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Latin America

Mrs. Hutchison: Madam President, I rise today to talk about Latin America. I think this has been highlighted by the President's trip there and the focus the President is putting on Latin America.

It is so important that we not forget our own hemisphere and some of the problems we are facing in our hemisphere.

President Bush, of course, is in Mexico right now. He is holding discussions with Mexican President Calderone. Immigration, reducing poverty, fighting drugs, and strengthening our economic relationship are all items on the agenda. This is the President's final stop on a five-nation trip that included Brazil, Uruguay, Columbia, and Guatemala.

But the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, has been conducting his own tour, deliberately instigating protests and riots to disrupt the President's peaceful mission.

It is very important that we focus on Mr. Chavez and what is happening in South America because it will affect the stability of our whole hemisphere.

The problem starts in Venezuela, a nation which once enjoyed 50 years of democratic traditions but now is in the early stages of a dictatorship. Last month, elected representatives in Venezuela abdicated their responsibility and gave the Venezuelan leader sweeping power to rule for 18 months to be able to impose economic, social, and political change. These dictatorial powers would be alarming in anyone's hands but particularly dangerous in the hands of Hugo Chavez.

This strong man rules an oil-rich nation that exports 1.1 million barrels of oil to the United States per day, roughly equivalent to what we import from Saudi Arabia. President Chavez has already colluded with other OPEC nations to raise oil prices, and when he nationalizes multibillion dollar crude oil projects, that is going to make the prices rise again. This could have a severe impact on the pocketbooks of American families. According to some economists, every time oil prices rise by 10 percent, 150,000 Americans lose their jobs.

Mr. Chavez has used his nation's windfall oil profits to buy political support at home and to stir trouble abroad. He says Venezuela has a "strong oil card to play on the geopolitical stage" and "it is a card that we are going to play with toughness against the toughest country in the world, the United States."

In his struggle against U.S. imperialism, President Chavez has found a useful ally in the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, the Government of Iran. He is one of the few leaders in the world to publicly support Iran's nuclear weapons program. The Iranian mullahs have rewarded Mr. Chavez's friendship with lucrative contracts, including the transfer of Iranian professionals and technologies to Venezuela.

Last month, President Chavez and Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadi- Nejad revealed plans for a $2 billion joint fund--$2 billion--part of which they say will be used as a "mechanism for liberation" against American allies.

This could help achieve the vision that Mr. Chavez has stated:

Let's save the human race; let's finish off the U.S. empire.

Mr. Chavez has grown bolder by interfering in the elections of several Latin American countries and his own brand of politics has made some gains.

Bolivia's newly elected President, Evo Morales, has nationalized the energy industry, rewritten the Constitution, and promised to work with Mr. Chavez and Fidel Castro to perform an "axis of good" to oppose the United States.

The former Soviet client, Daniel Ortega, has returned to the Presidency of Nicaragua. During the 1980s, Mr. Ortega ruled his country with an iron fist until U.S.-backed freedom fighters ousted him from power. Nicaragua's democracy prospered for the next 16 years, but now he's back.

In response to the Ortega victory, Hugo Chavez said:

Long live the Sandinista revolution.

Then, in his first week as President, Mr. Ortega met with President Ahmadi-Nejad from Iran and told the press that Nicaragua and Iran share common interests and have common enemies.

Left unchecked, Presidents Ahmadi-Nejad and Chavez could be the Khrushchev-Castro tandem of the early 21st century, funneling arms, money, and propaganda to Latin America, endangering that region's fragile democracies and volatile economies. If these two succeed, the next terrorist training camp could shift from the Middle East to America's doorstep. We need to face reality. We need to confront this threat head on.

At the pinnacle of the Cold War, President Reagan seized the initiative and repulsed Soviet efforts to set up camp, in our hemisphere, with Cuba. We should follow that lead. We should dust off the Cold War play book and become active in helping our friends to the south.

Specifically, we should adopt a three-pronged approach: Energy independence would be No. 1. We should confront the Chavez threat head on by reducing imports to the United States from Venezuela. How can we do that? We can do it by increasing our domestic energy supply and production and accelerate innovation for renewable fuels--wind power, solar power, ethanol, biodiesel, even wave energy. Using the currents in the sea can always produce energy, and research is going on in that effort.

There is so much we can do to make our country independent from people such as Mr. Chavez and Mr. Ahmadi-Nejad and others who would try to affect our economy by raising the price of oil or cutting off the supply.

No. 2, free trade. We should try to reduce heartbreaking poverty by approving free trade agreements with friendly Latin American countries, those Latin American countries that have democracies, that want to increase their economic prosperity.

We need to reauthorize the President's trade promotion authority which expires on July 1. Free trade and working for economic prosperity in these countries is the best way to keep them free.

And No. 3, debt relief. We should help stabilize Latin America's fragile democracies by reducing their crushing debt burdens. This would empower their newly elected governments, or their elected governments that have been elected many times before, to use their revenue on education and health care for their people, strengthening their democracies.

Energy independence, free trade, and debt relief would go a long way toward helping us strengthen our whole hemisphere.

As we are looking at so much volatility around the world, it is important we remember that if we strengthen our hemisphere, if we increase the prosperity and the living standards of people throughout our hemisphere, it will not only help us have stronger economic ties, which will be good for our country and other countries, we create export markets for our goods as well as importing the goods from overseas, from Latin America, but it also is a security issue for our country. The idea that we would have terrorist training camps set up in countries that are hostile to America in South America is one I don't even want to anticipate. It would be very harmful for the security of America to have more of these dictatorships setting themselves up as an "axis of good" to thwart American freedom and democracy.

I am glad our President has gone to Latin America. The President of Mexico acknowledged that the President of the United States, after 9/ 11, had security threats that had to be addressed and, therefore, he was not able to do the innovations working with South America he had hoped he would be able to do in his first term as President.

But now the President is trying to renew that promise and go to South America and Mexico and talk about what binds us together. Land binds us together. Borders bind us together. We need good relations with Mexico and Central and South America. We want friendly borders. It is important for our security.

I hope the President's efforts are not for nought. I hope we can enhance what he has started by promoting free trade, by giving him the ability to negotiate free trade agreements with more of the South American countries that are friendly to America, by promoting independence in energy supply for our country so we don't have to depend on any foreign source for energy to make sure our economy stays strong, and to try to help them be relieved of debt that would allow their countries to invest more in education and health care for their people and their children.

This is an initiative whose time has come. Maybe it is an initiative whose time has long since come but is now beginning to become a viable option for our country. I hope the President's efforts are rewarded with Congress stepping up to the plate and helping America become more energy independent, helping America have more free trade agreements to build up economies in these foreign countries. That would be a huge step in the right direction.

