck officer to carry a firearm on the officer's person. Notwithstanding subsection (c)(1), the officer may purchase a firearm and carry that firearm in accordance with this section if the firearm is of a type that may be used under the program.
(2) Preemption.--Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal flight deck officer may carry a firearm in any State and from one State to another State.
(3) Carrying firearms outside united states.--
(A) In general.--When operating to, from, or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government where an agreement allowing a Federal flight deck officer to carry or possess a firearm is not in effect, a Federal flight deck officer shall be designated as a Federal air marshal for the purposes of complying with international weapons carriage regulations and existing agreements with foreign governments. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to allow Federal flight deck officers to receive any other benefit of being so designated.
(B) Requirement to negotiate agreements.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate agreements with foreign governments as necessary to allow Federal flight deck officers to carry and possess firearms within the jurisdictions of such foreign governments for protection of international flights against hijackings or other terrorist acts. Any such agreements shall provide Federal flight deck officers the same rights and privileges accorded Federal air marshals by such foreign governments.
(4) Description of authority and procedures.--The authority of a Federal flight deck officer to carry a firearm shall be identical to such authority granted to any other Federal law enforcement officer under Federal law. The operating procedures applicable to a Federal flight deck officer relating to carrying such firearm shall be no more restrictive than the restrictions for carrying a firearm that are generally imposed on any other Federal law enforcement officer who has statutory authority to carry a firearm.
(5) Locked devices.--
(A) No requirement to use.--A Federal flight deck officer may not be required to carry or transport a firearm in a locked bag, box, or container.
(B) Requirement to provide.--Upon request of a Federal flight deck officer, the Secretary shall provide a secure locking device or other appropriate container for storage of a firearm by the Federal flight deck officer.".
(c) Due Process.--Section 44921 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the follow new subsection:
(l) Due Process.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, the Secretary shall establish procedures for the appeal of adverse decisions or actions. Such procedures shall provide timely notice of the action or decision, including specific reasons for the action or decision.".
(d) Identification and Screening.--Section 44921 of title 49, United States Code, as amended by subsection (c), is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:
(m) Credentials.--The Secretary shall issue to each Federal flight deck officer standard Federal law enforcement credentials, including a distinctive metal badge, that are similar to the credentials issued to other Federal law enforcement officers.
(n) Security Inspections.--A Federal flight deck officer may not be subject to greater routine security inspection or screening protocols at or in the vicinity of an airport than the protocols that apply to other Federal law enforcement officers.".
(e) Reports to Congress.--Section 44921 of title 49, United States Code, as amended by subsections (c) and (d), is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(o) Reports to Congress.--
(1) Reports on program.--Not less often than once every 6 months, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall report to Congress on the progress that the Secretary of State has made in implementing international agreements to permit Federal flight deck officers to carry firearms on board an aircraft operating within the jurisdiction of a foreign country.
(2) Report on training.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, the Secretary shall report to Congress on the issues raised with respect to training in Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General report OIG-07-14 that includes proposals to address the issues raised in such report.".
(f) Conforming and Other Amendments.--Section 44921 of title 49, United States Code, as amended by sections (c), (d), and (e), is further amended--
(1) by striking "Under Secretary" each place it appears and inserting "Secretary"; and
(2) by striking subparagraph (G) of subsection (b)(3).
Mr. Bunning: Mr. President, this amendment makes changes in the implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, commonly referred to as the Armed Pilot Program, to require the Department of Homeland Security to implement the package and program as Congress originally intended.
Four years after Congress created this program, the Department of Homeland Security continues to drag its heels on providing flight deck officers, commonly known as FFDOs, or armed pilots, with the necessary tools to prevent another September 11-type attack.
My amendment will ensure that all armed pilots can truly act as a real defense against hijacking on commercial flights.
This amendment would end the ridiculous practice of forcing armed pilots to carry their guns in lockboxes and would allow them to carry the guns on their body where the gun is easily reachable and more discrete to carry.
No other Federal law enforcement officer is forced to carry a firearm in a lockbox, and Federal law enforcement officials agree that carriage on the body of an officer is the best way for law enforcement officials to carry a firearm to ensure that the threat can be stopped in the safest way possible.