I yield the floor.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from California is recognized.

Mrs. Boxer: Madam President, will you state the parliamentary situation in front of the Senate at this moment.

The Presiding Officer: The Senate is postcloture on the motion to proceed to S.J. Res. 9.

Mrs. Boxer: So, Madam President, we are now debating whether to proceed to S.J. Res. 9. I am glad the Chair clarified that. I am here to speak briefly, to say I hope our colleagues will say yes and will proceed to S.J. Res. 9. I will go into why I think that would be an excellent vote for this Chamber to take. I wish to speak briefly as to where we are procedurally.

Our Democratic leader, Senator Reid, has presented to the Senate S.J. Res. 9. Its purpose is to revise the policy of the United States in Iraq, and if ever we needed to revise the policy of the United States in Iraq, it is certainly now. In my belief, it was certainly a year ago and the year before.

As someone who did not vote to give the President the authorization to go to war in the first place, I and a number of my colleagues have watched with horror as we have seen take place what we predicted.

We said the President did not consider what would happen if our troops were not greeted as liberators and, in fact, were greeted as occupiers. We asked questions about the possibility of sectarian violence among the Sunni, Shia, and others. We said it was a mistake to take our eye off capturing bin Laden and finishing our work in Afghanistan, which is crucial. We wondered why the President was doing this when the whole world was with us after the tragedy of 9/11. He turned around and went after Saddam Hussein, told us he was going to get nuclear weapons, told us he was harboring al-Qaida, and I will tell you, Madam President, all of that proved to be false.

So he took the country to war on false pretenses, and who has paid the price for that? The military families. The dead. These families have lost over 3,000 of their nearest and dearest, and they will never, ever--ever--be the same.

The wounded are suffering the worst kind of wounds. These are the folks who have paid the heavy price and who continue to pay the heavy price.

I am proud of Senator Reid and the Democratic leadership. We promised the people we would make this our No. 1 priority, and we are. We tried to debate Iraq before. The Republicans stopped us. Now we are trying to do it again.

We have a resolution I wish to share with you, Madam President. I said it was called a Joint Resolution to Revise United States Policy in Iraq. It says, and I am going to truncate this:

Whereas, Congress and the American people will continue to support and protect the troops who are serving or have served bravely and honorably in Iraq; and whereas the circumstances referred to in the authorization in 2002 have changed substantially; and whereas U.S. troops should not be policing a civil war, and the current conflict in Iraq requires principally a political solution; and whereas U.S. policy in Iraq must change to emphasize the need for a political solution by Iraqi leaders in order to maximize the chance of success and to more effectively fight the war on terror; therefore be it resolved that we transition this mission away from being in the middle of a civil war toward being supportive of the Iraqi troops and training them; that we shall begin the phased redeployment of the U.S. Forces from Iraq not later than 120 days after enactment of the resolution; that we then move forward with a comprehensive strategy so that we finally resolve this Iraq quagmire--it means that it has to be diplomatic and political and economic--and that there be a report every 60 days so we know how this redeployment is going.

This is a breath of fresh air. This resolution is a breath of fresh air into a situation where you can't even breathe you are so suffocated from the tragedy, from the deaths, from the wounded, from the explosions every single day. So, yes, we are debating whether we should proceed to S.J. Res. 9, and I hope we will.

In closing, let me say this. There is a lot of talk about loving the troops, and I think every one of us in this Chamber loves the troops, so I have a rhetorical point here. If you love the troops, and I believe we all do, why put them in the middle of a civil war where they can't tell who is shooting at them? If you love the troops, why do you give them a mission they can't accomplish? They can't solve the civil war. That has to be done diplomatically, politically. If you love the troops, why would you lower the standards for their future colleagues in arms? We are stunned to see that convicted violent felons are now being taken into the military, that is how desperately stretched the military is.

If you love the troops, why would you put them in a place such as Walter Reed, where you have mold on the walls and vermin, and not give them the access when they leave Washington and go back home, not give them definitive access to the help they need?

Why would you send them, if you loved the troops, out to battle again and again and again? I met a man yesterday whose son is on his third tour. I have the charts in front of my office with the names of the California dead. He looked at that, and I saw the look on his face, and I said, what is wrong? He said, I have a son in Iraq, third tour of duty, no rest.

So why do you have a rule that says they have to have rest; they have to be properly trained; they have to have the proper equipment?

If you love the troops, why would you continue to send them over in that fashion, without being properly equipped or trained? Why would you send them out on the battlefield with post-traumatic stress and a bottle of antidepressants, if you loved the troops?

I am proud to be a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 9. This is a comprehensive solution. The other side of this debate keeps saying, well, where is your solution? Here it is. It is right there. We transform the mission to a mission that can be accomplished, not mission impossible. That mission will be to protect United States and coalition personnel and infrastructure, training and equipping Iraqi forces, and conducting targeted counterterrorism operations. Now that is a mission we can accomplish.

As for sending our troops into the middle of a civil war, that is wrong, and I don't believe anyone who voted for that resolution--and I am so proud and so glad I didn't vote for that resolution to take this country into this ill-fated war, but if you voted for it, you didn't vote to put troops in the middle of a civil war. So if that is where we are right now, we need to change it.

You know, Martin Luther King--and I read this recently--who is one of my heroes in life, said during the Vietnam war that what can happen to you when you are faced with these horrible options, these horrible choices--and by the way, the worst kind of leadership, no matter where it comes from, is a leadership that gives you no good choices, okay? But Martin Luther King said, when you are faced with that circumstance--and he was talking about Vietnam, where it was tragic, there were no good choices, what could we do--said, paralysis sets in and people can't change. What happens is the status quo prevails and it becomes a new reality: dead, dead, dead soldiers every day, suicide bombs, and we can't get out of it.

The surge isn't a new strategy. It has been tried before. We know what is happening. The enemy tells us what is happening. They are leaving, going someplace else to cause trouble; waiting it out. We know they will adjust to this.

There is only one solution, and that is why S.J. Res. 9 is so important. What is the solution? We spell it out. A comprehensive strategy shall be implemented as part of a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community for the purpose of working collectively to bring stability to Iraq.

There is no more coalition of the willing. They are all leaving, whether it is Great Britain--which now is going to have only a few thousand troops there--Italy, Spain, Portugal. I could go through the list. They are all leaving. We need to redeploy our troops and we need a comprehensive strategy. I am proud to support S.J. Res. 9, and I hope when we have this vote we will vote to proceed to this very important resolution.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The Presiding Officer (Mr. Menendez): The Senator from Texas.