In addition to putting more armed pilots in the skies, this amendment would also put armed pilots on international flights.
The current law for the Armed Pilot Program allows pilots on these flights, but so far the State Department has been slow on entering into negotiations with other countries to allow this to occur.
My amendment requires the State Department to negotiate agreements with other governments to get armed pilots on international flights. Over the last few years, many international flights have been canceled because of terrorist threats.
This amendment will also allow armed pilots to protect the flights of U.S. airlines and free up air marshals so they can be put on targeted foreign flights that we know terrorists are targeting.
This amendment also provides for the issuance of a metal badge for armed pilots so they can easily be identified in a crisis situation.
It is important to make sure that these pilots have a means to identify themselves so that air marshals and other passengers know who they are and that they are lawfully carrying a firearm.
It also requires TSA to give armed pilots the same screening protocols other Federal law enforcement officers have so that the terrorists cannot easily identify them at security checkpoints.
Under current TSA requirements, all armed pilots must be screened publicly in plain view of everyone at the security checkpoint, as opposed to Federal law enforcement officers who are screened behind closed doors.
Finally, this amendment would give pilots basic due process. It requires the Department of Homeland Security to establish procedures to give notice and appeal rights when making any decision against the pilots. Currently, the pilots have no recourse.
I believe these changes that update the law governing the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program are vital and are needed to ensure that this voluntary program runs as it was intended to run and would encourage more pilots to enter into it.
I have spoken many times in the past on the merits of this program and the need for it. It has saddened me that I must once again be forced to ask TSA to start implementing this program as it was originally intended. Once again, we must be forcing TSA's hand to get enough pilots armed to actually create a strong defense against terrorists in the air. We currently have the opportunity to speed this program up and force TSA to do what Congress intended by adopting my amendment.
I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this amendment.
I thank the Chair.
The Acting President pro tempore: Under the previous order, the Senator from New York is recognized for up to 5 minutes.
Mr. Schumer: Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the managers of the bill. We have made good progress on this bill, something that has taken far too long to accomplish since the Commission's report.
Next, I would like to offer two amendments to this bill, which I filed in an attempt to strengthen certain provisions. The committee versions of the bill make significant strides in several areas of security, including improving truck security, and I offer a modified version of No. 367 and the original, No. 366. Two amendments.
The Acting President pro tempore: Without objection, the clerk will report the amendments.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from New York [Mr. Schumer] proposes amendment number 367, as modified, and amendment number 366, en bloc, to amendment No. 275.
Mr. Schumer: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendments be dispensed with.
The Acting President pro tempore: Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments (Nos. 367, as modified, and 366) are as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 367, AS MODIFIED
On page 303, strike line 12 and all that follows through page 305, line 18, and insert the following: of Transportation, shall develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of high hazard materials, as defined in this title, and to equip vehicles used in such shipments with technology that provides--
(A) frequent or continuous communications;
(B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; and
(C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency message.
(2) Considerations.--In developing the program required by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
(A) consult with the Secretary of Transportation to coordinate the program with any ongoing or planned efforts for motor carrier or high hazardous materials tracking at the Department of Transportation;
(B) take into consideration the recommendations and findings of the report on the Hazardous Material Safety and Security Operation Field Test released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; and
(C) evaluate--
(i) any new information related to the cost and benefits of deploying and utilizing tracking technology for motor carriers transporting high hazard materials not included in the Hazardous Material Safety and Security Operation Field Test Report released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration on November 11, 2004;
(ii) the ability of tracking technology to resist tampering and disabling;
(iii) the capability of tracking technology to collect, display, and store information regarding the movement of shipments of high hazard materials by commercial motor vehicles;
(iv) the appropriate range of contact intervals between the tracking technology and a commercial motor vehicle transporting high hazard materials;
(v) technology that allows the installation by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices on commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement authorities to disable the vehicle and alert emergency response resources to locate and recover high hazard materials in the event of loss or theft of such materials; and
(vi) whether installation of the technology described in clause (v) should be incorporated into the program required by paragraph (1).