Mr. Cornyn: Mr. President, I have a lot of respect for the Senator from California, but I couldn't disagree with her more on this topic, and I will explain why.

This resolution that is currently before the Senate calls for the President to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq within 120 days. It calls for withdrawing all combat forces from Iraq--all combat forces from Iraq--by March 31, 2008, and it calls for limiting the flexibility of our military commanders to go after the enemy.

None of these provisions strikes me as wise or a good idea. And it is not just me. Let me quote from January 31, 2005, a speech made by one of our distinguished Members at the National Press Club. This distinguished Senator said: "As far as setting a timeline, that is not a wise decision, because it only empowers those who don't want us there." Who was that speaker? Well, none other than our majority leader, Senator Harry Reid, Democrat from Nevada, who said, "It is not a wise decision to set a timeline, because it only empowers those who don't want us there."

Senator Reid was not the only one. Senator Clinton said, "I don't believe it's smart to set a date for withdrawal. I don't think you should ever telegraph your intentions to the enemy so they can await you." That was a comment she made on February 13, 2007.

Senator Joe Biden, Democrat from Delaware, said: "A deadline for pulling out will only encourage our enemies to wait us out." He said that on June 21, 2005, in a speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

I think we find ourselves in a time warp, but it is hard to know whether the distinguished majority leader's position is what he says today, when he says we ought to set a timeline for the withdrawal of troops, or whether we ought to credit his remarks made in 2005, when he said it is not a wise decision because it only empowers the enemy.

I think we know where the differences come down. There are those, as the distinguished Senator from California said a few moments, who regard what we are doing in Iraq, and she used these words, as "mission impossible." In other words, there are those who simply have given up, who believe all is lost and there is nothing we can possibly do to reverse the tide in Iraq and in the global war on terror, what Zarqawi, the former head of al-Qaida in Iraq, called the central front in al-Qaida's war against the rest of the civilized world.

What I would suggest is that this resolution, which calls for withdrawing troops beginning in the next 120 days, sets a hard deadline of March 31, 2008, to withdraw all troops and which limits the flexibility of our military commanders to go after the enemy. This is not a plan to succeed. This is a plan destined to fail. Because, in fact, to give the critics some credit, they have given up, so they believe all that is left is retreat, to admit defeat. But this Senator is not prepared to give up on either the mission or the members of our military who are carrying out that mission in Iraq.

Arbitrary deadlines for withdrawal and micromanaging our military commanders on the ground is not a military strategy, it is a recipe for defeat. The problem is the new majority and the Democrat strategy can best be characterized as one of slow bleed, micromanage, and say nice things about supporting the troops but don't support the mission we sent them on. I have said before, and I will say it again, if you believe all is lost and there is no possibility of success in the war in Iraq, to me, the logical conclusion is you would defund the effort to support that mission there. In other words, you would use the tool that is available to Members of Congress, the power of the purse, to cut off the funds.

I disagree with that. I don't think we should. But Senator Dodd and Senator Feingold have been the ones who have said, you know what, passing nonbinding resolutions is simply not worthy of the Senate. Nowhere else in life can you pass a nonbinding resolution, make a "no" decision and be credited for doing anything. Only here in Washington, only in the Senate can you pass a nonbinding resolution and somebody says, you know what, we have done something. Well, the fact is, the only thing we would have done is to lend encouragement to those who want to see us fail in Iraq and to possibly undermine the morale and support given for our troops who are in harm's way.

Giving the enemy a timetable when American troops should withdraw from Iraq only helps the enemy plan on how to accomplish their goals, not ours. Our focus should be, how can we succeed in Iraq. The irony of this proposal--the best I can tell, the 17th proposal that has come from the majority since we began talking about Iraq resolutions--is it comes at a time when the new Baghdad security plan appears to be making some hopeful signs toward success. One of those signs is Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric who is in charge of the Shiite militias in Iraq, has fled the country because he knows the American military and our Iraqi allies are beginning to enter areas such as Sadr City, which have been in his sole province and domain. He has left to go to Tehran, to Iran. Similarly, he has instructed the Mahdi armies, the Shiite militias, not to confront the American soldiers or Iraqi allies as they go in to clear, hold, and build in some of the previously most dangerous areas of Iraq, that of Sadr City.

Democrats have offered 17 proposals on how to lose in Iraq but not a single proposal on how to succeed. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin, recently conceded that there are between 5,000 and 6,000 members of al-Qaida in Iraq--specifically in Al Anbar Province. To pass legislation that sets an arbitrary deadline for withdrawing our combat forces without defeating al-Qaida in Iraq makes no sense. Rather, it would provide potentially a safe haven, a power vacuum into which al-Qaida could reestablish itself, gain a foothold, and use that platform as a place to launch terrorist attacks against the United States and other countries.

The Iraqis know our commitment to Iraq is not open-ended, so it is simply not accurate to say that is the position of either the administration or anyone in this body. No one has made an open-ended commitment to Iraq. The Iraqis understand that the future of Iraq is in the hands of Iraqis, and that is exactly where it should be.

But to pass legislation that micromanages how our troops should fight and to try to make tactical decisions on how to handle those 130,000 or so troops on the ground from Washington, DC, is simply crazy. We unanimously confirmed GEN David Petraeus, who essentially is the architect of the counterinsurgency plan now being carried out in Baghdad. General Petraeus will lead our operations in Iraq and, frankly, he doesn't need armchair generals here in Washington, DC, trying to tell him what to do. General Petraeus knows what to do, and that is the reason the Senate unanimously confirmed him to carry out this new Baghdad security plan.

If Members of this body really support our troops, then they will provide our troops with the resources they need to accomplish their mission and not engage in a slow-bleed strategy of cutting off resources or reinforcements. We all want our troops to come home as soon as possible. But any decision to withdraw from Iraq should be based strictly upon national security considerations and not on political expediency.

We find that even our colleagues on the other side of the aisle are conflicted internally about the best strategy as reflected by this now 17th iteration of their resolution strategy. A Washington Post editorial dated March 13 labels the restrictions on Iraq war funding drawn up by House Democrats--and the 17th proposal on Iraq, by the way--this is the Washington Post. They called it "something of a trick," and is merely "an inflexible timetable, conforming to the need to capture votes in Congress or at the 2008 polls."

Then an article in the Wall Street Journal yesterday quotes House Appropriations Committee chairman, Democrat of Wisconsin, David Obey, saying this about the language contained in the wartime spending bill passed or being considered in the House--specifically regarding the benchmarks laid out for Iraq. Mr. Obey is quoted as saying:

I don't know if these are the right benchmarks or right conditions or right timetable.