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, through the Transportation Security Administration, shall promulgate regulations to carry out the provisions of subsection (a).
(c) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this section, $7,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, of which--
(1) $3,000,000 per year may be used for equipment; and
(2) $1,000,000 per year may be used for operations.
Amendment No. 366
(Purpose: To restrict the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a license authoring the export to a recipient country of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. MEDICAL ISOTOPE PRODUCTION.
Section 134 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160d(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking subparagraph (D);
(2) by striking paragraph (2);
(3) in paragraph (3), by striking "paragraph (2)" and inserting "this section";
(4) in paragraph (4)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(iv), by striking "cost differential in medical isotope production in the reactors and target processing facilities if the products" and inserting "cost differential of radiopharmaceuticals to patients if the radiopharmaceuticals"; and
(B) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
(B) Feasibility.--For the purpose of this subsection, the use of low enriched uranium to produce medical isotopes shall be determined to be feasible if it could be accomplished without a large percentage increase in the cost of radiopharmaceuticals to patients.";
(5) in paragraph (5), by striking "(4)(B)(iii)" and inserting "(4)(B)";
(6) in paragraph (6), by striking "(4)(B)(iii)" and inserting "(4)(B)"; and
(7) in paragraph (7), by striking "subsection" and inserting "section for highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production".
Mr. Schumer: Mr. President, I offer the first amendment, No. 367, to make the provision in the underlying committee bill even stronger with a new program to address trucks carrying high-hazard materials. Every day there are trucks that carry high-HAZMAT materials. If a truck is hijacked by a terrorist, it could spell disaster. We need to take action to prevent this from happening, and that is why my amendment will create a system not only to track these high-hazard trucks but to take action to stop a truck in its tracks by shutting down its engine if it strays off course.
This has worked in other countries. My amendment will require the Department of Transportation and TSA to work together to create a system to track these trucks, as well as respond accordingly if there is a problem. Every one of these trucks must submit a predetermined route to the TSA. If a truck strays from its plan, and we will know this by tracking its movements, which GSA allows, TSA is automatically alerted and the system quickly responds.
As I said, we know a system such as this can work. It has been implemented in other countries. Hazardous material in trucks is one of the issues we have not dealt with sufficiently since 9/11. I look forward to the committee's receptiveness to this amendment and to working with the chair and ranking member to see if we can adopt this amendment. This is an important step.
The second amendment I offer, No. 366, along with my colleague, Senator Kyl, will restore export restrictions on highly enriched uranium to reduce risks of terrorists obtaining this material to make nuclear weapons. Highly enriched uranium, HEU, can be used to make actual nuclear weapons, such as that dropped on Hiroshima, not just dirty bombs.
Until 2005, U.S. law restricted exports of bomb-grade uranium. However, this antiterrorism policy was undercut by an ill-considered amendment to the Energy Policy Act that eliminated these restrictions. By increasing the amount of HEU in circulation around the world, the Energy bill created an unacceptable risk by heightening the possibility that weapons-grade uranium could be lost or stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists with known nuclear ambitions. What made this language so astonishing is that it created much more risk without absolutely any reward by claiming to fix a problem that didn't exist.
The reality of this situation is that terrorists don't care if the weapons-grade uranium they try to get their hands on was meant for medical or military use. We know all they care about is how they can use it to attack our Nation and our way of life. If we have learned anything since September 11, it is we must take every step to ensure terrorists can never lay their hands on the materials they would need to launch an attack of mass destruction against the United States.
I urge my colleagues to support both these amendments. I hope we can work with the committee to get them accepted.
Mr. President, with that, in deference to my colleagues, I yield the remainder of my time.
The Acting President pro tempore: Under the previous order, the Senator from Colorado is recognized for up to 10 minutes.
Mr. Allard: Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of my amendment No. 272 to the Improving America's Security Act, and I believe it will do that, improve America's security.
We have a rampant problem of identity theft in this country. Identity theft not only affects innocent victims, it poses a security threat to our country. As the 9/11 Commission put it: "Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft."
We have long been aware that failure to protect the integrity of the SSN has enormous financial consequences for the Government, the people, and the business community. We now know that shortcomings in the SSN issuance process can have far graver consequences than previously imagined. The difficult lessons of September 11, 2001 have taught us that SSA can no longer afford to operate from a "business as usual" perspective. Whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice, we must protect the number that has become our national identifier; the number that is the key to social, legal, and financial assimilation in this country.
We recognize SSA alone cannot resolve the monumental issues surrounding homeland security. Efforts to make our Nation safer will involve new or expanded initiatives by almost every segment of our population, including State and local governments, private industry, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens. However, we also recognize that, in endeavoring to protect our homeland, no Government system or policy should be ignored. As such, SSA, as a Federal agency and public servant, must resolve to review its systems and processes for opportunities to prevent the possibility that anyone might commit or camouflage criminal activities against the United States. We believe SSN integrity is a link in our homeland security goal that must be strengthened.
The 9/11 Commission went on to note: " … all but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud."
I have here an inspector general's report, inspector general for the Social Security Administration, and he is talking about the integrity of the Social Security number. He says an important link in homeland security is the Social Security number. To specifically quote him, he says:
The difficult lessons of September 11, 2001, has taught us that the Social Security Administration can no longer afford to operate from a business-as-usual perspective. Whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice, we must protect the number that has become our national identifier, the number that is the key to social, legal, and financial assimilation in this country.
He went on to say in his report:
We believe the Social Security number integrity is a link in our homeland security goal that must be strengthened.
For every case of identity theft, there is a thief. We have to ask ourselves: Why would someone want to steal somebody else's identity? After all, every person has an identity of their own. Why would somebody be so dissatisfied with their own identity that they deem it necessary to steal from another? The answer to that question is simple: They have something to hide. For many, the fact they are trying to hide is that they are in this country illegally. Whether someone is here illegally in pursuit of work or to carry out the work of an international terrorist organization remains anyone's guess.
What we do know, however, is that there are clear signs of when an identity has been stolen. One obvious sign is when multiple people are using the same Social Security number. By law, every Social Security number has only one true owner. It follows, if 10 people are using the same Social Security number, 9 of them are thieves: 9 of them have something to hide.
One common use of Social Security numbers is for reporting earnings. And where are earnings reported? Earnings are reported to the Social Security Administration. That means that when multiple people are reporting to the Social Security Administration using the same Social Security number, the Social Security Administration has information in its possession relating to the crime of identity theft.
What does the Social Security Administration do? Absolutely nothing. It is prohibited from sharing their information with others in our own Federal Government, such as the Secretary of Homeland Security.
I believe it is an example of what the 9/11 Commission described as, and I quote from the Commission:
The pervasive problem of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers.
In January of this year, a bipartisan group of Senators and I met with Secretary Chertoff on this very issue. Secretary Chertoff explained that, under current law, Government agencies are prevented from sharing information with one another that, if shared, could expose cases of identity theft.
My amendment tears down the wall that prevents the sharing of existing information among Government agencies and permits the Commissioner of Social Security to share information with the Secretary of Homeland Security where such information is likely to assist in discovering identity theft, Social Security number misuse or violations of immigration law.
Specifically, it requires the Commissioner to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security upon discovery of a Social Security account number being used with multiple names or where an individual has more than one person reporting earnings for him or her during a single tax year.
It seems logical that we would already be doing this, but we are not. In the meantime, we are effectively enabling thieves to continue to perpetrate the crime of identity theft.
In addition to the national security implications, for every case of identity theft there is an innocent victim.
Innocent victims like Connecticut resident John Harrison who had his active duty military ID and Social Security number stolen. The thief ran up an over $260,000 debt and opened 61 credit or bank accounts in the victim's name. Meanwhile the victim lost his job and the military decreased his retirement pay because Phillips had run up a debt owed to the U.S. Government.