Mr. Obey said:

It's a huge mistake for people to look at this word and that word… . This language will change 10 minutes after it passes the House.

The Vice President was quoted as saying this on March 12, and I couldn't agree with him more in this regard. He said:

The second myth is the most transparent. And that is the notion that one can support the troops without giving them the tools and reinforcements necessary to carry out their mission… . When members of Congress pursue an anti-war strategy that's been called slow bleed, they're not supporting the troops, they are undermining them. And when members of Congress speak not of victory, but of time limits--when members speak not of victory but of time limits, deadlines or other arbitrary measures, they're telling the enemy simply to watch the clock and wait us out… . Anyone can say they support the troops and we should take them at their word. But the proof will come when it's time to provide the money. We expect the House and Senate to meet the needs of our military and the generals leading the troops in battle on time and in full measure.

I couldn't agree with the Vice President any more than in those quoted remarks. We have now had 17 different proposals from Democrats in the Senate to date. Maybe there are more to come but 17 so far. For my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to propose this ever- shifting plan of how to deal with Iraq is simply not constructive.

I must say that it is simply absurd that we would tell our enemy when we plan to leave Iraq. I am joined in that belief by Senator Clinton and Senator Reid, from the statements I quoted earlier.

This Senator is not prepared to give up on our men and women in uniform, and I am not prepared to agree to arbitrary timetables or strings on the money that we appropriate that will limit their ability to be successful. I hope all of us, Republican or Democrat alike--all Americans would hope that our American soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will come back home safely but after they have accomplished the mission we have asked them to take on, and that is to leave Iraq in a condition where it is stabilized, where it is able to govern itself and defend itself. Only then will we have eliminated another safe haven for al-Qaida and terrorist activities. Only then will we have reduced to the barest possible minimum the likelihood that we will have to return following a regional conflagration, following a vast humanitarian crisis and ethnic cleansing that is likely to occur if we do not take every possible step to see this Baghdad security plan succeed.

Yes, we all want our troops to come home as soon as possible. Some of us are not willing to set arbitrary deadlines or to bring our troops back home based on some calendar that bears no relationship to conditions on the ground. We want them to come home as soon as possible, but after they have accomplished the mission that they so bravely have taken on and in which they are so nobly led by GEN David Petraeus.

I believe S. Res. 9 is misguided. It should be defeated, and I will do everything within my power to urge my colleagues to so vote.

I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Levin: I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Levin: Mr. President, after 4 years of fighting and the loss of almost 3,200 American lives, 24,000 wounded, $350 billion spent on this war, it is long past time for a new approach in Iraq. Everybody who participates in this debate wants to maximize our chances of success in Iraq. Even those of us who voted against going to war and those of us who have disagreed with how this war has been conducted want to see a stable Iraq which enhances our own national security.

But continuing the current course and surging along the current course does not do that. The President's current course of action, of putting more U.S. military personnel in the middle of a growing civil war in Iraq, does not enhance our security and it does not maximize the chances of success.

The President's plan has a fundamental flaw because what is needed in Iraq is a political solution among the Iraqi leaders, not a military solution. Our troops perform bravely and brilliantly, but American military firepower will not end the civil war in Iraq. It has been apparent for a long time that there is no military solution in Iraq, that an Iraqi political solution is necessary to end the violence. GEN Peter Chiarelli, commanding general of the multinational force in Iraq, said the following in December:

We need a commitment by all Iraqis, of all of the ethno- sectarian groups to commit first to nonviolence and to resolving their differences through the political process …

And he continued:

I happen to believe that we have done everything militarily that we possibly can.

At his confirmation hearing in December, I asked our new Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates:

Do you believe that the end to violence in Iraq requires a political settlement, and that we need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Iraqis to pressure them to reach a settlement that only their politicians can reach?

Dr. Gates replied:

Yes, I do.

The Iraq Study Group stated that:

The violence in Iraq cannot be stopped or even contained if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country.

Perhaps most telling was Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's acknowledgment recently on this essential point. This is what Iraq's own Prime Minister said:

The crisis is political. And the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and blood-letting of innocents are the Iraqi politicians.

The real battle for Baghdad is not a military battle, it is a political one, and that battle can be resolved only by Iraqi politicians and not by our military.

So how do we pressure the Iraqi leaders to reach the political settlement that is essential? We can start by ending our open-ended commitment to Iraq. The President has changed his rhetoric about ending our open-ended commitment, but he has not changed his policy. In fact, he sent the opposite message when he sent more troops to Baghdad.

Our objective in Iraq, and the objective of this resolution, must be to shift responsibility to the Iraqis, both politically and militarily, for their future. For that to happen, we must end the open-ended commitment that has been made by this administration to Iraq of the presence--without decision by us, leaving it up to the Iraqis for how long and how many--of American troops.

We must make clear to the Iraqis that their future is in their hands, not ours. We must make it clear to the Iraqis they must reach a political settlement among themselves and, if they do not, we cannot save them from themselves.

As General Abizaid said in November:

It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.

General Casey made the same point in early January when he said:

The longer we in the U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq's problems, which are at base their problems.

The Iraq Study Group specifically drew the connection between the importance of ending the open-ended commitment of American troops and persuading the Iraqis to make political compromises. There is a connection between the two, the Iraq Study Group said, between ending the open-ended commitment and getting the Iraqis to resolve their political differences. Here is the way they put it in the Iraq Study Group's report:

An open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those difficult actions.

That is the Iraq Study Group.

Columnist Tom Friedman put it succinctly recently in the New York Times:

Right now everyone in Iraq is having their cake and eating it--at our expense. We have to change that.

But instead of putting pressure on the Iraqis, the President is putting his faith in the Iraqis to meet certain benchmarks they have set for themselves. But look at the track record of the Iraqi Government in meeting some of the benchmarks and promises it has set for itself and it has made.

Iraqi President Talibani said in August of 2006 that Iraqi forces would "take over security in all Iraqi provinces by the end of 2006." That pledge surely has not been kept.

Prime Minister Maliki said last June he would disband the militias and illegal armed groups as part of his national reconciliation plan, and in October he set the timetable for disbanding the militias as the end of 2006. That commitment has not been kept.

The Iraqi Constitutional Review Commission was to present its recommendations for changes in the constitution to the Council of Representatives within 4 months of the formation of the Iraqi Government last May. Well, the commission has yet to formulate any recommendations.

Prime Minister Maliki put forward a series of reconciliation milestones to be completed by the end of 2006 or early 2007, including approval of the provincial election law, approval of a new de- baathification law, and approval of a new militia law. Not one of those laws has been enacted.