Connecticut resident John Harrison is not alone, In fact, for the seventh year in a row, with nearly 250,000 complaints, identity theft is the No. 1 complaint received by the FTC from Connecticut residents. Likewise, for the State of Maine, 2006 marked the seventh year in a row that identity theft complaints topped the Federal Trade Commission's Annual "List of Top Consumer Complaints."
Even my home State of Colorado is no stranger to identity theft. With 4,535 victims in 2005, we are ranked 5th in identity theft--behind only Arizona, Nevada, California, and Texas.
For instance, an 84-year-old Grand Junction woman was deemed ineligible for Federal housing assistance because her Social Security number was being used at a variety of jobs in Denver, making her income too high to qualify.
Unfortunately, for the victims of identity theft, by the time the identity theft is discovered, the damage has already been done. Yet when the Social Security Administration has reason to believe that a Social Security number is being used fraudulently, they are prevented from sharing it with the Department of Homeland Security. Withholding this information effectively enables thieves to continue to perpetrate the crime of identity theft against innocent victims.
By simply sharing information related to the fraudulent use of Social Security numbers among Government agencies, cases of identity theft could be discovered much sooner. Victims of identity theft deserve to have this existing information acted on, and my amendment allows this.
Senator Cornyn, who is on the floor with me, was at the meeting where Secretary Chertoff explained the problems with the Social Security numbers and DHS not being notified so that they could take law enforcement actions against such acts as a terrorist threat.
I wonder if Senator Cornyn would give me his impression.
Mr. Cornyn: Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. Allard: I will be glad to yield.
Mr. Cornyn: Would the Senator from Colorado tell us what portion of the population is sort of disproportionately affected by this identity theft, particularly when it involves Social Security numbers?
Mr. Allard: A large portion of the population that is affected by the Social Security theft identification is the older population, those individuals on Social Security. The impact it is going to have on them is immediate in some cases because they are qualifying for a certain amount of Social Security based on the income that may be coming. If somebody else is using their Social Security number, that exceeds, perhaps, what allowances they may have to qualify for the Social Security benefits. If an individual has a job, then the effect is felt much later on.
The retired individuals of this country are most dramatically affected in this regard.
Mr. Cornyn: Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Colorado whether he is aware that the Federal Trade Commission has identified the top 10 States where identity theft is the biggest problem and that they have ranked Arizona as No. 1; and Nevada, the State represented by the majority leader; California; and Texas, No.4; and then Colorado at No. 5.
Is the Senator aware that the Federal Trade Commission has ranked those States as the top five States where identity theft is the biggest problem.
Mr. Allard: I thank the Senator from Texas for his question, and, yes, I am very much aware of that. Those States are disproportionately affected because of the overpopulation they have within their boundaries.
Mr. Cornyn: Is the Senator from Colorado aware there are those who will purchase bogus documents on the black market--basically for purposes of evading and breaking our immigration laws so they can purport to be someone whom they are not--and whether this, in his opinion, represents a security risk to the United States.
Mr. Allard: That is one of the problems we are facing today and one of the problems that Secretary Chertoff of Homeland Security pointed out. It is vital that we be able to identify duplicate uses of Social Security numbers because a number of the terrorists that were here on 9/11, attacking this country, were here under fraudulent IDs. It is an important aspect of law enforcement, and particularly homeland security, to be able to carry on their responsibilities.
Mr. Cornyn: Finally, Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator whether this isn't exactly the kind of stovepipe or wall that the 9/11 Commission talked about when it comes to information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Isn't this exactly the same kind of information sharing they found so important to protecting the security of our Nation?
Mr. Allard: Well, it is the very thing the 9/11 Commission was pointing out that is a problem with protecting the citizens of this country, the stovepiping of information among the various agencies and where there is no passing of information back and forth.
This is a classic example where one agency, in this case the Social Security Administration, has a number, and they know it is being used more than once throughout the country, yet nobody gets notified; it stays within the Social Security Administration. Even those law enforcement agencies within Homeland Security cannot get that information to act on it.
Secretary Chertoff said an important part of being able to carry out our function to ensure the security of this country is to get that information. Yet right now, the law explicitly prohibits the Social Security Administration from sharing that information with Homeland Security.
I think it is a problem that needs to be corrected, and the sooner we can correct that, the better.
Mr. Cornyn: I thank the Senator, and I support his amendment.
Mr. Allard: Mr. President, let me summarize my comments by saying I think it is important, in ensuring the security of this country, that we pass this amendment. Without the sharing of that information between the various agencies, it is going to be possible for anybody who comes into this country illegally, terrorists especially, to stay within this country and operate in a way where they are not discovered. We want to have law enforcement become aware of the presence of somebody here illegally, particularly if they are a terrorist. If their intention is to either destroy a building or to lay a bomb out somewhere, they are a real threat to this country.
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this amendment.
The Presiding Officer (Mr. Sanders): The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 10 minutes.
(The remarks of Mr. Kerry are printed in today's Record under "Morning Business.")
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. Wyden: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the earlier unanimous consent request so I can offer the Wyden-Bond amendment at this time.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Wyden: Mr. President, I offer this amendment with the distinguished vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I thank him for the many hours he and his staff have put in, working with me on this amendment.
The purpose of the legislation before the Senate today is straightforward: to apply what has been learned from one of the greatest tragedies in American life in order to better protect the American people in the days ahead. One of the tragic lessons of 9/11 is what we do not know can hurt us, and hurt us badly.
Because of the outstanding work of the 9/11 Commission, extensive information about what went wrong has been made public. The national security community has learned from a number of its mistakes, and today is taking concrete steps to make sure what happened on September 11, 2001, does not happen again. There has been a variety of reports that have been issued, critical to our understanding of what happened that tragic day. The bipartisan 2002 Joint Congressional Inquiry, on which I was privileged to serve, is one example, as well as the Department of Justice's report on FBI accountability.
There is one essential report that has remained classified. Nearly 2 years ago, the CIA inspector general submitted a report detailing CIA accountability in the runup to the 9/11 attacks. I am sure that some may and will consider a number of the inspector general's findings unsettling, perhaps embarrassing, but the report is of high quality and it is comprehensive. The CIA inspector general has provided this country with an important perspective on one of the defining moments in American history, and I believe the public has a right to know what went wrong at the CIA, so we can make sure those mistakes are not repeated.
I have spent more than a year working on a bipartisan basis with our friend from Missouri, the previous chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts, to make an unclassified version of this report available to the public. I have repeatedly asked the intelligence community to redact any sensitive national security information in the report's executive summary so that it could be declassified. I have been joined in these efforts, in addition to the assistance Senator Bond has provided, by the current chairman, Senator Rockefeller. I have already mentioned the help of Chairman Roberts for some substantial length of time.
Multiple CIA Directors, as well as the former Director of National Intelligence, regrettably have not been willing to cooperate. Why the leaders of the CIA have been so reluctant to cooperate is not clear to me. Neither former Director Goss nor Director Hayden nor Ambassador Negroponte have ever provided a valid reason for keeping the report, the entire report, classified. In fact, there is no good reason why the CIA cannot declassify this report. The executive summary is concise, and it contains little information about CIA sources and methods. It could be redacted and released quickly. That information is in the interests of the American people.
The amendment, the bipartisan amendment we offer today, would require the Director of the CIA to declassify the executive summary of the inspector general's report on 9/11, removing only that information which must be redacted to protect this country's national security. The amendment requires the Director do this within 30 days. I think anyone who has read the report would agree that this is more than enough time.
I am pleased that the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Rockefeller and Senator Bond, join me as cosponsors of the legislation.
The American people have a right to know what is in this report. Some of the findings may be unpleasant, others may be a source of pride, but at the end of the day the American people have a right to know about how the Central Intelligence Agency performed at a critical moment in this country's history. We need that information made public so as to ensure that there is true accountability. September 11, 2001, is part of this country's history. To hide the truth from the American people is unacceptable.
I urge the adoption of this amendment.
I see my friend from Missouri and thank him again for his patience during the many hours our staffs have been working on a bipartisan basis.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up the amendment at this time.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, the pending amendment is set aside.