On January 30, Secretary Rice wrote to me about these benchmarks. She said the Iraqi Government had adopted a lot of benchmarks, and she attached those benchmarks to her letter called "Notional Political Timeline."

Here is what she said about the benchmarks attached to her letter:

… Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006.

Then she said:

These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the President of Iraq's website.

The posted document shows one benchmark after another, starting in September 2006, going through March of 2007, and I am going to read them off.

Now, there may have been one or two of those guidelines met. If so, I am not sure what they are, but I want to at least allow the possibility that a flag, emblem, and national anthem law was adopted. But of those perhaps 15 milestones--and a timeline for them--to be adopted by the Iraqi Presidency, not more than one--but maybe two--of the 15 have been adopted. And none of the important ones have been adopted.

We are told by Secretary Rice, that was on the Web site of the President of Iraq. Then suddenly and mysteriously it disappeared from that Web site a few months ago.

When I asked Secretary Rice--I wrote her a letter asking: You said, Madam Secretary, this was on the Web site, but it disappeared from the Web site. Can you find out why? We have not heard back from the Secretary of State about that problem.

So much for the promises and commitments and milestones of the Iraqi leadership. They post them on a Web site month by month what these promises and commitments and milestones and benchmarks are, and then-- poof--they disappear from the Web site, just as though they were not made. That is the problem with milestones, benchmarks which have no consequences when they are not met.

The President talks about benchmarks, and yet he has not outlined any consequences for the Iraqis if they fail to meet these new benchmarks. I have little hope they will meet benchmarks they lay out unless they see no alternative. It is time to go beyond the toothless benchmarks and to make clear to the Iraqi leaders their dawdling must end and that their nation is in their hands, and we cannot decide for them how to build a nation, whether to build a nation, or whether they prefer to have a civil war.

The administration says our debate on this bill would embolden the enemy. But what that shows is a serious lack of understanding of the situation we face. Congressional debate over Iraq policy does not embolden the enemy. The enemy is already emboldened. The enemy is emboldened by an open-ended presence of western troops in a Muslim country's capital, which serves as a magnet for extremists and gives a propaganda club to our enemies.

The enemy is emboldened by an invasion of Iraq without the support of the international community, and with no plan for a violent aftermath. The enemy is emboldened by a million and a half Iraqi refugees, with thousands more being added each day. The enemy is emboldened by a surge of American troops into a civil war that postpones the day when Iraqi leaders will take responsibility for their own future.

And now our responsibility as a Congress. What is our responsibility? What this resolution does is implement our responsibility by working to make the day when Iraqi leaders take responsibility for their own nation come sooner rather than later. The most recent intelligence estimate says "the current security and political trends in Iraq are moving in a negative direction."

Our resolution is the best way to stop the Iraqi leaders from continuing to fiddle while Baghdad burns. It would seek to pressure the Iraqi leaders to achieve a political solution by requiring our President to promptly transition the mission of American forces in Iraq to protecting United States and coalition personnel and infrastructure, to training and equipping Iraqi forces, and to conducting targeted counterterrorism operations.

Our resolution would require the President to begin the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq not later than 120 days after enactment, with the goal--I emphasize "goal"--of redeploying all United States combat forces by March 31, 2008, except for--except for--those that are needed to carry out the three missions which are described in the resolution, and which I have just outlined. That goal and the three limited missions are the same as the goal and the limited missions recommended by the Iraq Study Group.

Passing this resolution would deliver a cold dose of reality to the Iraqi leaders and would tell them we are not going to be their security blanket without end. When they finally understand our military presence in Iraq is neither permanent nor unconditional, then--and only then-- are they likely to take the political steps necessary to deal with sectarian violence and to defeat the insurgency.

By shifting responsibility to the Iraqis for their own future and their own country, this resolution does what is needed the most--it puts pressure on the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.

As we consider the future of our involvement in Iraq, we must always be mindful of the price our military and their families are paying as a result of multiple deployments of units and people to Iraq. We must be mindful that the lack of attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan has allowed al-Qaida and the Taliban to regroup and strengthen. We must also be mindful that our nondeployed forces lack the equipment and other resources needed to maintain an acceptable level of readiness, and, as a result, the risk our Nation faces has substantially increased.

We must be tragically mindful, always, that the pledge to take care of those courageous soldiers and marines, who have sustained serious physical and mental injuries in combat, has been broken by this administration.

In recent days, there have been statements suggesting a debate in Congress on the war in Iraq is undermining the troops. Just last Monday, Vice President Cheney said, among other things, that:

When Members of Congress pursue an antiwar strategy … they are not supporting the troops, they are undermining them.

Contrast the Vice President's statement with statements Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Pace made recently on February 7 before the House Armed Services Committee.

Here is what Secretary Gates said:

I would tell you that I think that our troops do understand that everybody involved in this debate is looking to do the right thing for our country and for our troops, and that everybody is looking for the best way to avoid an outcome that leaves Iraq in chaos. And I think our troops are sophisticated enough to understand that that's what the debate's really about. It's about the path forward in Iraq.

Here is what General Pace said, and contrast this to what Vice President Cheney said--how worthy Secretary Gates' statement is--and listen to how worthy General Pace's statement is compared to the stale and unworthy comments of the Vice President of the United States about what this debate signifies.

General Pace:

There is no doubt in my mind that the dialogue here in Washington strengthens our democracy. Period.

And then he added:

From the standpoint of the troops, I believe that they understand how our legislature works and they understand that there is going to be this kind of debate.

When I listened to the Vice President and his unworthy remarks, it reminded me of not only how worthy our troops are and how they are professional enough to understand what their duty is, but also that they are loyal Americans to know and understand that it is our duty to debate this war. For those of us who think it is leading in the wrong direction and going nowhere, it is on a road to failure, it is our duty to try to change that course.

Contrast our troops and their honor and their loyalty to the principles upon which this Nation was founded, reflected, interestingly enough, in a poll taken of our military by the Military Times. This poll was printed in the Army Times a few months ago. The question that was asked of our troops was whether they approve of the President's handling of the war in Iraq. Forty-two percent of our troops disapproved of the President's handling of the war in Iraq. Thirty-five percent of our troops approved of the handling of the war by their Commander in Chief. They are divided as Americans are divided. We should not only respect their bravery, we should respect their intelligence and their commitment to this debate in the Congress. That is what they are fighting for: that we can debate a mission and we can debate how to best secure this country so that we can debate how to best succeed in Iraq.

That is what our troops believe in. That is what they are fighting for. It is insulting to them. It is insulting to them to say, as the Vice President of the United States said, that a debate in the United States Congress as to how best to succeed in Iraq, how best to change the course in Iraq, somehow or other undermines the troops.