The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oregon Mr. [Wyden], for himself, Mr. Bond, and Mr. Rockefeller, proposes an amendment numbered 348 to amendment No. 275.
Mr. Wyden: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To require that a redacted version of the Executive Summary of the Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 is made available to the public)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ___. AVAILABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY REGARDING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.
(a) Public Availability.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall prepare and make available to the public a version of the Executive Summary of the report entitled the "Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001" issued in June 2005 that is declassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with national security.
(b) Report to Congress.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a classified annex to the redacted Executive Summary made available under subsection (a) that explains the reason that any redacted material in the Executive Summary was withheld from the public.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. Bond: Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Oregon for his persistence in pursuing something we both agree should and must be disclosed and made public, to the extent it can consistent with national security. Accountability for one's actions is something most of us are taught from childhood. It is rooted not only in religious teachings but also in the tenets of government at the Federal, State, and local levels.
For those of us in public service, whether we be in an elected capacity or appointed position or some form of service directly related to the security of our Nation, we should know we must expect to be held accountable for our actions. When we serve the people and if we expect the rewards of doing good deeds, just as surely we should face the negative consequences of actions which do not turn out well.
In addition, the public, to the maximum extent possible consistent with national security, should have made available to it the findings and the conclusions of the Government's own agencies with regard to accountability.
As my colleague from Oregon has stated, in June of 2005 the Office of Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency published a report concerning the conduct of intelligence activities prior to September 11, 2001, and afterward. To this date, that report remains classified. The amendment Senator Wyden and I propose requires the CIA to make as much of that report public as is possible, consistent with protecting the sensitive sources and methods relating to our national security.
The Senator from Oregon has referred to the 9/11 Commission, the joint congressional inquiry. Our Senate Select Committee on Intelligence spent 2 very intense years, 2003 and 2004, doing an extensive investigation of what the intelligence was, how it was formulated, what the problems were, and we found that there were tremendous holes in it. So much of what would be found in the inspector general's report has already been stated. But I think to make the record clear and complete, so that we may ensure that all of the agencies working on national intelligence have the ability to learn from the mistakes--and we in our role as the oversight committee will use the information in this report and on this floor, if need be--to point out how we can make our intelligence better.
In an age where the war on terrorism has been brought to us by radical Islamic groups who continue to threaten us, good intelligence is the only defense we have adequate to the threat we face. It is important that we get it right.
Now, it is not pleasant to air some of these mistakes. We all make mistakes, but we better learn from them or we are destined to commit them again.
I thank my colleague from Oregon.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside this amendment so that I may offer a Rockefeller-Bond amendment.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Bond: I send to the desk an amendment and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Presiding Officer: The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Missouri [Mr. Bond], for himself and Mr. Rockefeller, proposes an amendment numbered 389 to amendment No. 275.
Mr. Bond: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide the sense of the Senate that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate should submit a report on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with respect to intelligence reform and congressional intelligence oversight reform)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING A REPORT ON THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REFORM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (referred to in this section as the "9/11 Commission") conducted a lengthy review of the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation.
(2) In its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that--
(A) congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States is dysfunctional;
(B) under the rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives in effect at the time the report was completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence, and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges faced by the intelligence community of the United States;
(C) as long as such oversight is governed by such rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the people of the United States will not get the security they want and need;
(D) a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure is needed to give the intelligence community of the United States appropriate oversight, support, and leadership; and
(E) the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its final report will not succeed if congressional oversight of the intelligence community in the United States is not changed.
(3) The 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities.
(4) Congress has enacted some of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
(5) The Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the 108th Congress to address some of the oversight recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term limits for the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the referral of intelligence- related legislation, but other aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding oversight have not been implemented.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate each, or jointly, should--
(1) undertake a review of the recommendations made in the final report of the 9/11 Commission with respect to intelligence reform and congressional intelligence oversight reform;
(2) review and consider any other suggestions, options, or recommendations for improving intelligence oversight; and
(3) not later than December 21, 2007, submit to the Senate a report that includes the recommendations of the Committee, if any, for carrying out such reforms.