So we have before us an opportunity, an opportunity which can only be achieved if this debate can advance beyond the motion to proceed. We will be voting on that motion later on today or tomorrow. I hope that Senators, regardless of our views on this war, will allow this Senate to once again debate the direction in Iraq. The last real vote we had was one that denied us this opportunity to proceed. I hope there will be enough of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle who will recognize the importance of this debate to this future--the future of this country, to the future of this world, perhaps; to the lives of so many of our gallant, brave troops and their families, and perhaps, indeed, to the future well-being of this institution because this institution surely should be about debating issues as transcendently important as our future in Iraq.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some correspondence between myself and Secretary Rice, and Senator McCain and myself with Secretary Rice be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. Levin: I yield the floor.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. Reed: I thank the Chair.

Mr. Dorgan: Would the Senator from Rhode Island yield?

Mr. Reed: I yield for the purpose of a question, yes.

Mr. Dorgan: I was wondering if we could determine the timing for debate, and I was wondering who is arranging debate on this side of the aisle.

Mr. Levin: Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Rhode Island would yield.

Mr. Reed: I will yield for a question.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. Levin: There is no order that has been established, No. 1. I would like very much to establish an order for the convenience of all Senators, but I would have to know more about the other side in terms of what their wishes are. I know Senator Schumer wanted to begin at about 1:45, and then I know Senator Dorgan was in the queue--it is an informal queue. I believe, if my memory is correct, although I don't have the sheet of paper in front of me, Senator Dorgan wanted to come out between 3:00 and 4:00.

We will do everything we can to accommodate Senators, and if Senators could let me know, for those who want to speak in favor of the motion to proceed, when they would like to be here and about how long they need, I would be most appreciative, and I will try to put together an order.

Can we put in an order now that Senator Reed has the floor, and we would be happy to alternate if a Republican shows up. Let me ask Senator Dorgan. I did tell Senator Schumer that we would try to fit him in at 1:45. Can we put Senator Specter in immediately after Senator Schumer? Could we put the Senator from Pennsylvania in immediately after Senator Schumer because I have not specified with him the amount of time he needs. But I would prevail upon him to see if he could end close to 1:55. Let me raise that with Senator Schumer.

Could I ask the Senator from Rhode Island about how much time he needs?

Mr. Reed: Apparently, approximately 10 minutes or until Senator Schumer arrives.

Mr. Levin: As always, he is most accommodating. The Presiding Officer apparently also wishes to have time. Could we put the Senator from New Jersey in after the Senator from Pennsylvania? Why don't we set up the next three Senators on this side to be Senator Reed, Senator Schumer, and then Senator Specter, and then Senator Menendez.

Mr. Dorgan: Mr. President, if I could be added following the last Democratic speaker who was mentioned, I would appreciate it.

The Presiding Officer: Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. Reed: Mr. President, we are engaged in a debate that will be critical to the future of this country. We have now for many years been engaged in Iraq. We have seen substantial casualties of our military men and women, not only those who have given the ultimate sacrifice but those who have been seriously wounded. We have seen our position in the world, particularly in that region, seriously eroded. We have a situation where, unwittingly perhaps but actually, Iran has become a more powerful agent in that area of the world because of the policy of this administration. I think we have the opportunity at this juncture to change this flawed strategy; also, to improve the operational skill of this administration because not only was the strategy flawed, but the implementation was absolutely horrid.

The Iraq Study Group made many useful suggestions, and key to those suggestions was to begin a phased redeployment of our forces. This was similar to language Senator Levin and I proposed last June, which talked about a phased redeployment of our combat forces, leaving residual missions for other forces, and also talked about an ambitious diplomatic effort to try to adjust politically the various forces and the various tensions in the country of Iraq and in the region. It was interesting to note that many months after the Levin-Reed proposal, the administration finally participated in a regional conference last week involving both Iran and Syria and the other neighboring countries. That is a step forward--a timid step but, indeed, a step forward.

The President, however--after the Iraq Study Group recommendations and after our debates last year--in January, when he was able to present and willing to present his new strategy, he made another mistake in several respects. First, the surging or escalating of forces is, I think at best, a temporary stopgap. The real solution to the dilemmas and the details that engulf Iraq are political in nature. That has been vouched for by every military commander and most commentators.

Rather than embracing the Iraq Study Group's recommendations, he distanced himself from them. Rather than talking about a phased redeployment, he talked about an indefinite escalation. In doing so, he jeopardized one of the fundamental foundations of any national policy, and that is public support. I believe the American people were listening closely, waiting for a sign that the President finally got it and that he was going to begin to conduct an orderly phased withdrawal and concentrate on the other critical missions of training Iraqi forces and going after terrorists who are much more important to our long-term security. They did not hear that in his speech. It is no surprise to me that their continuing lack of confidence in the administration has been translated into a lack of confidence in our prospects in Iraq.

I think the American people are looking for a policy they can support, one they can sustain, and one we can sustain. In my view, that policy is laid out very explicitly in the proposal that we are debating today authored by Senator Harry Reid. It focuses on defining critical missions so that our soldiers know precisely why they are in that country and that we can give them all the resources necessary for those missions to go after terrorists who have infiltrated the country.

The existence of terrorists before the invasion was one of highly speculative debate, and it turned out there was more speculation than fact. But the reality is terrorists have infiltrated Iraq in the intervening several years, and we have to go after them just as we did in Somalia, just as we are doing in Afghanistan, and just as we hope the Pakistanis are doing in Pakistan. After all, that is where bin Laden and Zawahiri are residing, reorganizing, and contemplating attempts to attack us again.

That effort of preemption of terrorists has to go on, and we have to maintain a presence in Iraq to do that. We also have to train the Iraqi security forces because, frankly, they are ultimately the decisive point in terms of security for Iraq. It is not American soldiers. We don't have the cultural affinity, as best we try; we don't have the vested interests. We are trying to help, but it is not our country, it is their country, and to prevail, they must carry the burden of war. We have to help them, we understand that. We have to continue to train them. Of course, we have to protect our forces.

There was some discussion today about how these missions are going to cause our soldiers, as they go through Iraq, to say: Well, I can't go after that fellow because he might be a sectarian militiaman and not a terrorist.

If those forces pose a threat to American troops in the field, they are fair game. That is what this resolution says. But it is made, these missions are, in the context of a policy of redeployment, of getting our combat forces out of Iraq. We hope we can do that within a year, but much depends upon what happens in other arenas: political mentoring and economic support. Frankly, this administration has done a dreadful job of that.

I have been to Iraq a number of times, as my colleagues have. You arrive there and they proudly announce they are going to have provisional reconstruction teams all over the country. Suddenly you discover months later that their goal of 20 was really 10, and now they have just about 10 but not fully staffed and not fully functional.

They are still trying to get it right. Again, any military officer will tell you that military forces in a counterinsurgency buys time. The decisive action is by political and economic progress, to give the citizens, the people of Iraq, tangible proof that their future lies with a legitimate government and not those who seek to undermine. Yet, repeatedly, when you strip away the President's proposal, it is just more troops, without the real enablers, the real decisive factors of economic, political, reconstruction and reconciliation.

So, again, I think this is exactly the right course to pursue. It is a course that we must pursue. I have a great deal more to say about this issue. I notice my colleague from New York has arrived. Under the arrangement worked out with Senator Levin, I will yield the floor so he may speak in the order established. There is much more to be said, and I hope I have the opportunity to do so.

I yield the floor.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. Schumer: Mr. President, first, I thank my colleagues from Rhode Island and Michigan for yielding me some time. I appreciate it. Their expertise in this area has been invaluable not only to the Senate but to all Americans. I could not think of two people who have shown light more on this issue than the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Rhode Island.

Where are we now, Mr. President? Somehow--and there will be many debates as to how--what we are doing in Iraq has largely evolved into fighting a civil war, into patrolling a civil war, into policing a civil war, and, yes, into fighting it at times. The age-old enmity between the Sunnis and Shiites, of course, has exploded. Once Saddam Hussein was gone, it was perhaps inevitable that it would occur, particularly without any real authority in large parts of the country.

Most of what our soldiers are doing, and most of those who come back from making the ultimate sacrifice, dying or making a large sacrifice by being wounded, are doing is not fighting terrorism but, rather, policing, patrolling, and even fighting in a civil war. That is not what the American people bargained for. That is not what President Bush stated when we began going into Iraq. In fact, he has never stated that.

Now they say we need to bring order to allow their government to work, but that is a fallacious argument for two reasons. First, we may bring temporary order to Iraq but, make no mistake about it--you don't have to be a Ph.D. in middle eastern studies to realize that the minute our troops leave, whether it is 3 months or 3 years, the fighting between the Sunnis and the Shiites will continue. We will have lost lives, and men and women will have lost limbs, but not much will have changed--even in the medium term.

Second, the absurdity of what we are doing is shown by this: We are sending more troops to create a temporary peace to bolster a government that we don't trust, like, or believe in. Prime Minister Maliki is almost universally regarded poorly, not just at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue but at the other end as well. Their government seems incompetent. The government seems unable to accomplish the most basic things. The government, of course, created a terrible drama, almost, when they could not complete the execution of Saddam Hussein in a way that would have conformed to how it should have been done. So their government is incompetent. It is also controlled, in large part, by someone we do not like, Sadr. The Sadr party is the Prime Minister's base. He cannot do anything, even should he want to, in terms of actually bringing peace and creating a government that is friendly to America.

So here we are with this escalation, a surge to bolster a government we don't like or trust. Here we are, instead of fighting terrorism, policing a civil war. The American people know that. We have seen all of the data and all of the polls. The overwhelming majority does not support the President in Iraq. So we need a change in strategy. Substance dictates it, people see it, and our job in the Senate is to do that. That is what we are attempting to do in this debate.

The proposal that most of us on this side of the aisle are behind is a very simple one. We require the President to change strategy. Instead of policing a civil war, fighting a civil war, our troops should have the far more limited mission of protecting us in America from terrorism. That means that if al-Qaida sets up a base anywhere in Iraq, we should take it out--do what it takes to take it out. But it doesn't mean that our soldiers should be patrolling the streets of Baghdad simply because the Sunnis and Shiites are fighting with each other. That will require a change in mission and will require fewer troops, and those troops need not be in harm's way. It makes eminent sense.

We set a deadline of a little more than a year from now, during which time the mission will have changed. The number of troops will be greatly reduced. We don't set a number. That is up to the President. It is our job in the Congress to debate missions and the broad context of foreign policy and then, should we pass a law, have the President carry out the details.

Now, some on the other side have said that any debate means you are not supporting the troops. Well, I have talked to the troops--to generals and enlisted men and women. They want debate, Mr. President. The more demagogic the other side is, saying if there is a debate, you are not supporting the troops--frankly, that is not the American way. Of course, we debate issues. In fact, their view is that basically the only way to support the troops is to rubberstamp the President's policy. We don't agree with that. We are supporting the troops. We are supporting the troops when they are in the field by trying to get them the body armor and humvees and blood-clotting bandages they have not had. We are supporting them when they come home by trying to fully fund the Veterans' Administration. Don't talk to us about supporting the troops. We are walking the walk and putting our money where our mouth is.

So, sadly, our colleagues on the other side, instead of joining us in this debate, often seek to thwart it, as they did last time. I hope they will not do that again because America is demanding debate. We hope they will come together with us, as we did last year in the Levin- Reid resolution, in a bipartisan change of mission. That is what the people are asking for.

I know my colleagues on the other side are in an uncomfortable position. They are torn between the policy of our President, their party leader, and what their constituencies want. By the way, the constituencies across America want this. I have seen the polling data. It is not just in places such as Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania where the people are asking for a real change in strategy; it is also in places such as Kentucky, North Carolina, and Mississippi. It is throughout America. They are not doing it because they don't support the troops or for some nefarious reason. They are doing it for a reason that is as plain as the noses on our faces: what we are doing now is not working--whether it be with 140,000 or 150,000, 160,000, or 200,000 troops.

So we are here in the hallowed tradition of our Constitution to debate what we are doing in foreign policy and war policy and whether it is right. We will stand together on this side of the aisle and state that, as patriots who support our troops, we desperately need a change in strategy and in mission. We will bring up this issue on the floor of the Senate again and again and again, until our colleagues on the other side join us, until our colleagues on the other side understand that the wishes of their constituencies are for a change in strategy, until our colleagues on the other side have the courage to tell the President that on this issue he simply is wrong. That is part of the hallowed tradition of this country. We are proud to do what we are doing.

Mr. President, I hope and pray that our colleagues on the other side of the aisle will allow this debate to go forward, that they will put forward their ideas, and we will put forward ours. Debate it we will and debate it we must. I hope and pray that debate starts to yield the change in strategy that our troops in Iraq, our people in America, the Iraqi people, and the people of the world so desperately need.

With that, I thank my colleague from Rhode Island for the time.

I yield the floor.

The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. Specter: Mr. President, the Senate has now commenced the debate on an issue of great importance, really of historic importance, which challenges us on the issue of what course of action we should take in Iraq, in a very complex factual situation, and challenges us on what our authority is under the Constitution, contrasted with the President's authority as Commander in Chief.

On the factual issue, when we look at the resolution, which calls for the phased redeployment of the U.S. forces from Iraq not later than 120 days after enactment of this joint resolution, with the goal of deploying by March 31, 2008, all U.S. combat forces, except for three purposes: one, to protect the U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure; second, training and equipping Iraqi forces; third, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations.

We are setting a deadline and our opponents simply have to wait us out. They know if they can hold on until March 31, 2008, a little more than a year from now, we will be leaving, except for those stated limited purposes. That is not a very desirable course of conduct.

It is equally undesirable, however, to view the current situation in Iraq, which looks like an endless tunnel--a tunnel without a light at the end. You cannot see the end of the tunnel and, certainly, there is no light at the end of the tunnel in terms of what we can do.

Last month, the House of Representatives passed a nonbinding resolution expressing displeasure, objecting to the President's course of action in Iraq. Last November, in the election, the American people spoke in a resounding manner, in a way that could only rationally be interpreted as rejecting the conduct of the war in Iraq. We are faced with very considerable discomfort in this body. How it will resolve itself remains to be seen. I think it is very important that we debate this matter, that we exchange our views, that we stimulate discussions that will go beyond this Chamber and will resound throughout the country, resound throughout the editorial pages and the television and radio talk shows, and by our colleagues in the corridors and in the cloakroom so that we can try to work our way through an extraordinarily difficult situation where, as I see it, there is no good answer between the two intractable alternatives to set a timetable where our opponents simply have to wait us out or to keep proceeding down a tunnel which, at least at this juncture, appears to be endless and has no light. We don't know where the end is, let alone to have a light at the end of the tunnel.

What I am trying to do at the moment is to get from the administration, from the Department of Defense, and the Department of State an evaluation of what has happened since General Petraeus briefed us on what he intended to do before he returned to Iraq several weeks ago. There have been some preliminary reports that the strategy employed by General Petraeus is producing results. There have been some commentaries.

The Washington Post last Sunday in an op-ed suggested things are improving. Reports by NBC's Brian Williams suggest that matters are improving, not sufficiently definitive to come to any conclusion, but if there was a sign on the military side that we could see improvement and see a path to victory, that would have a material bearing on what this body would do or at least on the thinking of this Senator.

The resolution calls for a comprehensive strategy, and it defines it as "diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community for the purpose of working collectively to bring stability to Iraq."

I was pleased to hear the testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, when she appeared before the Appropriations Committee on which I sit on February 27, 2007, announcing the initiative of an international conference to be held in Baghdad and announcing for the first time that there would be negotiations by the United States in a conference which included Iran and Syria, which I think is a very important and sensible change in the foreign policy of the United States.

We saw the results in North Korea where we faced a very difficult situation with North Korea possessing nuclear weapons and the various tests they had undertaken. We saw the multilateral discussions and then, more importantly, saw bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea, which Secretary of State Rice obtained the authority of the President to engage in those direct bilateral talks so when she was traveling overseas, she did not go through the normal vetting and analytical processes in Washington which might well have stopped that direct bilateral discussion. It did occur, and it appears to have been instrumental in working out what may well be a diplomatic answer. It appears that way at the present time, although no one can ever be sure in dealing with North Korea.

I would like to have an up-to-date evaluation--and I am seeking one-- from the Department of State as to what is happening with those negotiations. Candidly, it is pretty hard when we have one of our sessions in room 407 upstairs, which is the secret room where we are briefed. We very seldom get much information there. I think it would be very useful if we could find information to bring us up to date as to what progress, if any, the administration is making. I know, to repeat, it would be very influential on my thinking as to what course I will take when the roll is called on these resolutions.

Beyond the evaluation of the factual situation, there are very complex legal questions involved in what is the authority of Congress. The resolution does not call upon the congressional constitutional authority on appropriations or the so-called power of the purse. We know there is authority in the Congress to cut off funding. I think there is unanimous agreement that we should not even broach the issue cutting off funding if in any way it would jeopardize the troops who are serving in Iraq.

The President's powers as Commander in Chief have been the subject of judicial interpretation. In the case of Fleming v. Page--it goes back a long way to 1850--but the Supreme Court said:

As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.

On the face of that statement by the Nation's highest Court, there is a real question as to whether Congress has the constitutional authority to order the "phased redeployment of the United States forces from Iraq."

The Supreme Court dealt with the issue on the power of the purse in the case of United States v. Lovett in 1946, holding that Congress cannot use its appropriations power indirectly to accomplish an unconstitutional objective.

So that brings into play squarely what is the constitutional authority of the President as Commander in Chief.

I think it is most unwise for Congress to even broach the subject of micromanagement of the war. When Congressman Murtha suggested some time ago that funding be conditioned on a whole series of requirements, it bore all the earmarks of micromanagement of the war.

The resolution at hand calling for a redeployment may well cross that line of micromanagement of the war. It is unclear. But there remains the very deep concern in the country, expressed by the electorate last November, expressed by citizens across the country that reflected in the resolution passed by the House of Representatives last month objecting to the administration's conduct of the war and considerable sentiment in this body so that we are searching for a way to approach this issue rationally.

We have to face up to the consequence that if we acknowledge defeat in Iraq, there are very disastrous consequences which will flow from that, disastrous consequences in the region, the issue of whether the terrorists will come at least in part from the Mideast to threaten us on the homeland. But, at the same time, we have to recognize that when the President laid down two markers in his State of the Union speech earlier this year, that the Iraqis accomplish two objectives: One, to stabilize Baghdad, and, two, to end sectarian violence. The Iraqis have not shown either the capacity or the will to accomplish those two prerequisites which the President set down as minimal markers.

My thinking is we ought to deliberate on this subject. We ought to hear each other out, and we ought to seek updated information from the administration to see whether there are any signs, in the several weeks since General Petraeus has undertaken the new strategy, whether there are any indications of what may lie ahead on the negotiations, now that there have been contacts by the United States with Iranian officials and presumably also with Syrian officials.

I would like to see this Chamber filled with Senators when we undertake this debate. I recollect the debate we had back in 1991, which was classified as historic, when we decided to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force. I know we are all very busy. I am about to go to a hearing of a subcommittee on Labor, Health, Human Services, and Education. This issue warrants the close attention of the Senate. We have been called the world's greatest deliberative body, and this issue now will give us a chance to see if we are entitled to that lofty title.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter I sent to the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, outlining underlying legal issues in the debate we are now undertaking, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. Specter: I thank the Chair and yield the floor.